

THE CHRISTIAN REVIEW.

NO. XXX.

JUNE, 1843.

ARTICLE I.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JESUITS.

THERE are certain periods in the history of the world, so prolific in great events, so abounding in mighty men, so fraught with portentous principles, that they seem engraved upon its pages in characters of light. They are periods when abstract ideas, long slumbering in the human bosom, have come gradually to assume a tangible form, and to work out changes in the social and moral condition of men. By the application of a practical philosophy, they have been brought to bear on the existing institutions of nations, and have effected those revolutions, mental and physical, which make these periods landmarks in history, eras in the progress of civilization.

Such was the epoch embracing the latter half of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth century. Perhaps there have never been condensed in the short period of one hundred years so many wonderful events, so many important changes, and we might almost add, so many illustrious men. There was certainly never an age, which has exerted so powerful an influence on our own times. Within that short period, the reign of Charles VIII, in its varied course, laid the foundation of the present political condition of the several governments of Europe, and thus drew a broad line between the modern and the middle age. The freedom of the north was created by Gustavus Vasa. The religion of the south

was upheld by the iron hand of Leo de' Medici. Columbus and de Gama laid open the boundless continents of America and India to European enterprise. And, greater than all, the art of printing appears among the discoveries of this age. But the fifteenth century contained the germ of still greater things, which were to bud and blossom in the next,—for which America and India were to furnish the ground of action, and by which all Europe was to be shaken to its centre.

These were two grand, conflicting ideas; their weapons were the press; their object, the rise or the ruin of Popery. The freedom of the mind, on the one hand, the absolute submission of the will to sovereign dictation, on the other, were the two great principles then preparing to agitate the world.

In 1483, in the town of Eisleben, amidst the forests of Germany, was born that man who was destined to be the champion of intellectual liberty. Eight years after, rocked in his cradle among the mountains of Biscay, slumbered the *incarnation of spiritual despotism*. And surely there never were two men on earth better fitted to become the leaders of the powerful parties, that rallied under their separate and opposing standards, than were Luther and Loyola. Men, alike possessed of gigantic minds, of unconquerable energy of will, of a determined perseverance which no obstacles could impede and no fear could intimidate, they stand forth, the master-spirits of the age. The morality of the church of Rome, for a long period, had been such as to cast reproach upon the Christian name. The holy zeal for the religious advancement of their subjects, the stern virtue and uncompromising integrity, which marked the earlier bishops of Rome, had given place to a desire for temporal aggrandizement. Ever since the ambitious Hildebrand had compelled the emperor Henry IV to stand bareheaded three days in the blasts of an Apennine winter, praying admittance, that he might humble himself before him,—or Alexander III had placed his foot on the neck of the haughty Frederic, with the expression, "*Super aspidem et basiliscum ambulabis*," the church of Rome had descended from its high purpose, and stooped to grasp at temporal dominion. A succession of daring pontiffs had made the ancient capital of the world once more the arbiter of Europe; and the sword they wielded over the heads of kings and princes, for the last four centuries of the Middle Ages, was hardly less potent than the power of Roman arms

over barbarian nations before the fall of the republic. But power engendered luxury, and luxury corruption, until the hierarchy, satisfied with the tranquil possession of authority won for them by more virtuous or more energetic leaders, relaxed its severe and purifying discipline; and, by an extension of the doctrine of indulgences, connived at open immorality and sensual gratification. A moral pestilence pervaded the entire mass of the Catholic church, and made all Europe a prey to licentious passions. No efforts at reform were made by the pontiffs. A refined dissipation had assumed the throne of a holy religion. The study of the fine arts, and the cultivation of belles-lettres, supplied the place of religious zeal and theological inquiry. An old statue, or a fine painting, was to them a higher source of enjoyment than the spiritual beauty of their faith; and a classic manuscript, discovered among the ruins of antiquity, was, to their atheistic eyes, more venerable than the law delivered amid the thunders of Sinai. Nor was Leo X an exception to this. The son of Lorenzo de' Medici inherited the taste and genius of his father, and with them the refined skepticism which prevailed among the Italian nobility of the time. His predecessor, Julius II, had begun that vast cathedral which received the name, and was to perpetuate the worship, of the founder of the hierarchy. Every thing which this brilliant era in the history of art could furnish, was applied to adorn the holy temple. The coffers of Rome were emptied, and St. Peter's was scarcely begun. To defray so enormous an expense, Leo resorted to a general sale of indulgences; and, from the proceeds of this nefarious traffic, the cathedral was completed. So gross an abuse of the papal power met with a stern rebuke from the pen of Luther,—and thus commenced the great Reformation in the north. Up to this date, 1521, no measures, except those prompted by the vindictive spirit of Leo, had been taken to prevent a result, which a careful observer of the times might have foreseen. But the keen eye of Loyola discovered the remedy, and his intellect and energy planned and completed the work. His early training had been such as to fit him for the task. Born of a noble family, his youthful days had been spent at the court of the Castilian queen, and had given him the manner and address adapted to the polished circles in which his influence was to be exerted. His early manhood was

passed in the camp of Ferdinand and his successor, where he learned the severest discipline of a soldier's life. He was a courtier and a cavalier. In the war which ensued between Charles V and Francis I, he bore an active part. At the siege of Pampeluna in 1521, he received a wound in the leg, and was confined for several weeks. Some idea may be formed of his energy and power of endurance, when we read that, in order to make the limb recover its former length (for it had contracted in healing), he actually underwent the torture of the rack,—having the refractory member daily stretched upon a rack, in the vain hope that it would recover its original symmetry. The hours of his sickness he passed in reading the books of chivalry; until, becoming tired of tales of romance, in which he could no longer bear a part, he took up the lives of the saints. And now a strange fancy seized him; combining the two, he resolved to become a knight-errant in the cause of our blessed lady,—to throw aside the sword and spear of kingly quarrel, and, with the creed and crosier, gird on the armor of spiritual warfare, and defend the holy church from the powerful enemies arrayed against her. His warm imagination conjured up an image of perfection to be attained on earth, and his fresh zeal struck out a plan for its attainment. His ambition pictured the renown which must attend the success of his enterprise, and, in the spirit of Spanish chivalry, he resolved to press onward. He arose from his bed, an altered man. The whole strong current of his mind and will was directed into a new channel. A scheme, having for its object the complete reformation of the papal church, and the establishment of the pontifical authority on a basis which could not be undermined by the efforts of the northern reformers, employed his constant thoughts. But first he must prepare himself for the herculean task. To do this, he retired from the world, and entered upon a course of rigid self-examination. The workings of his mind at this time form almost an anomaly in the history of mental action. At one moment, he hangs breathless on the strains of seraphic harmony which float from angel choirs above; in the next, he starts back with horror from the groans and curses of the damned. He passes through every stage of raving or of rapture which, with common men, are called insanity; but he pauses on its verge. He has purified himself from the lusts of the flesh,

and is now ready for his work. Worn to a skeleton by bodily illness and intense mental anguish, he leaves his ancestral castle, a wreck of the once graceful courtier and gallant soldier. In the simple dress of a pilgrim, with a hair shirt next his skin, and a staff to support his feeble steps, behold the founder of the Jesuits ! One vast conception fills his breast. Compared to that, all worldly pride is vanity. He pursues his way to Italy, preaching, as he goes, against the worldliness and corruption of the church ; and in his own person setting an example of self-mortification by which alone perfection can be attained on earth. Strengthened in his labors by supposed personal communion with the mother of God, he at length, through long prayer, fasting and intercession, obtained from her admission to the real presence. He falls at the altar of the church of St. Mary, at Rome, fainting before the ineffable glory thus revealed. He is borne away to a convent ; but not before it had been disclosed to him that he should make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and there, on Mt. Calvary, should receive divine instruction. For weeks his life was despaired of ; but mind triumphed over matter, and, strong in faith, Ignatius set out on his long journey. After months of hardship, he reached the promised land. On the spot where our Saviour was crucified, he claims to have received from him a revelation, that he should found a new society, the order of Jesus. The course to be pursued was made plain ; but it was first necessary that he should acquire the ancient languages, then little known to any but the priesthood. He returned to Spain ; and, though then past thirty, he entered a class of little boys, and remained until he had made himself master of Latin. He then went to Paris, and entered the university. Here he became acquainted with Francis Xavier, who was also the scion of a noble family in Spain, and then a teacher of philosophy at the university. This man is represented at this time as being exceedingly gay, uniting the gallantry of Spain with the frivolity of France. But Loyola was no careless observer of men. He saw in Xavier a powerful intellect, united with undaunted energy, and he marked him for his own. With a perseverance which nothing could withstand, he strove to awaken the spirit of Xavier to a knowledge of its own power. He appealed to his ambition, to allure him from the society of the gay ; and then, to enlist him in the army of

saints and martyrs, he ever repeated to him the text, "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" He succeeded. And, years afterward, over the deserts of India and the mountains of Japan, those warning words of his great master served to support the spirit of Xavier in his labor of love, through trials which are almost beyond conception. Iago Laignez, second general of the order, and Alphonso de Salmeron, with three others, being duly qualified by their spiritual leader, united with them in a solemn vow of poverty, chastity, and obedience. And never was vow more solemnly administered, more rigidly adhered to, more holy in its purpose, or more portentous in its results. The qualification required by Ignatius of his followers before taking the oath, is laid down in his "Spiritual Exercises,"—a work of about forty pages. Four weeks of retirement are required for the sinner to become meet to inherit the kingdom of heaven. In the first week he was to mortify his body, submitting himself to severe penance, scourging and fasting, to purify the lusts of the flesh, while the mind was constantly occupied in gloomy retrospect of sin. The second was to be devoted to the study of the life and sufferings of Christ, and preparing the mind to imitate his example; and in close self-examination to determine what course of life the penitent would pursue, what profession or occupation was best adapted to his capacity, and would enable him to further most successfully the cause of religion. In the third, he was to contemplate the gloom of the grave where the Saviour lay, and the depths of the damned, from which he died to deliver us. The fourth was to be passed in one unbroken ecstasy, glorifying the Redeemer for his adorable sacrifice, and singing hallelujahs to the most high God. Such was the system laid down by Loyola. This was the course he had himself adopted, and which he pretends to have received from the holy virgin in one of his ecstatic visions. His six companions, having passed the ordeal, were ready to receive the oath. In 1534, at the altar of St. Denys, on the hill of Montmartre, these seven champions of the church recorded their solemn vow.

Such was the foundation of the society of Jesus. From this small beginning, trifling in number, but powerful in intellectual and moral strength, arose an order of men, the like of whom has never been seen on earth. As the acorn,

just shooting its feeble tendrils in the mould, unnoticed by the careless peasant, when that peasant is in his grave, has become the giant of the wood, and is destined to bear over every sea the commerce or the thunder of the world, so the Jesuits, weak and despised at the outset, had become powerful when those who reviled them were forgotten, conducted the commerce of more than one half of Europe, and unfurled the banner of the cross, from the plains of La Platte to the shores of Japan.

The secret agency by which these prodigious results were accomplished, the vital principle of their constitution, the causes which led to their suppression by Clement XIV, and their ultimate re-establishment thirty years ago, belong to another portion of the subject. It may be interesting, instead of treating of these matters, to know more minutely the history of the order; and to do this we must confine ourselves to its progress in different countries, and to the biography of the eminent men who were its founders, or who were among its first generals.

Immediately after the vow of Montmartre, Loyola returned to Spain, leaving orders for his companions to join him in two years at Venice. This they did, performing the journey on foot, and inflicting on themselves all kind of severities and penance. Nor was Loyola backward in setting them an example of self-humiliation. He knew the means by which he was to secure ascendancy over them. Penance by day, and visions by night, miracles, wrought in the name of the virgin, and revelations obtained by direct communication with him who is invisible, strengthened his followers, confirmed the doubting, staggered the skeptic in his unbelief, and united all in doing homage to a man, whose mental superiority they acknowledged, and who seemed, to their dazzled fancy, to possess a power that was not of earth. At Venice he gained many followers, who, having passed the ordeal prescribed in the "Spiritual Exercises," were dispersed throughout Lombardy, preaching and practising the doctrines of the new order. They were commanded by Loyola to dwell only in the hospitals, and to subsist by charity. This done, in 1539, he, with a chosen few, set out for Rome, and applied to Paul III to establish the society by a papal bull. In addition to the three vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, taken by the other religious orders, Ignatius added a

fourth, to overcome in the mind of Paul the objections to a new society, arising from the abundance of those already existing. This fourth vow was in relation to missions,—that the members bound themselves to implicit obedience to the papal mandate, to be in readiness at all times to go wherever and whenever his holiness should require, to preach the gospel among the heathen, and extend the dominion of the Romish church. While the object of every other religious association was to seclude its members from the world, the sole aim of the Jesuits was to render themselves masters of the world. Herein lay a grand distinction, and upon it Ignatius relied for the success of his petition. Nor was his reliance vain,—for Paul, on hearing the proposed plan of the society, exclaimed, “The hand of God directs the work.”

In 1540, was issued the celebrated bull establishing the order of Jesus, and limiting its members to sixty men,—but this limit was afterwards abolished, leaving the society unrestricted as to number. In its government it was an absolute monarchy, owning but a secondary allegiance to the pope. Its head was entitled “general,” and his power was supreme over the lives and fortunes of its members. Loyola was made general by the unanimous voice of his followers, though with a well-feigned reluctance he consented to act. Remaining at Rome, he employed himself in constructing the rules and constitutions of the society. From this time we hear but little of the detail of his proceedings. Withdrawn from public gaze, in the seclusion of the Casa Professa at Rome, he was employed in conducting the operations of that great army of apostolic warriors, which his energy had created, and his genius was to direct.

Leaving Ignatius, let us now follow the steps of his more illustrious disciple, Francis Xavier.

The Portuguese, after the discoveries of Vasco de Gama, had established their colonies in India, and founded the city of Goa. King John III was the first prince who introduced the Jesuits into his dominions. He built for them a college at the university of Coimbra in 1541, the first institution of learning they ever possessed. Being desirous to reduce his East Indian subjects to the obedience of the Catholic faith, he gave the Jesuits the next year another college at Goa. Xavier was sent out to superintend its erection. As the vicegerent of Loyola in India, he displayed all the energy

and zeal which belonged to his master, combined with superior intellect, and heroic self-devotion. Clothed in coarse garments, and haggard with toil, he walked the streets of Goa, ringing a bell as he went, to attract the crowd of gay and licentious inhabitants. Exhorting the parents to renounce their sins, and collecting the children together, he instructed them in the ways of eternal life. Living in the hospitals, he attended the sick; and, wherever he went, he was received with reverence and blessing; while at the table of the rich, or the abode of the profligate, he was alike a welcome guest: for Xavier, be it remembered, was a Spanish nobleman, and a professor in the university of Paris. He was a man of the world, and could adapt himself to every situation. Now playing at billiards to secure a thoughtless listener, or joining in the revelry of a wealthy and corrupted colony, he became all things to all men, that thereby he might save some. He remained at Goa little more than a year, when, having completed the college, and established his society on a firm basis, he set out for new regions in which to fulfil his mission. To the pearl-fishers of Malabar he first directed his steps. His residence at Goa had given him some knowledge of the native dialects of India, and the miraculous agency of the holy mother perfected the acquisition. His bell and his crosier were his sole attendants. Ringing the one, he called the fishermen together; and holding up the other, he expounded the doctrines of a crucified Redeemer. He translated a little catechism for the use of the children, and taught them to make the sign of the cross, and to repeat the principal prayers and confessions of the Catholic church. On that distant shore, the confiteor, the pater noster, ave Maria, and salve regina went up from the hovels of the poor fishermen, as amid the pomp of Rome, on the golden altar of St. Peter's.

Having effected his object in converting them to the Christian faith, Xavier next visited the kingdom of Travancore. Again that silver bell rung the approach of the apostle of India. A new language was acquired, a new form of idolatry overthrown, a new kingdom added to the empire of the church. The learning of the Brahmins was turned to nought by the religion of Xavier. The Rajah and his people studied that wisdom "which maketh wise unto salvation." Pursuing his triumphant career, the great missionary

explored the islands of Mora, Manez, Ceylon, the Moluccas, and every part of India known to European voyagers. Wherever he went, his bell announced his coming, and gathered the crowds of wondering heathen to hear the word of life. Some, attracted by his strange and grotesque appearance, many, by the novel doctrines which he preached, more, by the mild and blessed truths he revealed,—all gathered around him, and shared alike in his instructions. Pagan temples fell, and Christian churches arose. Idols fed the flames, but lately kindled to consume their human offerings; and mothers, no longer throwing their children to the waves of the Ganges, or immolating themselves before the car of Juggernaut, thronged around the man of God, and besought him to baptize them in the faith, and to instruct their infants in the creed of Christ.

The achievements of Xavier seem almost miraculous; and it is but little strange that his admirers have ascribed to him many absolute miracles. For instance, he is said to have had the gift of tongues, to have raised the dead, and to have driven back armies of hostile nations by the word of his power, or the strength of his arm. Xavier possessed great quickness and readiness in acquiring languages; from his long attendance among the sick, he had become a skilful physician, and practised the healing art wherever he went; he also had been, like Loyola, trained in the camp of Ferdinand, and, on more than one occasion, had displayed his knowledge of war among the belligerent nations of India; and in two instances had dissuaded an invading force from pursuing their hostile intentions against the people whom he had converted. And it is these facts, exaggerated by the love of the marvellous, that have swelled into miracles, under the pen of some of his biographers. Some years had now elapsed since he left Goa, and his converts were become so numerous that he required assistance. He returned to Goa, —sent forth other Jesuits from the college there, to be the pastors of his people, and even wrote to his old friends at the Sorbonne to come out and reap with him the heavenly harvest. At Goa he was no longer received as the reviled fanatic, and mad enthusiast, but hailed as the apostle of Asia, and spiritual ruler of the eastern world. The fame of his conquests had gone before him, and his renown extended all over India, even to the islands of Japan, and the unknown

regions of central China. Japan had lately (in 1542), been discovered by the Portuguese, and three of the natives had come to Goa to see with their own eyes the wonderful Bonze, whose name had reached to their remote dominions. These three men Xavier determined should be the means of introducing the true faith into their pagan land; and he looked forward with eagerness to the time when he should accompany them home, and unfurl the standard of the cross where Christian missionary had never trod. With fresh zeal he undertook the work of their conversion. He placed them at the college of Goa, until they were sufficiently imbued with the doctrines of Christianity.

In the spring of 1549, this indefatigable Jesuit, with his three converts, embarked at Goa, and, after a perilous voyage of four months, landed in Japan. This country was thoroughly pagan; but the Bonzes, superior to the Brahmins in the matter of toleration, at least, permitted every form of worship that did not interfere with affairs of state. Once more the bell of Xavier announced the tidings of salvation. The people listened with admiration at the words of the western Bonze, who spake to them "of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come." The emperor looked with wonder on the picture of the mother of God, and heard with amazement of the sufferings and sacrifice of her Son. The missionary discoursed on the beauty of Christianity, and the penalty of its rejection, with the eloquence that once made Felix tremble. The sovereign was baptized into the faith, and thousands of his subjects followed the example. The religion of Xaca and Amida was shaken to its foundation, and the whole empire was about to embrace Christianity. But the priesthood rallied to the defence of their religion, and challenged Xavier to a controversy in the presence of the king. For three days he maintained, alone, against 3000 opponents, headed by the learned and subtle Fucarondona, the superiority of the Christian faith. The sophistry of the Bonzes was overthrown by the dialectics of the Jesuit, and Japan was laid open to Christian influence.

Three years had passed since Xavier sailed from Goa; and some trouble having arisen at the college, he returned, leaving the seed he had planted to ripen under the care of his converts. On his voyage he longed to go and preach the gospel in China, which was hitherto unvisited by the

missionaries. Settling his affairs at Goa, and appointing a general to superintend the Jesuit establishment in India, he set out for the conquest of China. But the life of Xavier was drawing to a close. He was destined never to enter that unknown country. Leaving Goa for the last time, he sailed to Malacca. There, unforeseen difficulties detained him ; but his energy triumphed. He embarked in a vessel bound for the island of Sancian, at the mouth of Canton river. Here, at last, his frame, exhausted by ten and a half years of incessant toil in India and Japan, crossing seas, and piercing the interior of untravelled and uncivilized countries, exposed to hardships for the love of God which few would dare for the love of gold, he sunk, a martyr to the cause of Christ. He died on the shore of Sancian, in December, 1552, aged 46. His last words were, "In thee, O Lord, have I put my trust ; let me never be confounded." We have dwelt longer on the character of this wonderful man, than would be justifiable, were it possible to say less. He was the most interesting of the Jesuits ; perhaps the most enthusiastic, enterprising, and successful missionary that any church has ever sent forth. Though a fanatic to appearance, it was in the cause of humanity.

"His life was gentle ; and the elements
So mixed in him, that nature might stand up,
And say to all the world, *This was a man !*"

Leaving Asia, where the Jesuits, by the labors of Xavier, had become numerous, let us now return to Rome. As soon as their rights had been confirmed by the bull of Paul III, the company made simultaneous efforts to establish themselves in every city of Italy, and almost every country of Europe. In Spain, they encountered great opposition. Exercising their uncontrolled prerogative in the administration of the sacrament, the hearing of confessions, and other privileges and immunities, which had hitherto appertained solely to the regular priesthood, the Jesuits brought upon themselves the indignation of the bishops, whose rights they had invaded, and of the doctors, whose teachings they had supplanted. Sentences of excommunication were denounced against all who should receive their instructions, or attend their confessionals. But the genius of Jesuitism prevailed over the spirit of Romanism. The untrained troops of the Spanish

convents were no match for the military discipline of the company of Loyola. The contest was like that described by Milton, between Death and Satan, at the gates of Hell, where each brandished his infernal spear for conflict, till, learning from sin their near relationship, they ceased contending, and the power of hellish rhetoric gave Satan passage. In other words, the pope, Julius III, interposed his authority to still the combatants. At the request of Loyola, his holiness wrote to the archbishop, "that he was informed, with no less surprise than grief, that he was the only one who used the society of Jesus ill, which had been so solemnly approved by the popes, so much esteemed, and so well received in Catholic countries." Loyola commanded his company to carry the case before the royal council of Spain. They examined the bulls and privileges of the Jesuits; and, finding the proceedings of the archbishop contrary to the authority of the holy see, made a decree in their favor. This decree, joined with the letter of Julius, obliged the archbishop to revoke the ordinances he had made against them, and to let them enjoy their exemptions. Such were the difficulties which the Jesuits encountered from the bishops and others, in nearly every diocese of Spain; and thus triumphantly did they surmount them; until they had established colleges in all the principal cities, and awakened to renewed activity the dormant energies of the church. Where they met with hostility, they seemed to triumph in exact ratio with the virulence of their enemies. Thus had they done in the cities of Italy, and thus they did in Spain. "Experience teaches us," said Ignatius to Ribadeneyra, his friend and biographer, "that oppositions prepare the way every where for the establishment of the society; and the more it is traversed in a place, the more progress it makes therein."

In most of the Italian cities they found a ready welcome. At Genoa, the noble family of Doria gave them a college. At Padua, Florence, Mantua, Naples, every where but in Venice, they met with like success. The viceroy of Sicily persuaded his subjects at Messina and Palermo to build them splendid establishments, and Corsica also was laid open to their enterprise. In Venice alone did they encounter serious opposition. Here, where they had resided sometime, previous to their confirmation by the pope, they were at first

well received; and would probably have continued in favor, but for the unfortunate quarrel between the republic and the pope, Paul V, in 1603. Paul V was one of those daring pontiffs, who essayed to wield the temporal, as well as spiritual sceptre over the powers of Europe. Venice, ever jealous of her independence as a city, though her people were too often regardless of their liberty as citizens, resisted the papal encroachments, and an open rupture ensued. The Jesuits, as stanch supporters of the Roman party, were banished by a decree of the senate, in 1606. They fled to the neighboring states, and employed themselves in fomenting the political disturbances of the city; thus manifesting, for the first time perhaps, except in France, that course of policy which has since stamped the name of Jesuit with indelible reproach. By the mediation of Henry IV, of France, Venice was reconciled to the pope. But the Jesuits were not recalled. Gregory XV, successor of Paul V, aided by the vigorous efforts of Louis XIII, endeavored, but in vain, to procure their re-establishment in the city. It was not until the pontificate of Alexander VII, that the Venetians, attacked on all sides by the Turks, and driven to implore the aid of Louis XIV and the pope, both zealous friends of the society, consented to their re-establishment in 1657. But during this long period, their progress in every part of Europe had been wonderful.

It may not be improper, in this place, before relating their further history, to mention the mode in which they established themselves so successfully wherever they went. For this purpose, we shall quote the words of Rasiel de Selva, a French historian of the last century, whose extensive learning and research have made him high authority on every matter relating to the Jesuits. In his singular work, entitled "*The Spiritual Quixotte*," he says, "Their colleges and houses were, for the most part, in their first establishment, inconsiderable; but the Jesuits had no sooner set foot in a place, than, like a new Archimedes, they put the whole earth in motion. Their custom was first to hire a house, and pay the rent of it with the charities which they begged from door to door. This house soon became too small to hold the crowd of scholars, whom the bait of being taught gratis drew to it. Assisted by the interest of their scholars' relations, they easily obtained a larger house, where, being still pressed for room,

they engaged the city, in consideration of the public emolument, to found a college for them. This college grew by degrees larger and larger, by joining to it the adjacent houses, which they found means to appropriate by pious frauds, at the same time that its revenues were augmented by the donations and legacies, which, at their instigation, the bigots, whose consciences they governed, bestowed upon them." Their own records and earlier history show the truth of this statement. It was in this way, that they steadily and rapidly insinuated themselves into every important city of Europe, until, from being the unknown and unnoticed preachers, they became the popular and courted instructors.

We have related their introduction into Portugal, Spain, Italy, and India. It is impossible to treat of their history in strict chronological order; for their efforts were directed at the same time to almost every country. In some cities and kingdoms, we have seen, they effected a ready entrance, while, in others, their settlement was opposed; and, in detailing the events connected with that opposition, we are necessarily led somewhat beyond the date of their establishment elsewhere. But it is important to know the difficulties they overcame, in order to understand the characteristic feature of the society—their energy.

The progress of the reformation in Germany had shaken the Catholic religion to its centre. Immediate and powerful aid was required to defend the Romish church from its vigorous assailants, and preserve it from a complete and final overthrow. William IV, duke of Bavaria, had sworn to put down the Protestants in his dominions, by the press or the sword. He wrote to Rome for assistance, and Loyola sent him Salmeron and two others of his ablest men. A college was built for the society at Munich, while at the same time the emperor Ferdinand invited them to Vienna, and also gave them large establishments at Prague and Inspruck. In a short time, they founded colleges in all the chief cities of Germany. They were equally successful in the northern kingdoms, in Russia and Poland. But in spite of their untiring efforts, the Protestants daily increased in number. Ignatius knew too well the ability of his emissaries to attribute their discomfiture to a want of capacity; but ascribed it rather to their deficiency in the German language. He resolved to establish at Rome a college for the education of German youth in

scholastic divinity. Julius III gladly endowed this institution, and twenty-four pupils from different parts of Germany were placed under the direction of Loyola, to complete their education, and return to their own country, defenders of papal infallibility. Such was the foundation by Ignatius Loyola, of a seminary, which, from its plan and object, gave rise soon after to the far-famed "*Collegia de Propaganda Fide*," founded by Francis Borgia, and only differing from the first, in that it was extended to the students of all nations, while that of Loyola was confined exclusively to the Germans. The effect of this course of action was soon manifest; for, although it was impossible to recover those portions of Germany which had already enlisted under the standards of Luther and Calvin, yet they so effectually maintained the Catholic theology, that the further advance of Protestantism was greatly retarded; and, in less than a century, a large portion of southern Germany remained in indisputable possession of the pope.

We now come to the history of the Jesuits in France. Their progress and conduct in this kingdom furnish the best commentary on the nature and object of the society. It was here that they displayed to the fullest extent the political intrigue and religious casuistry, which at length occasioned their downfall. As soon as the society was established, Ignatius, desirous of introducing it into France, sent some of his novices to study at Paris. But as these were Spaniards and Italians, they were compelled to quit France the next year, when a war broke out between Charles V, and Francis I; for the king at once banished all the subjects of the emperor from his dominions. Their plans being thus for a while defeated, they retired into Flanders.

Here they finished their studies, and proceeded to establish the society throughout the Netherlands. They subsisted for some time by charity, until, in their usual way, they acquired sufficient influence to obtain colleges in the most important places. The interest of the highest nobles, especially those of the Spanish party, was on their side; so that in a short time, from being humble mendicants, they became extremely rich and powerful. They then by artifice gained entrance to Holland. In the disguise of merchants, they obtained commercial passports to visit that country; but their conduct soon exciting the suspicion of the States-General, they were

accused of plotting treason against the republic. At this time the Low Countries had revolted from the tyranny of Philip II, and commenced a war, which, after eighty years of almost unremitted conflict, resulted in the independence of Holland. Philip was a bigoted papist, and an ardent friend of the Jesuits. A decree was therefore issued by the States-General, "that all those who belonged to the destructive and bloody order of the Jesuits, that were to be found in the United Provinces, should depart from thence, and that such as resided out of their dominions should for ever remain without them, under the penalty, with regard to both, of incurring corporal punishment." Although this strong edict was often renewed, the Jesuits were not restrained from entering Holland, where they remained in secrecy, and strenuously opposed the Jansenists, who were protected by government.

At the close of the war between France and Spain, in 1544, other novices were sent to Paris. For six years they remained in obscurity, pursuing their studies under the auspices of the bishop of Clermont. They obtained this influential patron through the ability of Lainez and Salmeron, who had won him over to the new society while attending at the Council of Trent. By his assistance they erected colleges, and obtained letters patent from Henry II, allowing them their privileges. The king's council refused to confirm this grant, and the matter was referred to an ecclesiastical tribunal. The Gallican church has ever been jealous of the interference of Rome. Since the holy see was established at Avignon, and the French nation for seventy years had enjoyed the power of electing their own pontiffs, they were disposed to look upon every thing Italian with a national dislike. Although, as good Catholics, they admitted the infallibility of the pope, and acknowledged his supremacy in matters of faith, yet it was with eagle eye they detected any attempt at civil encroachment. That the general direction of the church should be in the hands of the sovereign pontiff, they were willing to allow; but would never admit his control over the ecumenical councils. The government of each diocese, they affirmed, should pertain solely to its own bishop; and they opposed, with the zeal of polemics, any infringement of, what they called, their common rights. With this spirit in the church, it is easy to foresee the result of the

reference. The bishop of Paris reported, "that the bulls of Paul III contain things which ought not to be tolerated or received in the Christian religion ; those who obtained them, arrogating to themselves the title of the company of Jesus, which belongs to the universal church, of which our Saviour Jesus is the head, seem as if they would constitute that church solely in themselves. In their privileges they have many things contrary to the common right, and prejudicial to the authority of the bishops, curates and universities." After this severe repulse, the policy of the Jesuits led them to remain quiet, until the accession of Francis II. Encouraged by the Guises, who ruled France at this time, they once more presented their bulls and letters, which, in consideration of the voluntary surrender of certain rights at first claimed by them, were favorably received, and a decree passed granting them legal settlement. Soon after, under Charles IX, they applied to be received as a religious order. This petition was referred to a general assembly of the Gallican church, and refused. Still, however, clinging to the decree of Francis II, they established themselves ; and, in defiance of the Sorbonne, commenced teaching philosophy and theology with much success. This incensed the university. The Jesuits requested legal collegiate incorporation. The case was carried before parliament, and argued on both sides with great ability. In the plea of the counsel for the university, who strongly opposed the petition, is foretold the danger which would some day result from their interfering in politics ; and this prediction was amply verified in the part which the Jesuits acted during the bloody wars of the league, in the very next reign. The request was refused ; but they were allowed to remain in the same state they were in before the case was commenced. From this time, A. D. 1564, they may be considered as finally established in France. An account of their subsequent difficulties, arising from their interference in secular affairs, pertains to another portion of the subject.

In the very year of the vow of Montmartre, 1534, England, under Henry VIII, had forsworn her allegiance to the pope of Rome. To recover this revolted province of the holy see, was among the most cherished designs of Loyola ; but it was one he was not destined to see accomplished. Under Henry and his successor, Edward VI, the efforts of the Romanists

to restore their church were abortive. Nor, at the accession of Mary, though the Catholic religion was again established, were the Jesuits more successful in their own designs: for cardinal de la Pole, whom, at the queen's request, Julius III sent into England to reconcile the two churches, was strongly opposed to the new society. His death might have resulted favorably to the Jesuits, had not Mary died at the same time. The thunders of the Vatican were hurled at the throne of her successor. The famous excommunication of Elizabeth, by the bull of Paul V, was the signal for the Catholic rising in the north. It was likewise the signal for the entrance of the Jesuits. The rebellion was easily suppressed; but the seeds of future strife were sown. In 1580, two English Jesuits, named Parsons and Campian, were sent into England, bearing with them, from Gregory XIII, confirmation of the bull of excommunication. Their language was violent, and their actions bold. The queen took strong measures to prevent the progress of their rebellious sentiments. A general pardon was offered to all offenders who would surrender any Jesuit to the officers of justice. Campian was seized, tried, convicted of preaching treason, and finally hung at Tyburn, a year after he had entered the country. Parsons escaped; but many others of the society were executed. One after another fell victims to the intrepid zeal, or rashness, with which they upheld the infallibility of the church, or the invincibility of the holy order of Jesus. Few instances can be found of more reckless courage, or more enthusiastic self-devotion, than was manifested by the Jesuits under the severe administration of Elizabeth. Of the many conspiracies which crowd the history of her eventful reign, there were few that were not traced, by legal investigation, to the intrigues of that society. James I banished them from his dominions; but his evident bias in favor of his Catholic subjects emboldened them to remain; and, in connection with the restless spirits of the time, to wreak their vengeance on the king and parliament in the atrocious gunpowder plot. The Jesuits have always denied their participation in this diabolical treason; but the testimony of Guy Fawkes, and others of the ringleaders, is conclusive on the point of their knowledge of the scheme. In 1610, the affair of Ravillac, in France, led James once more to banish the Jesuits; but they have, ever since, in some shape or other, continued in England

under disguise. Their success in that country, however, has been trifling, when compared with their triumph in other kingdoms. Their existence in Great Britain was a continual struggle with the crown. There is no date from which we can reckon their complete establishment, unless it be that of their revival in 1814; since which the toleration of the government has allowed them to have a college in Lancashire, and several boarding-schools in the kingdom. The cause of their ill success in England, they themselves attribute to the progress of the reformers in that country, who, under Wickliffe, were more than a century in advance of those of Germany.

Not content with their introduction throughout Europe and India, the Jesuits pushed on to the conquest of Africa, China, and America. In the former, their success was but partial, and temporary. On that wild continent, the untamed and untameable fierceness of its savage tribes presented a more impassable barrier than the idolatry of the enervated and luxurious east. The darkness of paganism brooded too deeply over the sunken and degraded African, to be dispelled, even by the fearless and untiring labors of the company of Loyola. Martyr on martyr fell, in the vain attempt to carry the word of life to these benighted regions. The curse of Noah still clung to the sons of Ham. Slaves to the Portuguese in body, slaves to Beelzebub in soul, the barbarous hordes bent in bondage to the one, and bowed in adoration to the other. On the eastern coast, the Jesuits could never effect a settlement. On the western, they gained access to Guinea and Congo through the traders of the coast, but effected little. With the Caffres they did more; but in Abyssinia they succeeded best.

The earliest records of this singular country display the traces of a crude civilization. Whence it sprung, or how it was maintained amid surrounding barbarism, is lost in tradition, or answered only by the unstable theories of philosophers and travellers. But this superiority, although trifling, afforded ample scope for Jesuit enterprise. The political condition of the kingdom favored their cause. The prince, pressed on all sides by the warlike tribes around him, applied for succors to John III, of Portugal. An army was sent to his assistance, and with them came the soldiers of the cross. The prince had fallen, but his son was on the throne. The young king,

by means of the Portuguese troops, subdued his foes, and then showed himself too wily for the Jesuits. They continued some years among the mountains, preaching in secret, until a civil war afforded them the chance of more open labors.

A new sovereign gave them his protection. But that instrument of tyranny, the Inquisition, which every where attended the progress of Romanism, was introduced, and it gave the death-blow to the Jesuits. The people, indignant at the introduction of an engine so despotic in its authority, and so cruel in its tortures, were seized with a general hatred to the Catholics, and to the Jesuits especially, as their leaders. Since 1622, the last vestige of popery has vanished before the anger of the outraged nation. A species of Christianity still exists in Abyssinia; but the hatred to Catholicism is deep and lasting.

About thirty years after the death of Xavier, at the very gates of China, the Jesuits made another and more successful attempt to force their way into the celestial empire. In 1583, three of the society pierced to the very heart of the country, where perhaps no other European since the adventurous Marco Polo, three centuries before, had ever trod. One of them, Ricci, devoted himself for ten years to the study of the Chinese language, and reading the books of the philosophers. The accounts given of these show a striking resemblance between the philosophy of that country, and some of the systems of ancient Greece. But in vain did they seek to find a near approach to the doctrines of Christianity. An idolatry, which none but a Jesuit could have found the means or the conscience to apply to the religion of Christ, prevailed over the land. The sect of the learned alone rejected in spirit the outward forms of worship, which they preached and practised; and these were, in belief, materialists, or atheists. The ready invention of Ricci contrived a mode of surmounting every difficulty. He expounded some of the doctrines of Christianity; and because Chinese vanity revolted from doing homage to a being who had died by the hands of men to save the lost, he excluded from his preaching the story of Christ's sufferings and death, and pictured him only as the glorious Lord of heaven. By this means, he accommodated the Christian doctrines to the followers of Foe. But it was forbidden in the empire to teach the religion of Europe. Punishment would surely

follow the destruction of the idols of their fathers, and thus would be lost the only opportunity of inculcating truth. To obviate this difficulty, Ricci allowed the new converts to continue the outward forms of idolatry; carefully enjoining on them to conceal behind the image of the god a crucifix; and, in their devotions, to offer their prayers secretly to that, while seeming to worship the idol stone before them. Thus he reconciled the true religion to those who bent the knee at the altar of Chinhoam, or bowed in adoration at the shrine of Confucius. But this mixture of idolatry and Christianity, however it might satisfy the pliable conscience of Ricci, did not meet with commendation from the church generally, or accord with the ideas of sincere but less politic Jesuits. Such was not the course adopted by the fearless and uncompromising spirit of Xavier; nor did it meet with approval from the most worthy of his followers. On the death of Ricci, his successor, as head of the Jesuits in China, avowed open hostility to the time-serving principles of his predecessor, and preached loudly against the whole system of Chinese idolatry. The society, in the meanwhile, had risen high in favor at the court, possessed establishments in Peking, and ranked among its converts many of the noblest mandarins of the empire. On their first entrance, ignorant of the principles of caste, as held by that aristocratic people, they had adopted the dress of the Bonzes. But this they soon found was rather a disgrace, and they exchanged it for the robe of the learned. Clad with this honored vesture, they won their way wherever they desired; and, by their knowledge of the arts and sciences, and by well-timed presents of European mechanism, had attained to the highest station, and were looked upon as magicians from the west. The zeal of Longobardi well nigh destroyed the influence acquired by the policy of Ricci. But, at his death, the old order of things was revived by his successor, who adopted the system more congenial to Chinese custom. The Dominicans and Franciscans, learning the abuse of Christianity permitted by the Jesuits, sent thither missionaries of their respective orders. They contended with ardor for the purity of the faith, and censured the Jesuits for the laxity of their discipline. Declaiming against the idolatry of Foe and Chinhoam, denouncing the adoration of Confucius, and preaching Christ crucified and glorified, asserting the purity of the faith, and

holding up the religion of China to condemnation or contempt, they experienced the displeasure of the emperor. Christianity in every form was repudiated, and its ministers persecuted. But the arts of the Jesuits turned the scale of persecution against their more faithful rivals, who were expelled from the empire, leaving them, through their interest at court, their scientific knowledge, and their accommodating method of religious teaching, sole masters of the field.

We have followed the Jesuits in their onward career, over three quarters of the globe. The new world opened to them a still wider range of conquest. Following closely the victorious arms of Cortez and Pizarro, they established themselves in Mexico and Peru. Early in the seventeenth century, they explored the North American wilderness. They first settled on the Penobscot, in 1611, and undertook, with some success, the conversion of the Iroquois. Their devotion was equal to that of their brethren in India. Their history is written in the blood of their martyrs. Every form of torture which savage ingenuity could devise, was heaped upon them; but, animated by a fervor which esteemed the crown of martyrdom a blessing, they won the admiration of the natives by their firm endurance. To admiration succeeded reverence, and to reverence, fear. The red man listened with awe to the teaching of the pale preachers, and many were baptized into the Catholic church. Such was the state of things among the Iroquois after more than a century of unremitted hardships, which the French Jesuits had undergone. But the seed they had sown was plucked up. Father Ralle, who, for more than fifty years, labored for the conversion of the Indians, fell, with all his church, in the massacre at Norridgewock, in 1724; and, with him, closes the history of the Jesuit missions in New-England.

In South America, the Jesuits established themselves rapidly in all the countries which were subdued by the Spaniards; but their most singular establishment was in Paraguay. Here they erected a commonwealth, which has justly astonished the world. It is the greatest of all their splendid achievements. Collecting together about fifty families of the savages, they taught them the arts of civilized life, as well as the doctrines of Christianity. They persuaded many other tribes to join them, and then gathered them into

one territory. They obtained from the Spanish crown the right of supreme jurisdiction over this territory, uncontrolled by the governors of Brazil and the neighboring provinces. With this power, they proceeded to form a sort of patriarchal government, and to make laws for their state. They instructed their subjects in European arts, but carefully excluded from them a knowledge of European vices. To do this more effectually, they forbade any foreigner from entering the territory without a special passport, and then only under the attendance of a Jesuit. All property was held in common; certain tasks were allotted daily to every individual, and the produce of each man's labor deposited in a general magazine for the good of the whole; whence, twice a week, were distributed the supplies necessary for the maintenance of each family. The country was divided into forty-seven districts, embracing many towns and villages. Over each district a Jesuit presided, who administered rewards and punishments to the people of his charge. In every town, a magistrate was appointed, always a native Indian, and elected by the people; but subject to the approval of the presiding Jesuit of the district. With this mixture of the patriarchal and republican forms, they built up a civilized, powerful, and virtuous state, although surrounded by savage tribes of Indians, and dissolute colonies of Spaniards. They were taught agriculture and the mechanic arts, and were subject to strict military discipline. They increased rapidly; and, in little more than a century, could bring into the field sixty thousand well-appointed troops. The politics of Europe at length wrought a change in the affairs of this people. A portion of their territory was ceded by the Spanish government to the Portuguese. The natives rebelled against this invasion of their rights, and took up arms. But the unpractised, though well-disciplined Indians, were no match for the veteran soldiery of Europe. They were conquered; and this El Dorado of the west was laid open to the tyranny, rapacity and vice of the myrmidons of Portugal.

Thus have we traced the origin and progress of the Jesuits from the causes which, operating in Europe to bring on the Protestant reform, and the counter-reformation in the Catholic church, led directly to the foundation of the society. We have marked its steady and rapid advance, from the time when a little band of seven men first recorded their solemn

vow on the hill of Montmartre, till it had spanned the globe with its enterprise.

So great was its increase, that, at the death of Ignatius, sixteen years after its foundation, the society had spread throughout the world, was divided into twelve provinces, or governments, and possessed one hundred colleges. Fifty years later, it had nearly three hundred colleges, and over ten thousand members; and finally, in 1710, it conducted more than six hundred colleges, sustained two hundred missions, and numbered twenty thousand members.

ARTICLE II.

WORKS OF CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH.

Personal Recollections, by CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. New York. 1842.

Principalities and Powers, by CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. New-York. John S. Taylor & Co. 1842. pp. 298. 12mo.

THE assumed name which stands at the head of our article, has, of late, acquired a deserved celebrity. This is owing to the intrinsic excellence of the works of this lady, which are decidedly evangelical, and written with very considerable ability, and also, to the personal interest she has thrown around herself by the "Recollections" of her life, and the mystery of a feigned name. She is an unknown, except to her personal friends in Great Britain, and to a few, also, we believe, in this country.

We are glad to greet a female writer of such ability, and of so decided a religious character. Among her own sex, especially, we may expect for her a favorable hearing. And it is surely no slight evidence of the actual progress of society, that, among the gentler sex, so many cultivated minds have recently thrown their softer radiance upon the path of virtue and duty. This important element of intellectual and moral culture was almost wanting in ancient times. A woman rarely wrote. What an influence for good might

have been exerted among the daughters of Athens, if, in their seclusion and degradation, some educated and virtuous woman had lifted up her voice, and spoken to them with the energy and sympathy of a kindred heart! What might not an Aspasia, a Theodota, or a Leontium, have done for the female sex, and thus for humanity at large, if their distinguished talents and cultivation had not been basely prostituted! How nobly and persuasively might they have spoken in behalf of their degraded sisters. What an interest they might have awakened in the mind of such men as Plato and Socrates, in vindication of the rights and dignity of woman. Instead of this, their accomplishments only isolated them more completely from their own sex,—in feeling, as well as in refinement. They were morally corrupt.

It was left for Christianity to inspire woman with higher impulses. That divine system, being adapted to the human race, benefits all alike. It raises the fallen, it strengthens the weak, it passes by none on the other side. The oil and the wine of its divine sympathy have quickened woman to a higher life. Under the influence of the gospel, many female writers have arisen, to carry forward the work of intellectual and moral regeneration. How many monuments now exist in Christendom of the vigor of woman's mind, of the richness of her fancy, and the refinement of her taste, of the delicacy of her perceptions, of the warmth of her sympathies, and often, of the fervor of her piety.

In her "*Recollections*," our author furnishes a sketch of her life. We will briefly refer to it, as it may throw light upon the second work named above. Charlotte Elizabeth informs us, that she was early distinguished for an exuberance and buoyancy of spirits. This often overstepped the prescribed limits of the gentler sex, and led her forth to engage, in the open air, and in the wide fields, in sports generally forbidden to girls. This was not attributable to a want of feminine delicacy, but to a natural love of independence, and perhaps, also, to her almost sole companionship with a brother of intrepid character. "I was," she says, "more active, and, perhaps, more energetic than young ladies are generally expected to be." But, by her own confession, this independent spirit was "often carried to the excess of self-willed obstinacy." We find a curious proof of this in her daring recklessness, during a storm which occurred while on her

passage to Nova Scotia, to meet her husband at his military station.

She was also "speculative and imaginative in an extraordinary degree." In her youth, she lived in a world of her own creation, and peopled it with the beings of her own fancy. Shakspeare was a favorite author, and did his share in making "every day a drama." To her, there was no sober reality, even in actual life. Her imagination made it unreal and extravagant. Her head was full of romance, so that when her brother, to whom she was devotedly attached, was eager to enter the military life, she encouraged him in his choice. She was dazzled by the false splendors of war.

As we should naturally expect from such a character,—so imaginative, and so independent,—she grew up to cherish strong partialities and antipathies. She has a great veneration for old England, and an equal abhorrence of the French,—love for Protestantism, and hatred of Popery. Of the latter, especially, she has a mortal horror. Yet she manifests, withal, a genuine catholicism, and a truly Christian zeal for the conversion of papists. While she abominates the system, which is the "convicted child of the devil," her very soul glows with love and pity towards its wretched dupes. She also breathes a noble spirit of liberality towards dissenters,—though she is a zealous church-woman,—and administers wholesome rebukes to the bigoted exclusiveness of the *apostolical* papists of Oxford. She has no sympathy with Puseyism and high-churchism. She is an Episcopalian, of the evangelical stamp of Newton, and Scott, and Macaulay, and Wilberforce. We would that the careless, worldly clergy of the church of England might profit by her merited severity.

In accordance with her mental idiosyncrasy, was her religious experience. Her convictions of sin were pungent. She was thrown into despair. She was restored to an ecstasy of joy.

In her religious views we see, also, her natural temperament. She never staggers at harsh truths,—at unpalatable doctrines. She is a rigid Calvinist. She is a firm and enthusiastic believer in personal, unconditional election.

Her conceptions are bold, and strongly expressed. She is no mincing girl, amusing us with pretty turns of thought.

Her style is natural, simple, expressive, always forcible, and often beautiful.

Yet we think, there is rather a stern severity in her cast of mind, which predisposes her to be, at times, dogmatical. She thinks clearly, strongly, honestly, and gives full utterance to her conceptions. She is sure that she is right; and feeling that truth is something of solemn moment, she speaks plainly and authoritatively. She has no fellowship with that false tenderness, which would withhold or disguise the truth, through fear of giving offence. We think she has been sometimes led, by her natural temperament, to an extreme of confidence, at least, savoring of dogmatism. She never scruples to call things by their right names. She loves, and freely uses the good old Saxon. Yet she never offends by coarseness, or vulgarity.

We think, too, that she has a rather too comfortable opinion of her genius, and anticipates fame too surely. In her "*Personal Recollections*," she seems so much afraid of being the victim of a post-mortem biography, that she would forestall every such attempt, by taking the dissecting-knife into her own hands. With the utmost gravity and earnestness, she conjures her friends not to give to the world her letters and private history, under the penalty of violating a sacred confidence; and then she opens the scene of her life, so far as she will condescend to do it, for the benefit of posterity.

Her vivid imagination and masculine independence, qualities admirable in their proper degree and place, rather disqualify her for being always a safe guide. She thinks vividly, and for herself; yet, sometimes, with too much self-reliance. She is predisposed, also, to what is bold and striking. Her judgment does not always bear sufficient sway. The grand and the awful find, in her mind, a kindred element.

She is, however, a woman of a deep and fervid piety, mellowed by affliction and the grace of God. Her talents she has consecrated to the best of causes. Her heart sympathizes with suffering humanity, especially with the spiritually deluded. Her faith is strong and childlike. She stands upon a rock.

Bearing in mind these considerations, let us come to the examination of her "*Principalities and Powers*." This work is divided into two parts, and each part into ten sections. In

the first part, she treats of evil spirits, under the several heads of their existence and character, their power and employment, satanic daring, cunning, cruelty, activity, knowledge, the limit of satanic power, satanic wrath, as the end draws nigh, the doom of Satan and his angels. In the second part, she treats of holy angels, of their existence and character, knowledge and power, obedience, sympathy, interest in the Jewish people, of Christ seen of angels, the apostles a spectacle to angels, angelic ministry in the last days, angelic triumph, and lastly, of Christ the king of angels.

The subject of this work is one, confessedly, of great importance. The candid reader of the Bible cannot, for a moment, question the existence of good and evil spirits, and their agency in human affairs. They invest man with a surpassing and mysterious interest. They exert no inconsiderable influence in the system of human probation. The visible and the invisible worlds are intimately conjoined. In the latter are man's most terrible enemies. The blessed Saviour and the apostles often speak with fearful emphasis upon this subject, and give us awful glimpses into the unseen world, where restless agencies are at work, forging the weapons, or laying the snares, which may destroy, or enslave man. Surely, then, the diligent study of all the revelations of God upon this point, is intensely important. It is cause for lamentation, that Christians and Christian ministers are so full of apathy, or unbelief, about it. Their creed may acknowledge the whole truth ; but, after all, it is, too generally, only a matter of speculation, not of intense reality. We are glad, then, that our author has so forcibly called attention to this subject. In her "*Personal Recollections*," she says,—

"Of all the errors into which the world has fallen, none is more fatally mischievous than the habit of overlooking the personality, the energy, the power, the watchfulness, the deep cunning of the devil. By a conventional system, no doubt of his own suggesting, he is never to be named but in the act of worshipping God, or that of spiritual instruction. Any other robber and murderer, who was known to be on the watch to attack our houses, would be the subject of free discourse ; his habits, his haunts, his usual plans, his successful, and his baffled assaults, in former cases, would be talked over, and thus a salutary fear would be kept alive, influencing us to bolt and bar, and watch and ward, with unflinching vigilance, to avert, or surprise. But Satan seems to be a privileged person ; we learn in the nursery to fancy him a hideous

caricature of human nature, with horns, hoofs, and a tail, inspiring disgust, and a childish fear, that wears off as we advance into youth, leaving an impression, rather ludicrous than alarming, of the ugly phantom that, nevertheless, continues identified with him, of whom we read in the Bible. We then, perhaps, take up Milton, engrafting his poetical conception upon the original nursery stock, and make a devil, half monster, half archangel, invested with the ugliness of the first, and the sublimity of the second; but still, far removed from the scripture character of that roaring lion, 'who goeth about seeking whom he may devour.' We do not *realize* his existence, his presence, his devices; and so we often do his work from sheer ignorance, or inexcusable thoughtlessness about it."—p. 61.

She says again, in her "Principalities and Powers," on the same point,—

"A variety of nicknames have been applied to him [the devil], the substitution of which, for his scriptural title, is considered as showing greater respect for the auditors, and greater refinement in the speaker; and he has been so identified with the most flippant, most trifling, or profane forms of speech, even among polished gentlemen, that one of the hardest tasks the awakened Christian has to encounter, is, to disconnect the name of the devil from such associations, and to dissuade others so offending. As regards his works, a still more dangerous mistake seems to prevail; he is looked on by the professing world in general as little more than a chimerical personage. . . . Nay, even among spiritual persons, there is a lurking unbelief on this subject, which gives the enemy many an advantage over them. They are loth to believe that when engaged in promoting a good work, Satan is at their hand, resisting them; that by his whispered suggestions, their humility is often depressed into cowardice, their zeal quickened to rashness, their confidence urged on to presumption, and their prudence chilled with unbelief. In whatsoever quality the Lord has enabled them to excel, that very excellence Satan will weave a snare for their feet; and the snare once laid, he has abundant agencies at work, to draw or drive them into it. Theoretically, perhaps, this is not denied; but point out a living instance of such delusion, and you are presently reproved, or frowned into silence."—pp. 19, 20.

There is much truth in these remarks, especially in regard to the early associations of the nursery, and the practical unbelief of Christians. Yet there is danger of going beyond the Scriptures. Fanaticism has always drawn its mightiest power from the spiritual world, and thence excited the fears of men. There is something so terrific in satanic agency, that a mind, not well balanced, may easily become the victim of a fearful superstition. It may be utterly unfitted for the sober cultivation of piety, and may imagine itself waging direful battles with the powers of darkness. The imagination may revel in the horrible scenes of an invisible world. It may people the earth with devils, as the theatre of their

infernal plots, so that the human, the visible, the real, may be quite forgotten. Such effects have not been infrequent. In different ages, the subject of demoniacal agency has powerfully wrought upon the minds of men, and given rise to fearful exhibitions of human weakness and depravity. It would be an instructive task, to trace the history of opinions on this subject, and to gather, from that review, safeguards against perversions. We can only glance at it. Throughout the Old Testament we find distinct allusions to the existence and agency of evil spirits. The Jews, with a few exceptions, believed in it. The New Testament confirms it. Our Saviour in the most explicit manner sanctions it. Language is a riddle, or Jesus an impostor, if the doctrine of demoniacal influence is not revealed in the New Testament. The apostles, also, frequently allude to it, and draw from it arguments to watchfulness and prayer. In the plan of human probation, Satan and his angels are declared, with solemn emphasis, to exercise a mighty influence.

After the time of the apostles, the belief in the existence and agency of evil spirits, and also in what are more specifically called demoniacal possessions, continued to prevail in the church. It was a common opinion, that evil spirits might be cast out in the name of Christ. This power was not supposed to be limited to any class of Christians officially, but to be a miraculous gift of the Holy Spirit. Bingham, in his *Christian Antiquities*, gives the opinions of many of the Fathers on this subject. Origen says, "Private Christians did, by their prayers and adjurations, dispossess devils." Socrates observes of Gregory Thaumaturgus, "that whilst he was a layman, he wrought many miracles, healing the sick, and casting out devils, by *sending letters to the possessed party only!*" Tertullian, and other ancient apologists declare, that if the heathen would bring into open court, before the magistrate, any person possessed with a devil, any ordinary Christian should make him confess that he was a devil, and not a god. Tertullian also relates the following instructive anecdote. "A Christian woman went to the theatre, and returned thence possessed with a devil. When the unclean spirit was rebuked in exorcism, for presuming to make such an attempt upon a believer, he replied, 'I had a right to her, because I found her on my own ground!'"

During the first three centuries, the practice of exorcism, or dispossession of demons, was not limited to any particular order ; but, after that time, a separate class was devoted to it. They were called exorcists. Cyprian (in Ep. 76 ad Mag.) says, "Even at this day (third century), the devil may be scourged, burned, and tortured by the exorcists, with a human voice, and divine power." The ordination of this distinct order in the church, is thus described by the fourth council of Carthage. "When an exorcist is ordained, he shall receive at the hands of the bishop, a book, wherein the forms of exorcising are written, the bishop saying, 'Receive thou these, and commit them to memory, and have the power to lay hands upon the energumens.' These forms were certain prayers, together with adjurations, in the name of Christ, commanding the unclean spirit to depart out of the possessed person."

These *energumens* were members of the church, or else catechumens in a state of preparation for a public profession, who were supposed to be possessed with an evil spirit. The exorcists were chiefly concerned with the treatment of such persons. They were to pray over them, and keep them employed in some innocent business, as in sweeping the church, and the like, to prevent more violent agitations of Satan, lest idleness should excite the tempter ; and also to provide them with daily food while they abode in the church, in which they seem to have chiefly resided.*

Our limited space forbids our pursuing this historical investigation further into the customs and opinions of the early church. To come down to later times, all are familiar with that supposed diabolical agency, called *witchcraft*, which has made so much noise in Europe and America. Here a compact was thought to be entered into with the devil, by virtue of which the devoted person was to abjure every thing sacred, and be dedicated to the service of Satan. From the thirteenth century, even down to the eighteenth, the belief in this satanic influence has resulted, at different periods, in the most terrible scenes of cruelty and bloodshed. In Geneva, 500 witches were burned in three months, about the year 1515. It is supposed that 100,000 victims of this delusion must have suffered in Germany alone, after the fifteenth century. In England, it is estimated that 30,000 have been

* Bingham, Vol. I, p. 237, seq.

put to death. As late as 1722, a witch was executed in Scotland.*

We hardly need refer to Salem witchcraft, so familiar to all, nor detail the terrible scenes, to which the popular belief gave rise. Neither need we wonder at the vulgar opinion, when we know that such men as Matthew Hale, Blackstone, Addison, Baxter, Calamy, and others, were believers in witchcraft. Blackstone, the great commentator on British law, says, "To deny the possibility, nay, the actual existence of witchcraft and sorcery, is at once flatly to contradict the revealed word of God, in various passages, both of the Old and New Testaments; and the thing itself is a truth to which every nation in the world hath in its turn borne testimony, either by examples seemingly well attested, or by prohibitory laws; which, at least, show the possibility of commerce with evil spirits."†

While, then, we must, if we receive the Bible, admit the existence of evil spirits, and their interest in human affairs, yet we learn, from a review of the past, the need of exceeding caution in fixing the limit and details of their influence. We should keep strictly within the prescribed limits of holy writ; and that never would justify any such belief as modern witchcraft. Neither would it authorize the civil magistrate to take cognizance of the supposed cases of diabolical agency. It is entirely a spiritual concern, wholly without the province of the civil authority.

In the case of the witch of Endor, we see nothing to contradict this view. It is, indeed, altogether probable, we may say, quite certain, that Samuel was actually evoked from among the dead. It was not, however, by the incantations of the witch, but unexpectedly to her, by the immediate purpose and power of God. She was astonished at the consequences of her invocation. This scene, then, so wonderful and mysterious, furnishes no proof that the so-called witch of Endor possessed any supernatural power. The remarks of Sir Walter Scott, on this passage, are worthy of consideration. We would refer our readers to his work on Demonology and Witchcraft.

But we should as widely err, if, in striving to avoid a superstitious belief, we should be led, with some, to deny

* Amer. Cyclop., Vol. 13.
VOL. VII.—NO. XXX.

† Com., B. IV, ch. 4, sect. 6.

altogether the existence of evil spirits, and to resolve them into harmless abstractions and principles. Still, it may be well to remember, in reading the work now under consideration, the peculiarly imaginative tendency of the author's mind, which predisposes her to believe what is startling and terrible in satanic agency. With this precaution, we shall find her work a very useful one, and well adapted to call attention to a subject too much neglected. We would, also, while in a critical mood, suggest another caution. We think that a person, on laying down her book, would be apt, if he should fall in with all her views, to ascribe too exclusive an influence, in his evil thoughts and actions, and in the casualties of life to an infernal power, instead of often tracing the former directly to his own heart, and the latter to the particular providence of God. He would make Satan a convenient sort of scape-goat, bearing all his sins ; a view rather too consonant with our self-approving spirit. He would be less afflicted, to be sure, with the painful task of self-examination and self-condemnation.

In passing, we would enter our protest against that coarse and familiar style of alluding to Satan, which is characteristic of a well known class of preachers. They speak of him, not in the solemn and chastened language of inspiration, but in that which is fitted, and apparently designed, either to harrow up the soul by hideous descriptions of his person and actions, or to provoke laughter by low attempts at witticism. They equally offend the refined mind and the pious heart.

Under the section which treats of the power and employment of evil spirits, we find the following spirited passage. Apart from the sentiments it contains, it is worth perusal, as presenting a fair specimen of our author's style. After citing several instances from the Bible, of satanic power, she observes :

“ These occasional glimpses of the invisible world are exceedingly awful ; instead of regarding the adversary as a contemptible being, we can scarcely overrate his importance. Possessed of a power that we cannot rightly estimate, and filled with a malignity the most direful and implacable, he is not a solitary individual, waging alone the war of rebellion and ruin ; he has hosts unnumbered at command ; and doubtless, he knows too well the value of order and subordination, not to avail himself, as a skilful general, of his whole disposable force. What then is his employment, and to what does he bend these superhuman energies, and mighty means ? The answer may be found in any part of the Bible,—we trace him by his operations where he is not actually named ;

and we know that so far as concerns us all, it may be summed up in these three words,—hostility to man. He sought to deface the work of creation in its bright morning prime; and to a sad extent he succeeded: the work of redemption was undertaken, through the tender mercies of God, to repair that deadly breach; and to resist it, is the perpetual aim of Satan and his angels. Alike to him is the task to impede a great national movement towards Christ, and to lure a little child from the way of righteousness. In either case, he puts forth his subtle power, and never loses sight of the object. Foreknowledge he does not possess; that is the prerogative of Deity alone; but his calculations must be wonderfully accurate, considering that to the high angelic faculties of his nature, he adds the experience of some six thousand years of intimate concern in the affairs of men; and a perfect acquaintance with all knowledge and all mysteries, attainable by created intelligence. Before him are spread out all the phenomena of nature; the stars in their courses, the ocean in its depths, the earth in all her hidden recesses, and all the complicated operations of her vast elemental laboratory, are visible to him. Long ere the shadow of a cloud encroaches on the unruffled sky bounded by our horizon, he perceives the coming storm, and prepares to seize such victims as he hopes may be delivered to him during the terrible convulsion. While all above is peace and serenity, he watches the internal combustion, and gloats over the slumbering city about to be inundated with a flood of burning lava, or swallowed in the yawning chasms of this quaking earth. He looks into man's wonderful frame, and with a practised skill that no refinement of mortal art can attain to, marks the seeds of incipient disease, as they take root, and tend, perhaps, unsuspected by the heedless individual, to the harvest of death—too often, alas! a harvest of wrath and ruin. Omnipresence is not his, but motion quicker than our thoughts he can no doubt command; and with an army of zealous followers, so well trained to execute his behests, he may leave it in their hands to work out some deep laid schemes of his devising in one quarter, while he speeds to the uttermost parts of the earth to pursue the same employment, perhaps in a distinct form; perhaps, so as to harmonize with, and to help forward the preceding mischief.”—pp. 27—29.

Some valuable remarks are made on satanic cunning, to put us on our guard against the devices of the “evil one.”

“Bold and potent as he is, Satan rarely goes to work in a straightforward manner. He is still the old serpent, accomplishing by craft his insidious purposes, gliding stealthily on the path of his intended victim, and concealing himself beneath the innocent flowers with which the Creator has bountifully clad that path.”

In another section, we are told how the power of Satan is restrained and overcome.

“It is our faith that effectually baffles the strongest efforts of Satan. . . . It is evident that man, being himself the lawful captive of Satan, and naturally inclined to follow his suggestions and to do his bidding, has nothing in himself calculated to oppose any effectual resistance to his power; and it is only as Christ, the conqueror of Satan, dwells in him by faith, influencing his desires and strengthening him with strength in

his soul, that any may venture to face so terrible a foe. All other means of defence are utterly vain ; Satan knows no fetter in his actings among men, but that which Christ has thrown upon him ; and there is nothing so sure to drive the sinner to seek refuge in his Saviour, or to keep the believer close to him, as the clear comprehension of this momentous truth—that Satan, ‘ going to and fro in the earth, and walking up and down in it,’ meets no restraint but where he meets Christ enthroned in the heart of a ransomed sinner.”—p. 95.

. Our author belongs to the class of English Literalists, who believe in the speedy advent of Christ. She does not profess to fix the precise time of that event, but confidently affirms its hasty approach. Ere that, however, she thinks that Satan will redouble his exertions to retain his waning power. He will ply every artifice to deceive the nations. He will excite “ wars and rumors of wars.” He will fill the earth with terror from “ earthquakes, famines, pestilences, supernatural signs,” and all the fearful array of judgments which holy writ enumerates as presaging the coming of the Son of man. He will, in her opinion, be empowered to perform “ signs and wonders” of a supernatural character. She regards the Irving heresy, which excited so much attention in London a few years ago, as a “ preparatory manœuvre of the enemy.” She observes on that subject :

“ The manner of bringing in this perilous deceit, was exceedingly like what the Scripture leads us to expect of Satan’s latter-day devices ; and it is remarkable, that just as the Lord placed an evident barrier to stay the farther spread of this delusion, another masked battery against the truth of Christ’s gospel, subversive at once of his atoning and his mediatorial all-sufficiency, was opened at Oxford, and has worked, and is working to the same end with the Irvingite heresy, only with a different kind of assumption. In the former attempt, the gospel was to be set aside by a new revelation, accompanied with attesting signs and wonders, as from the hand of its Almighty author : under the latter system, men claim a power, in virtue of a commission delivered to the apostles, of new-modelling all things, thinking ‘ to change times and laws,’ after the same manner and on the same ground as the papacy, that convicted child of the devil ; and into which the whole thing will probably soon resolve itself in the face of all men. These small droppings are at once a portent and a sample of the coming shower, and we shall do well so to regard them, and to take timely shelter under the shadow of the immovable rock.”—p. 110.

Among the “ signs ” of the great event, are reckoned the perversion and adulteration of the gospel, through a satanic influence, among the ministry of the present day.

The devil, in this instance, does not appear as a direct opposer, but artfully conceals the poison of error under the

semblance of truth. Such is the Oxford heresy ; such, in our author's opinion, is much of the popular preaching of the present age. It is true, as she remarks,—

“The preaching of the cross is a cross to the preacher, if he do it aright ; for he must be content to forego much of what is highly esteemed among men, and to be nothing, that Christ may be all. Line upon line, line upon line, precept upon precept, the wearisome repetition of that one story, ‘Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners ;’ that one warning, ‘He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth upon him ;’ that one direction, ‘Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out ;’ such a mode of dealing with a world dead in trespasses and sins, will never give the preacher an undue pre-eminence among men ; but it will glorify his Master, and save souls. Where now shall we go for this heaven-inspired strain ? Many such ministers there doubtless are, whose rule of preaching is, ‘Christ exalted and self abased ;’ but we may more readily find the thing which Satan fears in the pages of John Bunyan, or John Flavel, than from the lips of eloquent pastors of our day.”—p. 113, 114.

These remarks undoubtedly apply with great force to the established church of England. Our pious author must have been shocked, as was Cowper before her, at the dreadful worldliness of many clergymen of her own church. In our country, among the evangelical sects, we think that the style of preaching is far less exceptionable than in England. There is here more plainness of speech, and a fuller exhibition of Christ.

We would not sympathize with the harsh and wholesale denunciations of our ministry, which some modern lecturers deal out so freely. Our evangelical preachers, as a class, are men of eminent devotion. Still, there is room for just complaint. There are not a few who are diverted from the one single object of exhibiting Christ crucified, to matters of adventitious and ephemeral importance. There is too much preaching of self, too little of Christ ; too much courting the popular ear by beauty of diction, the display of intellectual acumen, and the discussion of entertaining topics ; too little willingness to be any thing or nothing for Christ. Yet he who preaches the cross, year in and year out, presents no meagre theme. The bearings, and relations, and sympathies, of this great cardinal doctrine are numerous, and they ever open to the thoughtful Christian in rich variety.

While we would agree with our author, in ascribing to the devil no small influence in the perversion of the gospel, yet we can hardly coincide with her in the opinion, that a

Laodicean apathy characterizes the modern ministry. It may be so in the English church; and England, we know, is almost the whole world, at least to an Englishman; but we may venture the opinion, that in America the Christian ministry is "about its Master's business," with some good degree of his spirit. Would that its incumbents possessed tenfold more of his devotedness!

We have but little space left to examine the second part of the work, which treats of holy angels. Many of the views presented, respecting the character and offices of angels, do not differ from the commonly received opinions. The following observations, in regard to false representations of angel-forms, are very just:

"The same presumptuous folly that has clothed evil spirits with fantastically frightful grimace, has invested the holy angels with a puerile silliness of appearance, wholly at variance with every scriptural representation. Baby faces between a pair of birds' wings, destitute of bodies; slim girls with long flowing ringlets, and pinions well feathered; these are the imaginary likenesses of things in heaven, which we are warned not to represent to ourselves; and the terribleness with which the Lord, for his own glory, has invested these ministers of his, is wholly lost sight of."—142.

"But where shall we look for the likeness of an angel? Beautiful they must be, because all God's unblemished works are so; and calm they must be, for holiness and happiness are always calm; but this earth, defiled by sin, and broken into helplessness, contains nothing to furnish us with a conception of the character, that spotless purity and overmastering power must impart to those who possess both. The expression of a very young and lovely infant's countenance, is the nearest approach that earth can make to heaven; but alas, the taint is there, though, as yet, comparatively undeveloped; and who could picture the feeble lump of clay, arrayed in the terrors of a warrior of heaven?"—p. 145.

"The effect produced on Daniel by the appearance of an angel, and on the sons of Ornan, on Manoah and his wife, and on the apostle John, who even after the vision of the Lord himself, and all the glories of heaven, was twice so overcome by the greatness of his angelic companion, that he fell down at his feet to worship him, all, with many other instances, tend to impress us with the belief, that an angel, however beautiful, is still exceedingly awful. He is the warrior-subject of a king, whose sovereignty is resisted; how can the servant's aspect be that of repose, so long as his adored master is resisted, grieved, and wronged, by the insolent rebels of earth and hell? No, a victory has to be won, before the holy angels sheathe their flaming swords, or lose the terrors of their stern and wrathful looks, now bent on every side to track the mazes of the insidious foe, and to repel him from the invisible boundary of the Lord's inviolable fold."—p. 146.

Charlotte Elizabeth has interwoven her belief in the literal and speedy reign of Christ on earth with the general discus-

sion of angelic agency. We can now only allude to this topic. It would demand an entire article for its full examination. We can say, however, that our author has not furnished, in the work under review, many arguments to aid us in coming to a decision. We have glowing descriptions, but little calm reasoning. The imagination would seem to have been allowed its full privilege in such interpretations of Scripture as are attempted.

There is, however, apparent, throughout all the works of Charlotte Elizabeth, a perfect sincerity of purpose. She writes from a strong conviction of duty, and a firm belief in her opinions. They are important in her esteem, and she would that all might so regard them.

We dismiss the works before us, thankful for the pleasure and profit they have afforded us. They are not faultless, but they have many redeeming excellences.

Since this article was prepared for the press, the writer has ascertained the true name of the distinguished authoress. Her maiden name was Charlotte Elizabeth Murray. She afterwards became Mrs. Phelan, the wife of an Irish officer in the British army. She is now Mrs. Tonna, and resides at Blackheath, near London, where she devotes her time to the benevolent task of preparing for the public, works of a moral and religious character. C.

ARTICLE III.

NEANDER ON THE PARABLES OF CHRIST.

Translated from his "Das Leben Jesu Christi, in seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange und seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung." By H. B. HACKETT, Professor in Newton Theological Institution.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

DR. NEANDER, of the Theological Faculty in the university of Berlin, is known to foreigners chiefly as an eminent ecclesiastical historian, in many respects undoubtedly the first of the age. He has by no means, however, confined his studies to

this department ; but has been accustomed, from the beginning of his career as a teacher, to lecture also on some portion of the New Testament ; and his merits here are hardly less decided, or in his own country less generally acknowledged, than in history. No professor in Germany,—certainly no theological professor,—has larger classes than Neander ; and his exegetical course on John, in the summer of 1842, the writer found to be even more numerously attended than his lectures on church history, which he was delivering at the same time. The publications of Dr. Neander have been confined almost exclusively to historical subjects ; and, inasmuch as the sphere of a teacher or lecturer must always be more circumscribed than that of an author, he has naturally acquired much less reputation abroad as a biblical interpreter, than in those studies in which he has appeared before the public. Indeed he has published no single work, so far as we know, which can be considered as belonging strictly to the department of exegesis. Those of his works which make the nearest approach to this, are his “ History of the planting and training of the Christian church by the Apostles,” and his “ Life of Jesus Christ in its historical connection and its historical development.” These are of a mixed character, essentially historical in their design and arrangement, but occupying necessarily much of the same ground, which would be embraced in a thorough commentary on the books of the New Testament. The “ History of Christ ” sustains this relation to the gospels, as does that of the “ Planting of the Christian church ” to the Acts and the Epistles, especially those of Paul ; and, taken together, they constitute one of the best introductions, or accompaniments rather, to the study of the New Testament writings, which has yet been produced. From these works, the reader can form a very correct idea of the characteristics of Neander as a critic. With the mere parade of philology he has much less to do than the Germans generally. Learning is manifestly with him the servant, not the master. He uses it merely as an instrument for unfolding the sense of Scripture, and expends his strength mainly in an endeavor to develop the ideas and the spirit of the sacred writers, and to trace out from them the great truths and principles which elevate Christianity above all that is local and temporary in its character, and adapt it to the designs of its author as the religion of all mankind. This is a favorite view of the

gospel revelation with Neander, and, as he seldom loses sight of it for a long time, cannot fail to impart a noble comprehensiveness and expansion to his style of exposition, even when we suspect that his love of principles and generalization may have led him astray. We speak of him more especially as he appears in the lecture-room, but to some extent also as we see him in the works which have been mentioned. To his theological views on some points, and to some of his principles of criticism, exception would justly be taken. With reference to this, it is sufficient to say here, that in his own country, as to all those subjects which define the religious position of men, which form the test questions between supernaturalists and rationalists, between the friends and opposers of the truth, he is considered as holding most decidedly with the former; and the influence which his reputation for learning, and his unsurpassed popularity as a teacher give him, is exerted in favor of Christ and the interests of his kingdom.

The translation which follows, does not profess to give a detailed exposition of the parables. Its value will be found to consist rather in the use which may be made of it as a guide to the study of these most interesting, and in many respects, difficult portions of the teachings of the Saviour. The subject could not well be more fully discussed by any one within the same limits; and a fuller discussion of it, within any limits, would hardly answer any very good purpose for those, whose object is to acquire an ability to explain the Scriptures for themselves, instead of relying on others to perform this process for them.

The parables of the Saviour deserve, and require much more attention than they are accustomed to receive. In the first place, they are one of the chief sources of our knowledge,—we do not say, of Christian truth in general,—but of the instructions, certainly, which have been transmitted to us from Christ himself. It is surprising to observe how great a portion of all which we have on record, as taught by him personally, was delivered in this form. Hence one of the evangelists, on remarking that Christ spake many things to the multitude in parables, adds, that without a parable, that is, comparatively, spake he not unto them. Nor again, are they by any means so obvious always in their meaning, so readily comprehended and explained, as some have imagined. On the contrary, there are no parts of the New Testament,

if we except those which, from their doctrinal character, have been so often obscured and perverted by polemical ingenuity, which require for the development of their meaning, greater skill in interpretation, more careful study and discrimination, or which, from the want of this in interpreters, have occasioned greater diversity and inconsistency of views, than these figurative discourses of Christ. Any one may satisfy himself of this who will take the trouble to look into the works within his reach, of those who have treated of this subject, and compare together the results of their labors. The translator would hope, therefore, that he has not performed a useless service, in presenting to the readers of the Review the extracts from Neander's "Life of Christ,"* containing the portions which relate to the parables.†

§ 1. *Parable defined,—its relation to the fable and the mythus,—points of agreement and difference.*

The parables of the Saviour we may define as representations, by which the truths relating to the kingdom of God are exhibited in a vivid manner to the eye of the mind, by means of special relations and analogies of common life, whether derived from nature or the world of mankind. A general truth is here presented under the similitude of a single fact, or a continuous history, and usually of one which belongs to a lower sphere of life, it being sometimes the operations and powers of nature or the qualities of irrational creatures, and sometimes the actions of men in their mutual relations to each other, on which the likeness is founded. Some would extend the idea of the fable so far as to include the parable, as the class comprehends the species; but still the parable, especially as Christ employed it, has always its entirely dis-

* See a notice of this work in the December number of the Review for 1842.—TR.

† Some of the principal writers and sources of information, in the literature of the parables, are the following. SUICERI—Thes. eccl., *παράβολή*. HERDER—Letters on the study of Theology, L. 16, 41, 43. KRUMMACHER—Spirit and Form of the Evangelical History, § 197—225. LÜCKE—Outline of New Testament Hermeneutics and their history, § 109, 112. STORR—Ds. herm. de parabl. Opusc. acad., T. 1, p. 89 seq. LOR. BAUER, Collection and Explanation of the parabolic discourses of our Lord. J. F. KROME—All the parables of Christ translated, explained, &c. for the use of religious teachers. LISCO—the parables of Jesus exegetically and homiletically treated. This work has been translated from the German, in the Edinburgh Biblical Cabinet. HESS—History of the last three years of the Life of Christ. B. 3, c. 3, B. 7, c. 2, and c. 4. B. 9, c. 1, et. alibi. OLSHAUSEN—Biblical Commentary, v. 1, p. 644. THOLUCK's Literary Index, 1839, No. 56 seq. The works above named are in German, except when the titles indicate that they are in Latin. See HASE's "Das Leben Jesu," pp. 127—130.—TR.

ting characteristics. It is allied indeed to the fable as used by Æsop, in as far as they both differ from the mythus, by employing the facts on which they are founded, professedly as mere illustration, as a covering only for the presentation of a general truth, which is all that the hearer or reader is to receive as real. But the parable distinguishes itself from the fable, in the fact, that in the latter the qualities and actions of beings of a higher class are attributed to those of a lower class, as for instance human qualities to animals; while in the parable, on the contrary, the two spheres of life, of which the lower serves to illustrate the higher, are always preserved distinct from each other. The agents and powers here introduced act always as the law of their nature dictates; but what takes place according to this law is employed as a figure of that which is true in a higher sense. The fable may represent something which, as when animals are described as thinking, speaking, acting like men, could never have occurred in this manner; while the parable exhibits all, as proceeding just as it is accustomed to take place in the natural world, in civil and domestic life. The hearer sees here before him events, operations, phenomena, which remind him of that already known to him in the circle of his familiar experience. It has been assigned, but incorrectly, as a characteristic of the fable, in distinction from the parable, that in the former animals are invested with personal attributes. In the parable, they may also be introduced thus, as is done for instance in our Saviour's parable of the shepherd and the sheep. But the great difference consists here, also, in that which we have already remarked. When employed in the parable, they act always in conformity with the law of their nature; and the two spheres of life, that of nature and that of the kingdom of God, are kept distinct from each other. Hence, also, it is not on account of any qualities which animals possess, in themselves considered, that they are ever employed for the illustration of moral truth. But since man stands in the relation, as it were, of something divine to the brute creation, since he exercises an immediate influence over them, appears to them as a being of a higher order, who is destined to control and guide them, and a powerful unconscious impulse of their nature leads them often to seek his society and protection, the relation of animals to men may serve as a figure for

representing the still higher relation of men themselves, to the kingdom of God and the Redeemer. Of this we have an example, when Christ introduces the sheep entirely in their usual relation to the shepherd, and employs this relation out of a lower sphere of existence, to illustrate what takes place in a higher, i. e., the relation of human spirits to their divine protector. This difference between the fable and the parable has its ground both in the form and substance of the illustration. It relates to the form, because the object of the parable is to direct the mind from that which is seen in daily life, in nature, in social intercourse, to a higher truth, in order that this may thus be more easily understood, and the impression of it be constantly renewed by the objects of daily observation. It relates to the substance, because the sphere of divine life with which the parable is concerned, could not be preserved in its proper dignity, were it transferred to beings in which there exists nothing of a correspondent nature; though single traits of domestic or social virtue may find a point of approach to them in the qualities of brutes,—a remark true, however, of these single traits only, and not by any means of the nature of morality, which, like religion, is something too exalted to admit of being represented by any qualities of the brute creation.

§ 2. *Multiplicity of the parables of Christ,—order in which they were delivered,—in what their perfection consists.*

We see in Matt. chap. 13, various parables presented together; and the inquiry hence arises, whether Christ can have uttered so many parables at the same time. We can conceive, indeed, that he may have employed several such illustrations on the same occasion, for the purpose of unfolding more distinctly the same truth, or kindred and closely related truths under different forms. The diversity in this case would serve to awaken attention, to bring the one truth by means of these varied exhibitions of it more closely before the mind, to direct the eye of the beholder from different points of observation more steadily to the object contemplated, and thus fix a more vivid and abiding impression of it in the memory. But that Christ should have delivered in succession so many parables, different in form, as well as design, or, although in a certain degree similar in form, yet essentially

different from each other in their object and reference, is not to be supposed ; because the design of this method of instruction would have been thereby frustrated, and the minds of his hearers confused.

In what we have remarked respecting the peculiar nature of the parable, it is easy now to see in what the perfection of this mode of discourse consists. In the first place, the fact selected from the lower sphere of life, should be, in its nature, properly adapted to symbolize the higher truth ; and in the second place, the illustration selected for this purpose, should be vividly presented, in all its traits, agreeably to nature. Hence, in order to understand the parables, the main endeavor must be to ascertain what the one truth is, for the exhibition of which the parabolic costume has been chosen ; and to this all the rest must then refer. The particulars which accompany the general fact in a parable, and serve to give greater fulness and distinctness to the picture, may aid us in obtaining a more comprehensive knowledge of the one truth ; we may see it under a great variety of aspects, as these appear in the correspondences which exist between the illustration and the subject to which it is applied. But we are never to seek the perfection of the parables of Christ in this, that all the traits which serve for embellishment, were intended to possess a strict significance, without having, at the same time, any very close connection with the proper point of comparison ; for this would be contrary to the object of the parable ; the understanding would be embarrassed, rather than aided by it ; the attention, instead of being fastened upon a single truth, would be distracted by too great a variety of objects. Such a method would be directly adapted to bewilder the hearer, and open a wide field for fancy in his interpretation of the words to be explained.

§ 3. *Classification of the parables with reference to the truths which they teach.*

We will now, after these general remarks, attempt to deduce from the parables of Christ, a connected system of truths, which find their common exemplification in the kingdom of God. (It is not supposed by the writer, that the Saviour had distinctly in view any such

systematic development of religious truth in his parables, as the analysis which follows shows to be contained in them. It is as a matter of convenience merely, for the purpose of avoiding repetition, and of passing the whole field of survey more rapidly and distinctly before the mind, that he adopts the classification which is here proposed.)

§ 4. (a.) *Parables which relate to the progress of the kingdom of Christ. Parables of the mustard seed, and of the leaven—in what they agree, and in what they differ. Parable of the sower, Mark 4: 26.*

The progress of the kingdom of God, or mode of its development, is represented under figures derived from the natural world,—the figure of the mustard seed, and that of the leaven. That common to both likenesses, is the designation of the power with which the kingdom of God, where the divine truth has been once received into the mind unfolds itself constantly, both within the soul itself, and in outward action; the greatest results proceed from that which at first appears as most insignificant. The point of difference is, that in the parable of the mustard seed the development is more expansive, in that of the leaven more intensive; in the first, we see the power with which the church, going forth from a feeble beginning, extends itself among the nations of the earth; in the second, the power with which the divine principle in Christianity pervades human nature in all its parts and powers, assimilates it to itself, and forms the individual, whom it animates, to be an instrument of its still wider extension among men.

With the parable of the mustard seed, is connected that of the sowing of the seed in general. But here we should first notice a parable which Mark only (4: 26), has preserved to us, and which bears upon it such undeniable impress of originality, that we cannot possibly regard it as a mere variation of one of the other parables of the seed, transmitted to us in a different form. In respect to the idea which lies at the foundation of it, it bears most resemblance to the parable of the leaven; since they both have the common object of describing the diffusive power of the divine word. As compared with the other parables of this class, it appears as more simple; and hence, we might be led to the conjecture, that this was the original form in which Christ first proposed

it, but that it was afterwards enriched and expanded by the addition of various new traits, of which we shall find similar examples. But it is certainly also possible, that, after Christ had delivered the parable respecting the unequal productiveness of the seed as determined by the quality of the soil, he might be led, by the figure of the seed still lingering in his thoughts, to apply it again, in order to characterize the process of development where the divine word has been truly embraced. It is thus that Mark presents it; and indeed the parable appears there in an appropriate connection. It harmonizes well with the preceding ideas, which also refer to the diffusive nature of the truth, the power with which, vanquishing all resistance, breaking through all restraints, it presses onward in its way, like the light which must shine. This idea prepares the way very naturally for the following parable. "It is with the kingdom of God, as when a man casts seed upon the earth. And while he sleeps and awakes, while day and night passes, the seed germinates, and it becomes a great plant, so that he who scattered the seed knows not how it is effected; for the earth brings forth fruit of itself, first the blade, then the ear, then the full fruit in the ear. But when the fruit is ripe, men thrust in the sickle, for the harvest is ready." Without doubt, Christ wished by this parable to impress the disciples with the conviction, that their province was to disseminate the truth taught by him; that when this was but once implanted in the mind, it would develop itself without further human agency, by its own inherent power, and at length accomplish that transformation in the soul, which realizes the end of its being. The promulgators of the divine truth act as the instruments of a power, whose effects they are not competent to measure or estimate. If they but proclaim simply the truth, and do nothing further, it cannot fail to produce, through its own inherent efficacy, a new creation in man, which it must fill them with amazement to behold. It would be impossible to express, in any more decided manner, the contrast between the gospel, in this respect, and the prevalent carnal views of the Jews respecting the external nature of the Messiah's kingdom; or to assert more pointedly the importance and power of the divine word, in opposition to the propensity of men to ascribe too much to human instruments and their effects

§ 5. *Kindred parables in relation to sowing of the seed; parable of the tares, Matt. 13: 19; the field the visible church, not the world in general. Parable of the net, as compared with the foregoing.*

From this parable we pass to those of a kindred form. And first, Matt. 13: 19, Mark 4: 3, Luke 8: 5, where we are taught how the divine truth, like the seed-corn, does not develop itself every where, where it is heard, in the same manner; but its effects on those who hear it are determined by their susceptibility for it. Hence, in one, the divine word produces no fruit at all; in others, it produces more or less, according to the degree of susceptibility with which it is received and appropriated. The parable, Matt. 13: 19, is, in its essential character, like the others, which relate to the sowing and springing up of the seed; but has one new trait from nature, which is made specially prominent. This is, that while the seed of the wheat germinates and brings forth fruit, the seed of the tares is also sown among it by an enemy; and shooting up together with the good fruit, is, by reason of the similarity between them, confounded with it, until its nature at last causes the difference to be seen.

In the interpretation now of this parable, the inquiry arises, whether, under the field, we are to understand the world in general, or the external manifestation of the kingdom of God, the visible church. If, with the Donatists,* any one would assume the former, the most natural view would be, that Christ intended to contradict the common Jewish idea in regard to the speedy separation of the righteous and the wicked, as also the near approach and consummation of the kingdom of God on earth, by teaching, that the members and the enemies of this kingdom were to remain for the present intermixed in the world; and that the sifting of the one from

* These were a party of schismatics, who arose in the fourth century, on occasion of the election of *Cacilius* as bishop of Carthage. The minority resisted violently this appointment, chose a bishop of their own, and finally carried their cause before the emperor Constantine. The origin of the name has been disputed; but it was derived, probably, from two bishops, of the name of *Donatus*, who took the lead in the contests which grew out of this dispute. The Donatists were distinguished for the strictness of their views in matters of church discipline generally, and especially differed from their opponents in regard to the proper treatment of those, who, after baptism, had apostatized, or in any way fallen into open sin. They maintained, that the church ceased to be a true church, if it tolerated in its midst, or received back, even on a profession of repentance, those who had violated their baptismal engagement. Hence, they had a strong polemical interest in understanding the parable of the tares, so as to exclude from it all reference to the mixed moral state of the kingdom of God on earth.—*Mosheim*, Vol. I, pp. 337, 338. *Gieseler*, Vol. I, p. 167.—Tr.

the other was reserved for a future decision. But this explanation is at variance with the plainest indications of the parable ; for it is not said, that the wheat is sown among the previously existing tares, as the representation must have been, were it the introduction of believers among the wicked, which is here meant to be affirmed. It is just the reverse of this. It is said, that the wheat is first sown, and that afterwards the tares are scattered among it by the enemy ; it is presupposed, that the latter, on account of a similarity to the former, might be confounded with it ; and hence, also, the owner of the field could express naturally the apprehension, that in any attempt to root out the tares, there would be danger of tearing up the genuine wheat together with them. Accordingly, there cannot be any reference here to those who have nothing in common with the subjects of the kingdom of God, who are as yet its declared opponents ; but those only can be meant, who make an outward profession of faith, who appear to belong externally to the kingdom of God. Indeed, the words of Christ, v. 41, contain the express declaration, that those who occasion an offence to the others, those who have devoted themselves to sin, shall, at the final separation, be thrust out from the kingdom of God, which implies certainly, that they had been hitherto intermixed in this kingdom with the true subjects of it. Nor does the remark of Christ, to which the advocates of the other interpretation appeal, that "the field is the world," stand, by any means, in contradiction to this ; for it is true, that the kingdom of God, in its external manifestation, belongs still to the world.

We shall not err, therefore, if we designate it as the fundamental thought of this parable, that Christ designed by it to foretell the future history of the church on earth ; that in the progress of Christianity its pure effects would be sometimes marred by foreign admixtures ; or, in other words, that spurious professors would associate themselves with the genuine subjects of his kingdom ; and that these, although different in spirit, would remain united with the former by a common creed, and an external connection with the church, until cut off by the decisions of the final judgment. It is a fact, of which the Saviour earnestly forewarns his disciples, on numerous occasions, that they will not all, who

pretend to the name of Christians, be acknowledged by him as such.

The same truth is portrayed in another form, by the parable of the net, in which the good and worthless fishes are intermixed with each other. If we compare these two parables together, the one appears as more simple, the other as more complicated than the other. The parable of the net contains only the one fundamental idea which has been mentioned, without connecting with it any additional, subordinate instruction. The disciples are warned against being deceived by the expectation of an undisturbed, pure development of the kingdom of Christ; they were to be apprized, that all who attached themselves externally to the Lord, would not be acknowledged by him as his friends. In the parable of the field, on the contrary, the manner in which that corruption of the church, and that intermixture of the genuine and the spurious takes place, is described more fully with reference to the process which occasions it. And this representation has specially for its object to set clearly and strongly before us the thought, that men should not wish, under the impulse of an intolerant zeal, to execute that separating process in the church of God, which he has reserved for himself at the end of the world; since they are deficient in the means of a just discrimination, and might separate from them, among those considered as insincere members, some who are true Christians, or might become such. Perhaps the disciples or others, by expressing their surprise, that Christ did not repel from him several persons who appeared to them unworthy, gave him occasion to utter this parable. Judas Iscariot was probably such a character, who in various traits betrayed the nature of the tares, but in regard to whom there was still hope, till he committed the final act which consummated his guilt. He had not till then passed the limit, where it ceased to be possible that the tender love and forbearing patience of the Saviour should succeed in rendering him capable of good fruit.

§ 6. (b.) *Moral requisites for entering the kingdom of Christ, including (1.) anti-pharisaic parables, or negative requisites; of the lost sheep and the lost piece of silver, Luke 15: 3—10; of the two sons, Luke 15: 11—32; of the pharisee and publican, Luke 18: 9—14; strife for the first places at feasts, Luke 14: 7—11.*

Thus one portion of the parables, as we have seen, relates to the progress of the kingdom of Christ. There is another

class, which describe the conditions or moral states requisite for admission to this kingdom, and the corresponding hindrances. In considering these, it is important to observe the connection in which a particular truth is introduced. The whole meaning is not to be inferred from a single illustration. The same truth has different aspects; and as it is sometimes one of these and sometimes another, which the occasion required to be presented, we must survey it on all sides, and combine the several views, in order to arrive at a full knowledge of the revelation of God in Christ. To this principle the Saviour always conformed; for, as the obstacles to the reception of the gospel which he encountered were various, so the particular bearing or aspect of the truth which he exhibited was varied, according to the nature of these obstacles, and the different classes of men whom he addressed. Hence, on the one hand, the strict demands which he made on the heart, in opposition to the common Jewish opinion, that descent from the theocratic nation, and an external adherence to the Messiah, would sufficiently qualify a person for his kingdom; and on the other, the benevolence and mildness which he showed to all penitent sinners, in opposition to the harshness and condemnatory spirit of the Pharisees. Every sinner penetrated with a conviction of his guilt receives grace; but a love which surrenders the whole heart, which shuns no sacrifice of self-denial, is demanded of him. And the self-righteous person must also be brought to a consciousness of his sins; and with a heart subdued with sorrow for them must seize, as his only hope, on the proffered redemption, if he would secure a part in it. Spiritual indolence and formal self-righteousness, products of the same selfish root in the heart, are hindrances which must be alike overcome, in order to secure the blessings of the divine kingdom. Thus the holiness and the love of God are displayed in their harmony, in the manner in which Christ receives the guilty, and in the demands which he makes on the spiritual homage of those who would share in the blessings of the gospel. Hence, there arises, in this respect, a two-fold direction of the parables.

The first anti-pharisaic direction appears in the parables recorded, Luke 15. These can be correctly understood only by reference to the occasion on which Christ delivered them. The Pharisees had taken offence at observing that he asso-

ciated so much with the publicans and notorious sinners. He does not stop now here to scrutinize closely the value of the supposed righteousness of the Pharisees, which, as is evident by other declarations of his,* he by no means acknowledged as genuine. He contents himself with justifying his own conduct, while he shows to them how important in the sight of God is the salvation of one fallen soul, how great is the joy of spirits, allied to God in the sympathies, over the repentance of one sinner. This mode of treating the subject was adopted also to show the Pharisees how far they were, in their coldness and indifference, from all genuine kindredship of soul with God.

In the parable of the two sons, we see represented in the person of the youngest the case of the publican, in whom a sense of the wretchedness into which his sins have plunged him, has awakened a spirit of repentance and a desire of reconciliation to his heavenly Father. But how now is this? If the elder brother corresponds to the Pharisee, who complained of the sympathy shown by the Lord to the publicans, are we then to conceive of the Pharisee as really a person who could declare with truth, that he had transgressed no command of his heavenly Father, and to whom the Father could say, 'thou art ever with me, and all which I have is thine?' But this would stand in contradiction to all which Christ is accustomed elsewhere to say of the character of the Pharisees. He affirms, that no one, whose righteousness is not greater than that of the Pharisees, shall enter the kingdom of heaven; he says of his disciples, that they, when they have done all which it is their duty to do, should still confess themselves unprofitable servants. If that here said of the relation of the elder son to the father were applicable to the relation of the Pharisee to God, it would follow, that he was already in a

* See among other passages in proof of this, Matthew 23. The following is an analysis of the portion of it which relates to the Pharisees. The Saviour charges them (1) with the grossest inconsistency between their teachings and their conduct, v. 4; (2) with ostentation in their religious duties, and love of distinction, 5—7; (3) with perverting the truth, to the destruction both of themselves and others, 13; (4) with avarice and extortion, 14; (5) with making proselytes, whom their corrupt doctrines and example only plunged into deeper guilt, 15; (6) with practising and sanctioning perjury, by their groundless distinctions in regard to the sanctity of oaths, 16—22; (7) with making the law consist in trifling external observances, while they neglected its substance and spirit, 23—28; and (8) with approving the crimes of their fathers, and thus making themselves accessory to their guilt, 29—36. This may be considered as the Saviour's picture of the Pharisees of his time. If, as has been said, the Saviour admits in some of his parables, that there may be some righteous persons who need no repentance, it was in favor of such men, as a class, that the exception was made.—Tr.

state of union with God, and could regard all heavenly blessings as belonging to him. But, in that case, like the angels with whom he would sympathize in spirit, he must have rejoiced over the rescue of the lost. On the contrary, the disposition which he discovers to assert his own merit before God, his deficiency in love, his envy, denote certainly a person who, in spirit, is still, just as much as was the publican at first, a stranger to the kingdom of God, and who needs a moral renovation in order to become qualified for it. We see, therefore, here, also, how we should fail of apprehending the sense of Christ, if we did not content ourselves with keeping merely the proper point of comparison in view, were we to press the individual traits of the figure too far, especially in respects in which they are totally irrelevant to one member of the subject under illustration; as, for instance, here, the relation of the son to an earthly father in regard to the observance of his commands, and the relation of mankind to God in regard to the requirements of his will, which relate primarily to the heart. What we are to hold, therefore, as taught here, under a figure borrowed from human relations, is simply the manner in which the paternal love of God meets the still guilty but repenting sinner, in his return to him. We cannot, certainly, in our conception of the doctrines of Christ, feel too deeply how by this representation of the divine love, with reference to the fallen children of men, all partiality in the purposes of God respecting the salvation of mankind, both before and after the appearance of Christ, is excluded. It is implied here, without doubt, that the benevolence of God contemplates the salvation of all his fallen children, among all families of mankind. But the labors and sufferings of Christ for our redemption, appear by no means in consequence of this as something superfluous, as if the paternal love of God was already disposed of itself to forgive all sinners. We see rather, in the work of redemption, a fruit of his paternal love, an arrangement through which its desires for the rescue of sinners can be carried into effect. This parable delineates specially the distinguishing feature of the revelation of God in Christ. But, on the other hand, in order to understand correctly the doctrine of the Saviour in all its proportions, we must connect with this description of the Father's love, the manner in which Christ presents also the holiness and punitive justice of God.

This parable stands related to another, Luke 18 : 9, 14, with which, for the purpose of its fuller illustration, it should be compared. It is the parable in which Christ contrasts the spirit of the Pharisee, who boasts of his ostentatious piety before God with that of the publican, who, in the matter of mere legal righteousness, has not indeed so much ground of pretension as the other. The publican, in consequence of his penitent disposition, becomes a partaker of the grace of God, and goes away justified. The Pharisee is deficient in the necessary conditions for obtaining this justification, and hence remains excluded from it. This Christ himself expresses, in the words, "He that exalts himself shall be humbled, but he that humbles himself shall be exalted." That is, he who has high thoughts of himself, who thinks, on the ground of his self-acquired virtue or his wisdom, to set up pretensions to merit in the sight of God, will fail of his object ; this arrogated merit will be shown to be worthless, and the asserter of it, on account of this very assumption, will be excluded from the true dignity which God alone confers. He, on the contrary, who, with a consciousness of his moral unworthiness, of the deficiency of his virtue and wisdom, humbles himself before God, shall be truly exalted by him. Here also belongs the parable in regard to seeking the first places at feasts, Luke 14 : 7—11. When Christ, on a certain occasion the guest of a Pharisee, perceived how the Pharisees vied with each other in contending for the first places in the company,—from which single trait was reflected the whole character of those people, who wished to be acknowledged as first by God and men,—he says, in reproof of this spirit, to the guests, "When thou art invited by any one to a wedding, sit not down in the highest place, lest when another guest, who is higher than thou comes, the host call upon thee to give place to him, and thou must then with shame take the lowest place ; but go rather and sit first in the lowest place, that when the host comes, he may say to thee, Friend, go up higher, and then shalt thou have honor in presence of all the guests." Upon this follow the words which Christ spoke in the instance of the publican and the Pharisee, and which, according to the nature of the case, he undoubtedly often applied. These words, which he certainly employed always in the same sense with respect to the relation of men to God, afford us the key for understanding the rule here

given by Christ. To lay down a doctrine of mere prudence, or expediency, for the conduct of men in the intercourse of society, was certainly as foreign to his purpose, as any thing could well be. We are to understand it rather in a parabolic sense, and the concluding words as furnishing the explanation of the parable. "Claim not for yourself, after the manner of the Pharisee, the first place in the kingdom of God, lest your presumption be exposed by his final authoritative decision, lest you, who have exalted yourself, be humbled; but take the lowest place, humble yourself before God,—that by means of your self-humiliation, you may be exalted before him." A sincere humiliation of ourselves before God,—humbleness of mind,—is the condition of attaining to honor with him.

§ 7. (2.) *Positive qualifications required; parable of the treasure hid in the field*, Matt. 13: 44; *of the pearl*, Matt 13: 45, 46; *building of the tower*, Luke 14: 28—30; *the warring king*, Luke 14: 31—33.

The other aspect of Christian truth is exhibited to us in those parables which refer to the *positive* dispositions required by Christ for admission to the kingdom of God, as the parable of the treasure hid in the field. The single truth, which it is the object of this parable to establish, is, that he, who will obtain this treasure, must give up every thing which he has, in order to secure it; that he must consider all other possessions as nothing, in comparison with that which he acknowledges as his highest good. All beyond this is mere costume, for the purpose of maintaining the consistency of the figure, and exhibiting more impressively this *one* thought. For the same thought is presented under another figure, in the parable of the pearl. This variation in the mode of illustration may have been very probably not without design, in order to denote the different ways in which men arrive at a knowledge of the truth. The person who finds accidentally the treasure hid in the field, may be considered as the type of those, whom the proclamation of the gospel takes, as it were, by surprise, who have not sought or expected it, but who yet possess a susceptible spirit; and, as the glory of the kingdom of God reveals itself to them, are ready to sacrifice all to secure it. On the other hand, as the merchantman seeks for goodly pearls, and, at length, in his extended search, finds one of great value, which eclipses all others in splendor,

so in religion, there are those who are impelled to its pursuit by a sense of their wants ; they feel a restless desire, which urges them from object to object, till at last they obtain a knowledge of the gospel, and there find the satisfaction which they seek.* The same thought, that a person can enter the kingdom of God only with this disposition to secure the one thing needful, at the expense of every thing else, is contained also in the parables, Luke 14 : 28—33 ; in regard to the man who will build a tower and must first estimate the necessary cost, and the king who, in order to make war with another, must first consider whether he has adequate resources for its prosecution.

§ 8. (c.) *Call to enter the kingdom of God ; invitation to a feast, Luke 14 : 16—24, and Matt. 22 : 1—14 ; the simple form of this parable in Luke the foundation of that in Matthew ; differences between them ; additional references in the second.*

Pursuing still the order which the contents of the parables indicate, we come next to those which relate to the call of men to participate in the kingdom of God, and the manner in which his judgment concerning them is determined by their conduct, in the acceptance or rejection of his mercy. In presenting this call under the figure of an invitation to a feast, he used an illustration already familiar to the Jews, as one of a circle of expressions which they were accustomed to employ to denote the happiness of the Messiah's kingdom. But we may distinguish between the origin of the figure, and the immediate occasion which led the Saviour to avail himself of it. This was furnished him probably by a feast, at which

* No one will deny, that a diversity, like that here pointed out, does exist in the religious experience of men. It would seem, therefore, not fanciful to suppose with Neander, that the different form of the parables was chosen for the purpose of bringing this moral fact incidentally into view. Olshausen also finds here the same distinction. "The precious object," he says, "(The *θησαυρός*, or the *μαργαριτη*) appears, indeed, in both parables as concealed ; but man's agency with reference to the hidden treasure, is differently exhibited. In the parable of the pearl, a noble, active nature is described, which, with an earnest aspiration after truth, searches (*ζητει*) for it, and exerts itself strenuously to attain it, until it finds in the divine, as revealed in Christ, the centre of its manifestation, the sum and perfection of all which is worthy of its desires, and whose possession it secures by an entire self-renunciation. In the parable of the treasure and the field, on the contrary, a more receptive nature is described, in its relation to the divine ; if this present itself to a person of this character, unsought and unexpected, he has the disposition and energy to secure it to himself at any expense ; but the activity, (the *ζητειν*) of the inquirer, is not so prominent. The histories of a Peter, and a Nathaniel, illustrate these different forms of human character."—*Com., über das Neue Testament*, V. I, p. 463.—Tr.

he delivered, for the first time, a parable of this nature in its more simple outline, Luke 14 : 15 ; for this manifestly lies at the foundation of the later parable, Matt. 22 : 1—14, which differs from it by a greater complication of parts, and a more extended significancy in the application. At the time, when Christ, although already hated by the Pharisaic party in secret, had not yet been attacked by them in so public a manner, as he afterwards was, it happened, that on a certain Sabbath he was invited by one of this sect, and not probably with the best intentions, to an entertainment at his house. As the discourse there turned on the happiness of the pious in the kingdom of God, after the resurrection, one of the guests, under the influence, no doubt, of the worldly notions of the Jews respecting the Messiah's kingdom, says, "Blessed is he who shall be permitted to sit down as a guest at the table of God in his kingdom." In order now to apprise this Pharisee, that something more was requisite for this than he, with his Jewish conceptions, supposed, and that many who believed themselves sure of admission to the kingdom of the Messiah, would be excluded from it, Christ employs the parable first in that more simple form. Those *invited* to the feast, who, when all is ready for the reception of the guests, are again summoned to attend, are, without doubt, the Pharisees, who, in consequence of their legal piety and zealous study of the law, imagined that they had special claims to a place in the Messiah's kingdom. That here charged against them is, that they do not readily accept the call which Christ extends to them, to submit themselves to the kingdom of God ; that they do not joyfully break away from every thing which interferes with their compliance with it, but suffer themselves by various worldly inducements to be diverted from it ; that the heart of one clings to this object, the heart of another to that, so strongly, that he is not able to sacrifice all for the sake of an interest in heaven ; while, at the same time, with a show of civility, they offer various apologies for not accepting the invitation. The guilt imputed to them is, that the call to embrace the offers of the gospel does not avail with them, as it should have done. As they, therefore, decline the invitation, the lame and the blind are called from the streets of the city, the despised of the theocratic people, the outcasts, the publicans, those who had hitherto lived in sin, but who now

accept with gladness the proffered salvation. In this, there is no reference whatever, as yet, to the exclusion of the Jews from their former theocratic privileges, or to the rejection of the ancient city of God. But when after this, room is still left for other guests, and the servant is sent to the highways, and out of the city to the hedges in the country, to bring in all whom he may find, we have, for the first time, an obscure intimation of the call of the heathen.

But the more complex parable in Matt. 21,* indicates its origin in the last period of the Saviour's ministry, by the fact, that the relation of Christ to the Jewish nation appears here as altogether different. There are two circumstances particularly, which distinguish this parable from the first. One is, that while in that the unsusceptible Pharisees are contrasted with those of a better spirit among the despised of their own countrymen, here, on the contrary, the Jewish people themselves, as a mass, are contrasted in their stupidity with those of other nations, who had not, as yet, been called at all. The other is, that those invited in the last case reject the invitation in a far more abrupt, hostile manner. They do not consider it even worth the trouble, to excuse themselves for their neglect of the repeated invitation; they do not so much as hear it; they express studiously their scornful contempt. Instead of the distinction which is made in the first parable, between the susceptible and unsusceptible among the Jews themselves, it is the spectacle of an entire people, sunk in one common insensibility, which is here presented to us; some abandoned to it more completely than others, but none wholly exempt from it. They all belong either to the numerous class of those, who, alive only to their earthly interests, suffer the divine message, which addresses no conscious want of their souls, to pass unheeded by them, or to the hostile Pharisaic party and their organs, by whom the servants of the king, through whom he invites to the

* I coincide in this view with the suggestions of Schleiermacher in his treatise on Luke, but not with the views expressed by Strauss, I, p. 610, Schneckenburger and De Wette. I perceive no ground at all, why, when on a comparison of the parables with each other, we find several of a kindred character, which yet differ by being in one case more simple, in another more complex, we should not assume that Christ himself varied their form in this manner, instead of regarding them in their more complicated state, as the product of different parables which have been confounded together. This latter can be affirmed only when it is shown, that heterogeneous elements are intermixed in the more complicated parables. Strauss has sought, indeed, to prove this in reference to this parable of Matthew, but he has by no means succeeded, as will appear from what is yet to be said.

marriage-supper,* that is, the messengers of God, through whom the call to the kingdom of heaven is extended to them, are reviled and murdered. Hence follows now the divine judgment on the people and city, the destruction of the murderers, the dominant Pharisaic party, and the overthrow of Jerusalem. The citizens of the destroyed city can, therefore, no longer be invited to the marriage-feast, to the privileges of the Messiah's kingdom; but after the destruction of the city, the king sends his messengers into the country, to the thoroughfares, where travellers in great numbers meet together, to invite all whom they find, to the wedding,—without doubt a prophetic intimation, that after the destruction of Jerusalem, and the rejection of the ancient theocratic people, the heathen nations, who had been hitherto excluded from the kingdom of God, would be called to be members of it. There is this difference further, which might be supposed to exist between the first and the second parables, that in the first, reference is made to the kingdom of God in general only, but in the second, to the personal Messiah; that in the first, we have an account of a festival entertainment only, but in the second, more specifically of a marriage-feast, which a king appoints for his son. Had Christ wished, however, to render this point prominent here, he would certainly have marked the gradation; the king would have first sent his servants, then finally his son himself, whose marriage was to be celebrated, and they would have reviled and murdered even him. But this turn would not have suited well the whole parable; for the son of a king could not be represented, in congruity with the figure, as a person, who, like a servant, goes about himself and invites the guests to the marriage-supper. Still the two parables remain clearly distinguished from each other, by the differences, that in the first, it is, indefinitely, a certain man who gives the feast, in the second, it is a king; in the first, it is an entertainment in general, in the second, an entertainment at the marriage of a king's son. This change now is adapted perfectly to the relation of the two forms of the parable to each other. The greater the honor shown to those invited,—the invitation of a king to the marriage-feast of

*Without reason Strauss thinks he has found here a foreign trait in the figure. The mal-treatment or killing of those who invite to a feast, appears indeed without any adequate motive; but this was necessary. By the contemptuous ingratitude with which the people received the honor shown to them by the king, it was intended to represent, forcibly, the manner in which they requited good with evil.

his son,—so much the more criminal appears the ingratitude and insolence, with which they treat so great an honor.

But the second parable contains another new and important allusion, in the distinction made between the genuine and false members of this church, which is to be collected from all nations. This is in accordance with the anxiety which the Redeemer always manifests, to hold up distinctly to view the fact, that an external profession, without the true Christian spirit, avails nothing; that it is only by a deep, moral renovation, that a man can become a true member of the kingdom of God. This is expressed in the words, which denote the point of the second part, added to the parable, “many are called, but few are chosen;” that is, many hear the offers of the gospel, many connect themselves externally with the divine kingdom, and belong to the visible church, who yet are not chosen to actual membership in it, inasmuch as they are deficient in the necessary moral qualifications. Those who came without the wedding garment, who went with the rest in their ordinary garb, in which they happened to be found at the time, who did not give themselves the trouble to procure first their festival attire,* represent those, who obey indeed externally the call, but are not careful to see to it, that they possess the character, which is demanded for admission into the kingdom of heaven.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

* Many expositors have thought, that the case is to be conceived of thus: The wedding dress, the *Kaften*,* according to oriental custom, was offered to the guests by the host himself; and they had manifested their neglect of the honor shown to them, by contemptuously refusing the proffered raiment. This was intended now to represent the righteousness of faith, as a gift of divine grace: But not to mention, that the existence of such a practice in regard to the *Kaften* in ancient times, has by no means been proved (which does not determine so much, since we find in the east so great an agreement between the customs of ancient and modern times), Christ would not, certainly, had he wished here to give prominence to so important a thought, have failed to express it definitely. In that case, this would have been specified in the accusation against the guests, who did not appear in bridal attire. ‘The wedding garment has been offered to you, and you have not accepted it. So much the greater your guilt!’ On the contrary, the point lies rather here, that they had not done what was their duty to procure the wedding raiment. In what way they could have furnished themselves with it, was not in this respect important to the case, and could be passed over in silence. Hence, it can by no means be said with Strauss, that this appears here as a foreign trait, because one does not perceive how they could have obtained such a wedding dress.

* This is a Turkish word, denoting a long, and as to its ground-color, white, dress, worn by the Turks. It was made of the richest materials, embroidered often with flowers, and other figures, interlaced with golden or silver threads, and was used only on occasions of special festivity.—See ROSENMÜLLER’S “*Das alte u. Neue Morgenland*,” v. 5, p. 77.

ARTICLE IV.

REVIEW OF TAPPAN ON THE WILL.

AND is it possible that Edwards is refuted at last? Has all Europe been dazzled by the brilliancy of a luminary, which is now set, to rise and shine no more? Can it be that Edwards, after receiving the thanks of the most distinguished professors of foreign universities, for the light which he cast upon a most difficult subject, should, himself, at last, prove but the patron of infidelity? Can it be true, that those profound reasonings are now completely demolished, by which he gained for himself, though unsought, the highest honors of philosophy, and the admiration of the most gifted minds of his age? All this, the work of Prof. Tappan proposes to show. Surely, a work of such pretensions has some claim upon our attention; unless, indeed, it be obviously the production of one of those reckless literary adventurers, who hesitate not to make their onset upon our most sainted authors, without any just appreciation of the subjects they are attempting, or of the men whom they denounce. But we should do the greatest injustice to Prof. Tappan, to number him with such a class. He ranks himself among the highest admirers of the piety and talents of Edwards; he also, unquestionably, brings to his subject some just sense of its numerous difficulties, and of its profound importance. Without the advantage of the least personal acquaintance with the author, we are bound to receive his work as an honest effort in defence of what he considers to be truth, and as the result of a sincere desire to bring some valuable contribution to the cause of science and of religion. We think we see evidence in it of a soul deeply stirred with important thoughts; we see a mind of no ordinary powers, manfully struggling to give clearness and consistency to what many have regarded as the only philosophical theory which can harmonize with the facts of consciousness, and the teachings of revelation. And, with his views of the momentous consequences suspended upon the decision of the question he approaches, we are not surprised, that Prof. T. enters upon the discussion of it with

all the powers of his intellect and heart. We cannot but hope, however, that the views he has formed of Edwards's system may prove to be owing only to the unfortunate medium through which he contemplates it. "The system itself," he says, "is a system of fatalism,—here then I charge directly this consequence, or feature, upon the system." He maintains, also, that the doctrine of a self-determining power in the will, furnishes the only possible escape from pantheism. These are weighty assertions. Surely one must feel that great interests are at stake, when a question is pending, which must decide whether he is to regard himself as a man or a god. Again he says, "It is only by admitting the idea of contingent causality, that the dogma which affirms God to be the author of sin can be set aside." Some may find it difficult to conceive how these two errors can be compatible with each other, or spring from the same root. We should judge, that if pantheism can once be shown to be a legitimate deduction from the system of Edwards, it would follow, not that God is the author of sin, but that, according to this system, the very existence of sin is impossible.

Yet we see, from these intimations, the nature of the task to which our author is committed. He stands virtually pledged to refute Edwards, or embrace pantheism, and charge God as the author of sin. His position is one of most momentous responsibility. Suppose he should not succeed in disproving the doctrine of Edwards, in the estimation of his readers; is he willing that they should adopt the only alternative he leaves them? Or, should he himself hereafter become convinced that these doctrines are impregnable; what would he do? We venture to say, he would make a violent effort to find some other method of egress from pantheism,—that he would be too modest to wear upon his shoulders the mantle of the divinity, and too tenacious of his individual privilege, to merge his own personality in the illimitable gulf of absolute being. We cannot but regret, that our author should have brought things to such an issue; and that he should have allowed himself to make such liberal concessions in favor of pantheism and infidelity, as to intimate that, on any conditions, the possibility of their truth is even conceivable. We regret, that any expressions should have escaped him, which would seem like staking the whole truth of the Christian religion upon a mere metaphysical discussion.

He is, doubtless, fully aware, that whatever be our speculations respecting the determining power of volition, the doctrines of religion must stand for ever and immutably fixed upon their own independent foundation. Still, we think that no candid mind would be disposed to make too much of such expressions; we regard them merely as indicative of the author's deep conviction of the importance of the controversy in relation to the freedom of the will. We readily concede that there is much to favor this feeling; since it is unquestionably true, that the philosophical theories of men must modify, in very material respects, their religious opinions. All things considered, we doubt not that the work before us will be productive of good. Its literary merits are of a high order; its influence upon the taste cannot but be elevating. Aside from some occasional harsh and severe expressions, which those who wield the pen of controversy know best how to excuse,—its style of criticism is at once chaste, respectful, and independent. Could the same noble example be followed in the criticism of living authors, there would be more hope of eliciting truth, and less danger of calling forth feelings of bitterness and animosity. Should the work fail of accomplishing the main object at which it aims, it may, at least, contribute to arouse a spirit of inquiry, which cannot but have the most favorable influence upon our rising literature. The author does not claim entire originality for all his views; yet he calls no man master, and takes occasion to speak of "my system." As a system, however, we do not perceive that his views differ materially from those of his predecessors on the same side of the question. In most of his conclusions, there is a striking similarity to those of Cousin, and other recent French metaphysicians.

In view of the important religious bearings of the subject discussed in this work, we need offer no apology for subjecting to a careful examination some of its main conclusions. It is but fair, however, to acknowledge to our readers, that we can lay no special claims to that qualification for criticism which consists in having no partialities, no fixed opinions, no reverence for what is old, no suspicion of what is new. Yet we claim to be ready to abandon the old, and embrace the new, whenever truth and justice shall require. No special fortitude is requisite, at the present day, to declare in favor of new theories; stern and genuine heroism is rather to be sought

among those who continue to tread the old and well-beaten paths, while the tide of popular feeling around them threatens to sweep into an eternal oblivion the wisdom of all past generations. We confess that our confidence in the doctrines of Edwards remains unshaken,—not because they are *his* doctrines, but because we think they are sustained by the consciousness of human nature. The history of the church furnishes lamentable evidence that the best of men may go astray in their reasoning; but it would be strange, indeed, if Edwards, who is pronounced a saint, as to his piety, should be an atheist in his logical conclusions; and that the proudest monument he has left to the world of his own intellectual greatness, should contain a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole Christian religion. We dare not pronounce it unsuitable to divine wisdom, to allow sanctified talent thus to be misguided; we dare not say, that he could never adopt such a mode of chastening the pride of the human intellect; but has he done it in the present case? Let us see.

Prof. Tappan's work is comprised in three volumes. The first professedly contains a statement and refutation of Edwards's system; the second, the author's own doctrine of the will; the third, the application of this doctrine to moral agency and accountability. Our limits will not allow us to follow our author through all his reasonings; nor can we commit to these pages even an analysis of his work. We propose, in the first place, to express our own views freely upon what we regard as the fundamental principles, and at the same time the fundamental errors, of his own theory. We shall then be better prepared to point out, in the next place, the fallacy of some of his most plausible arguments against the system of Edwards. As he professes to give us the dimensions of so important an edifice, we may the more boldly question the correctness of his measurement, if the measuring-rod which he has employed should, itself, be found defective. In justice to our author, however, we would state, that we take the liberty, for the sake of brevity and convenience, to remark upon these principles, not in the precise connection in which he has presented them, but according to the order which they have assumed in our own mind, after a general perusal of his work. Having apprized our readers of our plan, we feel at liberty to pursue it, without fearing that we shall be chargeable with the sin of

transcending any of the rules of honorable criticism. More truth may be elicited in this way, and it may prove even more acceptable to the author himself, than if we should compliment his skill in mere book-making, by giving a careful analysis of all that he has written.

It is of the greatest importance, at the threshold of this discussion, that our readers should distinctly understand that the question, upon which we now enter, is not of a theological character. It is, strictly speaking, a question of mental philosophy. It is important, also, to keep in view the nature of the evidence to be relied upon. The appeal is not to be made directly to revelation; nor is logical reasoning to be trusted beyond its proper province. Mere logic is not to be confided in, as an instrument of discovering truth, in any science whatever. Facts are what we need. What could mere skill in dialectics accomplish, in natural science, without the knowledge of facts; the case is not different, when we come to the science of mind. Here, too, we ask for facts; our appeal is to consciousness; on her testimony we rely, as ultimate evidence. When we ask, what revelation teaches, the question is one of theology. When we ask what consciousness teaches, it is one of psychology,—of mental philosophy. True philosophy can never contradict theology; the latter, therefore, so far as her decisions extend, may safely be confided in, as the *criterion and standard* by which we may test the accuracy of all our philosophical reasonings. But we cannot ascertain what philosophy teaches, by referring to revelation for proof; nor can we determine what revelation teaches, by an appeal to the decisions of philosophy. Revelation and philosophy are two independent sources of knowledge; each is, in itself, adequate for its own purposes. It is by an appeal to consciousness alone, therefore, that, in all questions of mental philosophy, we can best expose the sophistry of skepticism and infidelity. In relation to this, we have no controversy with our author. Had he always faithfully adhered to the method which he himself recommends, we think he would not have ventured upon some of his conclusions.

As preliminary, also, to a right understanding of the work before us, it may be proper to state, that it recognizes a threefold classification of the mental faculties. It represents the mind as consisting of what Prof. T. denominates intellect,

sensitivity,* and will. It of course requires a corresponding division of the mental phenomena. The acts of the first two, it is said, are characterized by necessity, while the acts of will only are free. This classification is said to have originated with the German metaphysicians; it is, however, the same, in the main, with that which was adopted a number of years ago, by Dr. Burton, of Vermont, and subsequently by Prof. Upham, of Bowdoin College. It has been brought into still more special notice, recently, by the writings of Cousin. We have no strong objections to urge against this classification, in itself considered; we are as ready to adopt this, as any other, provided we are distinctly informed what particular phenomena are designed to be included under each class. All our mental operations have, doubtless, various points of agreement and difference among themselves; and, consequently, different minds may classify them according to different principles, without being chargeable with philosophical error. What we most need, is to be *acquainted* with our mental phenomena; to know the various modes in which the mind develops itself, the feelings of which it is susceptible, and the laws by which they are generated and governed. The mere question of arrangement, is one of comparatively little importance. Yet, if a classification is to be adopted, which is designed to designate the limits of our accountability, then it becomes a matter of more serious moment. It is only on this account, that we should prefer the classification of Edwards to that of Prof. Tappan. Edwards, following the generality of European writers, divides our faculties into the powers of the understanding, and those of the will. Yet he subdivides the acts of the will, into immanent and imperative volitions; thus plainly admitting the distinction recognized by Prof. Tappan. If, therefore, it be true, that our accountability extends to all that is voluntary, according to Edwards, we are held accountable, not only for our volitions, properly so called, but for every passion, affection and emotion; and

* The term *sensitivity* is here employed to signify what Sir James Mackintosh denominates, "that unnamed portion of our nature, with which morality more immediately deals; that which feels pain and pleasure, is influenced by appetites and loathings, by desires and aversions, by affections and repugnances;" and which, he says, for want of a better name, "we may now venture to call the *emotive*, or the *pathematic* part of human nature." Dr. Wayland designates it by the term *sensitiveness*; Prof. Henry, in his translation of Cousin, by the term *sensibility*. The term employed by Prof. Tappan has not the disadvantage of having been employed to express any other idea, nor yet the advantage of ever before having been used to express this.

even for the very state of the heart. But, according to Prof. T., our accountability is restricted to volition, while that large and most important class of our mental feelings, included in the phenomena of the sensitivity, are entirely struck off from the list of our responsible acts, except where they are designedly brought to pass by previous volition. The extent of our accountability will be considered in its proper place; we would here only remark, that those, who agree in the classification which Prof. T. adopts, are not equally agreed as to the particular phenomena which belong to each class. Cousin assigns deliberation, preference, and choice, to the intellect. "To prefer," he says, "is to judge that one thing is preferable to another." He maintains that our preferences are not, therefore, under our command, and that, consequently, we are not accountable for them. Prof. T. denies that choice is a simple act of the intellect; yet he says it is not a volition, nor a primary *nisus* of the will, but precedes all volition. Still, he makes it out, in some way, an *affection* of the will, and claims for it freedom. Whether he designs to distinguish between an affection of will and an act of will, is not sufficiently clear.

We now proceed to our task. Prof. Tappan's scheme, in the first place, constitutes *will* our whole personality and our whole causality. This, at the outset, is mere assumption, and is equivalent to a *petitio principii* in relation to every point in dispute. "Will," he says, "is employed to express the causality of the mind. To this usage I mean to confine it in the following investigation. That there is a causality in the mind, is settled; when I speak of will, I shall refer only to this causality; and though I may not be able to disintegrate the usage of the word *will*, I hope to disintegrate the mind's causality, so far as to show that it is distinct from the affections and judgments."—Vol. II, p. 60. This error will appear the more prominent, when taken in connection with our author's threefold classification of the mental phenomena; for, according to this, our judgments, affections and passions, not being included in volitions, can have no cause in the mind. If the above language means any thing, it means, that whatever the will does not cause, the mind itself does not cause; in other words, that volitions are the only class of mental phenomena which are truly caused by the mind,—the only phenomena which are, strictly

speaking, our own. The will is made our self-conscious personality. Our judgments, reasonings, emotions, passions and affections, are not ours, because they are not volitions. They are not caused by the mind at all, because the will did not cause them. Lest we should seem to have mistaken our author's meaning, we shall here allow him to expound more particularly his own views :

“ According to this scheme, we take the will as the *executive* of the soul, or the *doer*. It is a doer, having life and power in itself, not necessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to do. . . . The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a will as above defined,—a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union ; and lastly, which may act in the indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion.* . . . What does personality represent ? If it represent the whole individual mind or spirit, then of course it is merely a synonym of mind or spirit ; but the term, personality, will not apply to every faculty of mind or spirit. It will be granted, that the I is applied to the will, as the free causality of the mind ; when it is affirmed *I do*, the will is the I. . . . The will is that which is entitled to say *my* and *mine* ; when, therefore, it says, *my will*, it affirms self-determination. It is its own will, because a cause *per se*, and self-moved and self-directed. It affirms itself of itself. . . . The sentiment of Cousin, that the will is only ‘ the eminent characteristic ’ of personality, deprives this feature of language of its peculiar force ; for, if that sentiment be just, the personal pronouns represent all the faculties of the mind equally. Besides, the word personality becomes a mere synonym of mind or spirit. But when we represent the personality as itself a characteristic of mind or spirit, and a characteristic which appears in a peculiar representative assigned it in the structure of all languages ; which representative constantly implies freedom and supremacy, then we gain a new point of view in philosophy, and a new and singular confirmation of the doctrine of the will we have been unfolding.”†

If our author would allow us to receive the above language as poetry, we should interpret it accordingly. But it is no poetry with him ; he seems to have chosen and adjusted his terms with all the precision of a philosopher. He specially guards us against the supposition, that he uses the term will, as Edwards and many other writers have done, as synonymous with mind. He tells us, it is by no means a synonym of the mind ; that the *I*, our personality, does not represent all the faculties of the mind, but only the will, the mind's causality. He goes beyond Cousin himself, in his unbounded respect for the will. Here is an instance, in which, we think,

he has deserted his psychological method, and has resorted to an assumption, to which neither logic nor psychology can lend the least support whatever. To what does logic assign personality? Personality can be predicated only of a self-conscious agent, possessing intelligence, sensibility and will. Without sensibility, will can have no motive; without intelligence, it can have no guide. But mere will, as it is employed in the above language, considered abstractedly from our affections and judgments, can be possessed neither of self-consciousness, intelligence, nor desire. Therefore, personality cannot be predicated of mere will. If it be said, the will can draw its light from the reason, and its motive from the sensibility, which constitutes the other departments of the mind, we still reply, that, as *mere will*, it is destitute both of intelligence to do the one, and of disposition to do the other. As mere will, it can form no conception, institute no comparison, and, consequently, can have no preference. Otherwise, it must be a little intellectual and moral system within itself,—a mind within the mind,—which is absurd. An enlightened psychology will confirm the decisions of logic. Let the appeal be made to consciousness, and who, that is not swayed by the love of system, can deny, that he means, by the pronoun *I*, not the will, exclusively,—not any single faculty,—but the whole mind, his unique rational being? If *I* means only the will, then how is it proper to say, I think, I know, I judge, I feel, I love, I hate?—for our perceptions, judgments, feelings and affections are not caused by the will. Professor T. thus replies to this objection,—“Hence,” he says, “the propriety of affirming *I know*, inasmuch as knowledge ensues only upon the exertion of my causality, of that which constitutes my personality. My causality does not create the knowledges, it creates only the condition of the development of the knowledges. . . . It is my knowledge, not because I make it, but because I seek for it and find it.” But we need scarcely say, that such a reply is inadequate and unsatisfactory. It proceeds upon the assumption, that will furnishes the necessary condition of all our feelings and thoughts. But nothing can be more absurd. Are there not feelings, which volition never originated, and cannot suspend? Are there not thoughts and ideas, which enter the mind, whether we are willing or not? Are there not images, that sometimes haunt the imagination, which the

mind can by no enchantment put down? If not, then, truly will is a faculty worth possessing. We have only to suspend imagination and memory, by the mere power of volition, and then neither retrospect nor anticipation could have power to harm; that fearful looking for of judgment, which so frequently accompanies guilt, could find a perfect remedy; the fires of remorse could be for ever extinguished, and the great day of the wrath of the Almighty could inspire no dread. But there are some things which we must know and feel, whether we are willing or not. The will, therefore, is not our personality. The agent that knows and feels is the same that wills,—this is the *mind*, which is itself the only personality.

On the same grounds we maintain, that the mind's *power of causation* is not confined to mere will. Indeed, if will does not constitute personality, as we have shown, it follows, of course, that it cannot constitute our causality. It can easily be made to appear, that the will is not the efficient producing cause, even of those phenomena which are most generally ascribed to it; also, that there are other phenomena which have truly their cause in the mind, which no one thinks of referring to the will, as their cause. Let us look first at volitions, the only class of phenomena which, according to Prof. Tappan's theory, are properly said to be caused. What are volitions? They are not mere blind phenomena, springing into existence like the varied fantastic forms of crystallization; they are, as no one can deny, intelligent *acts*, guided by some rational aim, and directed to some practical end. If so, it requires a mind, not only a voluntary, but an intelligent and sentient agent, to cause or produce a volition. The mere statement of this is all that is necessary to its proof. We might as well say, that the power of the muscles can walk or run, as to say, that the power of will can put forth a volition. In either case, an agent is necessary to exert the power. The very nature of volition is such, that mind only can put it forth at all; and mind only can put it forth in one direction rather than another. But we cannot dwell longer here, without prematurely discussing the main point at issue, between Edwards and the scheme we are considering.

We now pass to a consideration of other phenomena,—our perceptions, judgments, affections and desires. These, Prof. T. admits, have not their source in the will: but, as he

makes will the mind's only causality, he concludes that they are not caused at all ; at least, that they are not caused by the mind, and that they are not, properly speaking, ours. Now all agree with Prof. T., that these are not caused by the will ; but does it follow, as a necessary consequence, that they are not caused by the mind ? We prefer, however, to state the question in his own language :

"In taking up this question, I must recur to the broad distinctions made in the foregoing pages, between the will and the other faculties of the mind. The will is the causality of the mind. . . . Now, having thus gained and concentrated our idea of cause in will, is it legitimate to extend this idea to the other faculties of the mind, to represent the reason as the cause of its perceptions and knowledges, to represent the sensitivity as the cause of its emotions and desires ; or, is it legitimate to represent the objects of these faculties as the causes of their movements !"

He decides that neither the mind nor the objects cause our perceptions and emotions,—that, as they are not caused by will, they are not caused at all ; they are not *effects*,—that "all the different forms of cognition are really a development of that which existed before,"—that "the primitive judgments existed in the capacity of the reason, as its essential, necessary, and inseparable attributes,"—that "will is cause, volitions are effects,"—but, that "reason is not cause, knowledges and truths are not its effects, but its necessary and inseparable manifestations." Also, that our emotions, passions, and desires, are not effects ; not of physical cause surely, nor of will,—"the will has no power to create an emotion or passion ;" not of the sensitivity ; for he says, if we grant this causality to lie in the sensitivity, or in cognitions, then we remove causality from the will where we had concentrated it, and disperse it generally through all the mental faculties, and even through mental phenomena ; we destroy the very distinctions to which our previous investigation had conducted us." What, then, is the relation which reason bears to its cognitions, and the sensitivity to its emotions and passions ? He says, it is not that of cause and effect, but "the relation of substance and its attributes."* We have no misgivings in accepting the above as our author's sober conclusion. When Cousin deifies reason, and represents it as the divine in the human, we can scarcely divest ourselves of the suspicion, that

* Vol. II, c. 9.

he intends us to regard his speculations as, at least, one half rhapsody ; and that he means nothing more, than that our Creator has constituted us with faculties, capable of conducting us to truth. But we have no occasion for similar suspicions in the present case ; for it is fundamental to Prof. Tappan's whole scheme, to dispose of our cognitions, affections and passions, in some other way than to regard them as *effects*, since they are not caused by the will, our only causality. But upon what does our author base his reasonings ? He appeals to psychology ; but he professes to find what psychology can never teach. Consciousness does indeed reveal a distinction between our judgments and volitions, and our passions and volitions ; but it reveals a still wider distinction between attributes and judgments, and attributes and passions. The relation, however, we admit, is not precisely that of cause and effect. It is not proper to say, that an attribute is the cause, the efficient cause, we mean, of any of the mind's acts. The mind alone is the cause. Attributes are those endowments of mind, which render it capable of certain acts. Without intelligence, the mind could not know ; without sensibility, it could neither feel, desire, love, nor hate. It is only in a modified sense, then, that the reason can be the cause of the mind's cognitions, and the sensibility the cause of its affections and passions. Consciousness can teach nothing more clearly than that our judgments and passions are mental acts ; and if acts, they imply an actor, an agent,—in other words, they are effects, implying a cause, and mind only can be that cause. Who that consults his own consciousness, unbiased by theory, could ever dream that his mental acts are not acts, but attributes of the mind ? Prof. T. would have us believe that they always existed in the mind. He says, " As the cognitions have a necessary existence in the pre-existent capacity of the intelligence, so, likewise, the emotions and passions have a necessary existence in the pre-existent capacity or potentiality of the sensitivity." He also speaks of " our primitive conceptions, slumbering in the reason," until developed by their proper occasions. As well might we speak of the motions of a blacksmith's arm, slumbering in his brawny muscles. Does consciousness really teach, that axioms, abstract truths, the truths of geometry, or even the conceptions of these truths, were ever lying in embryo in the

reason? Plainly, consciousness can teach no such thing, even were it true. In their embryo state, they could not come within the sphere of consciousness; she can give no account of them, until they fall under her own eye; she knows of no seed from which they have grown, no germ from which they have been developed. When our cognitions and passions first make their appearance, consciousness affirms them to be acts of the mind, effects of a cause. Can philosophy appeal to any higher court? Let us consult this authority a little farther. It is asked, what is the cause of our cognitions? Is it the subject, or the object, or both in correlation? We shall endeavor to answer this; but let us first be explicit with regard to what we are to account for in the mind. Is it a truth, or is it a judgment, or a cognition of a truth? We must be careful to distinguish between a truth, and our conception of it. Prof. T. occasionally seems to lose sight of this distinction. He says, "whatever truth appears in the action, if the intelligence cannot be regarded as then first beginning to exist, it is the necessary development of that which always existed." Strictly speaking, a truth cannot be in the mind; it is not a phenomenon of the mind; nor, can we say that a truth is developed from the mind, without using language obviously figurative. The mind can, in no sense, produce or cause a truth. It may perceive a truth; but however necessary and absolute this truth, there must always remain the well known distinction between this and the mind's conception of it, that exists between the subjective and the objective. The mind, for instance, forms perceptions and judgments in relation to material objects; these perceptions, again, become the occasion upon which certain intuitive and necessary truths arise before the mind, which themselves become objects of conception. These are the immutable ideas of Plato and Cudworth. They are caused neither by material objects, nor by the mind, nor by both together. Whence then do they come? Where do they keep their "eternal home?" Their home is no where; they have no locality; they are not entities, and yet they exist; they are *truths*, and would always remain truths, even were there not a single finite mind to conceive them. These have no cause, they are eternal. Now we freely admit, with Prof. T. and Cousin, that one cannot say, "this is *my* truth," for it was not created by him, and in no way depends upon him for its

existence. But when he forms a conception, a cognition of this truth, which will entirely depend upon him for its existence, of this he may say, with the strictest propriety, it is *mine*; for it is his own mental act, and cannot possibly be the act of any other being in the universe. It is not a phenomenon appearing in the mind; it is an act produced by the mind. No other agent can make a cognition, and put it into the mind. This would imply an absurdity, which can no more be predicated of the Infinite, than of a finite being. Others may form similar cognitions, or conceptions of the same truth; but the mental act of one can never be made the mental act of another; and a mental act, whether it be a cognition of an absolute truth, of a moral relation, or of a material object, never could have "slumbered in the reason." It is not a development from a pre-existing germ,—it in no sense existed, before its manifestation in the consciousness.

Since now we are not to account for the existence of truths in the mind, but only of cognitions, judgments or perceptions, we would reply to the above inquiry, that these are not produced, or efficiently caused by their objects. Let a material object be presented to the view of the mind; the mind perceives it, and forms a judgment in relation to it; but the material object is not the efficient producing cause of this judgment; a material object cannot think,—it cannot perceive, nor form a judgment in itself; nor can it create one in the mind. Nor is it the object, in correlation with the mind, that can efficiently produce this judgment. Neither the object nor its correlation can think, perceive, or judge; they can take no part in forming a judgment;—a judgment is a mental act; it is simple and indivisible; it cannot be distributed among a number of causes, nor be participated in by any two causes; it can be efficiently produced by mind, and by mind alone. The presence of the object to the view of the mind, is the sole cause, ground, or occasion of the mind's forming a judgment in relation to one thing rather than another. But the mind is the only efficient cause of its own act. The same reasoning is applicable, whatever be the object presented to the view of the mind, whether a material substance, an absolute truth, or moral relation; or whatever be the nature of the mental act, whether it be a perception, a judgment, an emotion, or passion. Philosophy does not profess to explain how external

objects become the occasion of internal phenomena; she modestly rests on this as an ultimate fact, that when objects are presented, the mind, according to the laws of its peculiar constitution, acquires subjective knowledge, which corresponds with objective reality, and exercises affections, which correspond with its own moral state. The mind is not a passive recipient of its own acts; it is an agent, a *cause*.* If it is not the cause of these acts, they have no cause; and we must abandon the well known principle, so important to philosophy, as well as to natural theology, "that every phenomenon must have a cause." Prof. T. saw this consequence, and attempts to evade it. He says, "the distinction between the relation of cause and effect, and the relation of substance and attributes, at first sight, may seem to conflict with the principle of causality, that every phenomenon implies a cause, and to require the following modification—every phenomenon implies a cause, or a substance. The point, however, can be easily adjusted, without modifying the principle. If some phenomena directly imply only substance, let it be remembered that the substance itself implies a cause. The substance is that to which the phenomena belong as properties." This may possibly satisfy those who really believe that our rational acts are attributes of the mind, or "properties permanently and necessarily inhering in their substance." To us it affords a poor relief. The conclusion, therefore, to which psychology conducts us, is, that the mind, and not the will, is its own causality, the only efficient producing cause of all its acts, whether they be acts of the reason, of the sensibility, or of the will.

We proceed to the examination of Prof. Tappan's views of the nature of freedom, and the extent of our accountability. The same philosophy governs him here. Here, too, will is

* If we view the mind as acting under a physical necessity, and all its acts as originating, just as motion in one body is produced by an impulse from another, then the mind could not properly be regarded as the cause of its own acts. "Hence," says Clark, "without liberty (meaning, freedom from physical necessity), nothing can, in any tolerable propriety of speech, be said to be an agent, or cause of any thing. For to act necessarily is, really and properly, not to act at all, but only to be acted upon." Motion may be produced in one body by another; but perception, which is not a mere external impulse, cannot thus be produced by any body, or object, but the mind itself. That this was Clark's conviction, is evident from the following remark,—“In reality, it is altogether as hard to conceive how consciousness, or the power of perception, should be communicated to a created being, or how the power of motion should be so; unless perception be nothing else but a mere passive reception of impulse; which, I suppose, is as clear that it is not, as that a triangle is not a sound, or that a globe is not a color.”—*Being and Attributes*, Prop. 10.

all in all. It is not merely the seat of freedom and accountability in a moral agent ; it is itself the agent ; and though it is not a synonym of mind, it is a free, self-conscious doer, and the only responsible personality. The two main questions with which our attention is now to be occupied, are these :—What is the nature of freedom ? What is the extent of our accountability ? It will be understood, that we are not here to enter into the merits of the author's reply to Edwards on these points. We shall only state and examine his own theory. As to the fact, of the freedom of human agency, he has no controversy with Edwards ; but in his opinion, the doctrine, that the will is governed or determined by motive, is destructive of all freedom ; it is fatalism, atheism. To escape from such a consequence, however, he devises no new expedient, none which was not perfectly familiar to the mind of Edwards. His only resort is to the usual one of Arminian writers, the old doctrine of a self-determining power in the will ; or, what he is pleased to call "contingent volition." A theory, which the powerful pen of Edwards has rendered a lifeless corpse, he is now to re-invest with living energy, and make it perform the task of breaking the chain of fatalism, and of vindicating for ever the cause of liberty and responsibility. Not only so, he is to revive this theory, in what Edwards regarded as its most absurd form. "If," says Edwards, "to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said, that when Arminians speak of the will determining its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines them by any preceding act, or that one act of the will determines another ; but only, that the faculty, or power of will, or the soul, in the use of that power, determines its own volitions ; and that it does it without any act going before the act determined, such evasion would be full of the most gross absurdity. I confess it is an evasion of my own inventing, and I do not know but I should wrong the Arminians, in supposing any of them would make use of it."* This is the theory which Prof. Tappan unhesitatingly adopts ; and of the various constructions of which the above language is susceptible, he would prefer that which represents the determining act of the will as the same with the act determined ; or which represents the will as determining a volition

* Part 2, Sec. 2.

by the very fact of putting it forth. He maintains that there is no cause, out of the will itself, why volition takes place at all, or why it takes one direction rather than another; that the very activity of the will is a complete explanation of the whole affair. He even annihilates the necessity of the inquiry, why the will acts in one direction rather than in another; whereas this, with Edwards, is the main question. "The very act of volition itself," says Edwards, "is, doubtless, a determination of mind, i. e., it is the mind, drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two or more things proposed to it. But determining among external objects of choice, is not the same with determining the act of choice itself, among various possible acts of choice. The question is, what influences direct or determine the mind or will, to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the cause, ground, or reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwise?" The manner in which Prof. T. disposes of this inquiry, and also the concurring opinions of himself and Cousin in relation to freedom, may be seen from the following extracts:

"Self-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and, consequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in relation to volition, is just what any cause is, in relation to its effect. Will, causing volitions, causes them, just as any cause causes its effects. There is no intervention of any thing between the cause and effect, between will and volition. A cause, producing its phenomena by phenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards assumes that we do, and he assumes it as if it were unquestionable."—Vol. I, p. 187.

"It is, then, this self-conscious power of determining, or not determining, of causing, or not causing,—this contingent power,—this power, all-sufficient to move itself, and put forth the causative *nisus*, or to refuse and withhold the causative *nisus*, which makes up the idea of freedom."—Vol. II, p. 91.

"That act (volition) is an effect, in relation to the power of willing, which is its cause; and this cause, in order to produce its effect, has need of no other theatre, and no other instrument, than itself. It produces it directly, without intermediate, and without condition, continues and consummates, or suspends and modifies, creates it entire, or annihilates it; and at the moment it exerts itself in any special act, we are conscious that it might exert itself in a special act totally contrary, without any obstacle, without being thereby exhausted; so that, after having changed its acts a hundred times, the faculty remains integrally the same, inexhaustible and identical, amidst the perpetual variety of its applications, being always able to do what it does not do, and able not to do what it does. Here, then, in all its plenitude, is the characteristic of liberty."—*Cousin's Psychology*, Chap. 10.

"The will goes in one direction rather than in another, by an act of self-determination, which neither admits of, nor indeed requires, any other explanation than this,—that the will has power to do one or the other; and, in the exercise of this power, it does one rather than the other."—*Tappan*, Vol. I, p. 236.

"All possible volitions, according to the scheme of psychology I have above given, must be either in the direction of the reason, or of the sensitivity, or in the indifference of both. If the volition be in the direction of the reason, it takes the characteristics of rational, good, &c. If in the direction of the sensitivity, it takes its characteristics from the nature of the particular desire which it obeys:—it is generous, benevolent, kind, &c. What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason? Nothing moves it; it is a cause *per se*; it goes in that direction, because it has power to go in that direction. What moves the will to go in the direction of the sensitivity? Nothing moves it; it is a cause *per se*; it goes in that direction, because it has power to go in that direction."—Vol. I, p. 239.

It is now sufficiently evident that Prof. T. resolves freedom into the power of the will to act, and to act in one direction rather than another, irrespective of any influence out of itself. He maintains, then, as a matter of course, that if the will is determined in one direction rather than another by reason, passion, desire, or by any other motive whatever, so far its liberty is destroyed; and that, for the will to be brought under the entire dominion of motive, is fatalism. Let us see whether this can abide the test of truth. But the very first step towards either an admission or an intelligent rejection of this theory, must be to ascertain precisely what is meant by *will*. The nature of the will can be known only from volition. What then is volition? Let us revert within. Whether I recollect a past volition, or put forth a new one, I observe the same characteristics; I can conceive of it only as a mental act, by which I direct, order, or produce some change, either in body or in mind; the mental act is one thing, the change it effects is another. If Edwards thinks that all volitions can be arranged under the generic head of *choice*, we have no objections. It is a mere question of generalization. But we can get no idea of volition, except by a volition. The moment I attempt to put forth a volition, I proceed to do something, to exert some control over either body or mind; I will to raise my arm, and it is raised; to turn my eye, and it is turned; to direct my attention to some object, and it is directed. These mental acts are volitions. Now the will, as our best philosophers admit, is nothing but the power which the mind has to put forth such volitions. It

is not an agent, a self-conscious and intelligent being, having powers within itself. It is not a part, a fragment, or section of the mind; it is only a power belonging to the unique and indivisible soul. Shall we then take it for granted, that when Prof. T. says that the will determines its own volitions, irrespective of any influence out of the will itself, he means that the soul determines its own volition, not by reason, inclination or passion, but solely and exclusively by its power of will? This is the most generous conclusion we can draw; for, although the notion of will, as a self-conscious personality and causality, so far possesses his mind as to lead him astray in many of his reasonings, yet he seems to have occasionally lucid moments, when this fancy deserts him, and he talks of the "unity of the soul." We would fain believe, then, that his real opinion is, that the will is not a person, nor strictly a cause; but that the mind, only, is person,—that the mind, only, is cause. But if the will is what he sometimes calls it, then we should not dare to dispute a word he says of it; for aught we know, it is capable of all he ascribes to it, and infinitely more than we can conceive of. Again, perhaps, we should do him injustice, to intimate that he regards the *faculty* of the will, or the mere power of putting forth volitions, as the cause and determiner of its own volitions; for, as a volition cannot spring into existence, cannot cause or determine itself, without the will; so the power of will can neither cause nor determine a volition without the agent. A mere faculty, or power, can do neither one thing nor another. A man may have the most exquisite skill in music; yet this skill, of itself, can play neither upon pipe nor harp; but let the agent seize the lyre and use his skill, and at once we are delighted and charmed. So a man may have the power of will; but unless he exert it, the power itself can bring nothing to pass.

We take it for granted, therefore, that by will causing its volitions, Prof. T. must mean the mind in the exercise of will. Let us now see how far we can agree with this theory. We shall make as many concessions as we are able. We admit, in the first place, that the mind is the cause, and the only efficient producing cause of its own volitions. Let it be distinctly understood here, that we mean, by efficient producing cause, such a cause as nothing but an intelligent agent can constitute. No other cause can put forth volitions,

nor even participate with the mind in the efficient production of these effects. Edwards never dreamed of making motives the efficient producing cause of volition. If he ever employs the term "efficiency" in reference to them, it is never in such a sense as to make motives the agents which exercise volition. We admit, also, that while the mind is putting forth one volition, it has power to put forth another. No one act, no number of acts, can exhaust this power; it is a permanent attribute of the mind, an abiding possession, that cannot, for a moment, be alienated; an important trust committed, for which the mind is responsible; we do not say it is responsible for nothing else; but it is responsible for the use it makes of this. Further, we admit, that while the mind is putting forth one volition, it not only has *power* to put forth another, but it may at the same instant exercise that power. It may put forth two volitions at once; this is as evident, as that we can do two things at once, or cover two holes in a flute, at the same time, with different fingers. Nay, more; the mind has power to exert two volitions at the same time directly opposite, though not destructive of each other. This is just as easy as it is to sound a high note and a low one, at one and the same instant; and it may even put forth a great variety of opposing volitions, at the very same moment. Who ever doubts this, let him watch the movements of the fingers in a complicated performance on the piano; for all the different sounds that are heard at the same moment, there is a different touch of the finger; and a corresponding volition in the mind of the performer; and we may say, a corresponding motive, cause, or reason why, in each case, one note is sounded rather than another. It is just as evident, that the mind can put forth a variety of agreeing or disagreeing volitions at the same time, as that we can produce discord or harmony, by design, upon a musical instrument. The only thing, indeed, which the mind cannot do, in this line, is to will and not to will the same thing at the same moment, or to make the same volition a different volition. This is not denying freedom to the mind; it is only denying it the possibility of performing contradictions. Indeed, it could be no honor to an intelligent being to possess the power of effecting so grand an absurdity. When Edwards, therefore, and the writers of his school, assert, that, "at the instant in which we make a certain

choice, we have no power actually to make a contrary choice," they mean, as every one may see by a careful consideration of their language, that we have no power to make two choices at the same instant, destructive of each other; and that the conceptions of the intellect, the desires of the heart, and all other motives being the same, a different volition could not, merely from want of disposition in the agent, have been put forth. In this we are compelled to concur. We also admit, that the mind is a cause *per se*, limited indeed, conditioned, and dependent upon its Creator; susceptible, also, of *ab extra* influences, yet constituted to be, by the very activity of its nature, an originator of thought and motion; and is the only efficient producing cause of all its own acts. Some writers speak as if our judgments, affections, and desires, were produced in the mind by influences *ab extra*, and not by the mind; and, as if, when these exist, they can become in turn the cause of other mental acts, i. e., of volitions. But in the sense in which we are now using the term *cause*, this is not true. External things may furnish the *occasions*, upon which the mind forms judgments, and exercises affections; the latter, again, may become motives to the mind to put forth volition; but the mind alone can *originate* its judgments, affections, and volitions. The mind may be the recipient of influences from objects without, and from previous feelings and judgments within. Of these influences, it is not itself properly the cause; for it cannot be the recipient and cause of the same influences, at the same time. The mind is the *terminus ad quem*, where all these influences centre and exhaust themselves; but in case of volitions, passions, and judgments, the mind is the *terminus a quo*, from which they all proceed; it is the efficient producing cause, without which they could never have originated. These volitions, judgments, &c. are effects; but they are not effects of *influences*, in the same sense that they are effects of the mind, the producing agent. Whatever influences may be exerted on the mind, there is nothing produced by the mind which is not peculiarly its own.

We now feel authorized to pass over all the arguments which our author advances, in favor of any thing here admitted, as such arguments are entirely aside from the great point of controversy between Edwards and his opponents. But after all we have conceded in relation to the mind being

the cause of its own volitions, is it true, that the will has power to act, irrespective of any influence out of itself? Or, must the mind, in putting forth its volitions, in order to be free, divest itself of all intelligence, of all design, of all desire? Is volition free, only when it has been uninfluenced by any considerations, supplied either by the intellect or by the heart, by the truths of the gospel, or by the Holy Spirit? This is contingent volition,—volition for which no reason can be assigned, except that it springs from the *power of willing*, unprompted by any motive whatever. This, according to Prof. T., is freedom. But what kind of freedom must it be, for the mind to be governed by its own volitions, while these volitions themselves are entirely exempt from the control of any sense of propriety, or of the fitness of things, from any of the dictates either of reason or conscience? A contingent freedom, of such a nature, we are compelled to pronounce a most abject vassalage.* The true nature of freedom may be better understood, when we answer the question which still remains for us. Why does the mind put forth one volition rather than another? Or, in the language of Edwards, “What influences direct or determine the mind or will to come

* We cannot withhold from our readers the following eloquent remarks on contingent volition, from the author of the *History of Enthusiasm*:—“For a moment, let it be inquired, what advantage a sentient and intelligent being could derive from an absolute emancipation from causation, or from the certain sequency of effects? The very notion of a real contingency, in *this* sense, is inadmissible in philosophy. But let it be granted, as a thing conceivable. Ought not, then, this freedom from causation to be termed rather a necessity, of the most dire and formidable sort?—and he whose prerogative it should be, would become an object of as much pity, as the wretch who lives in the grasp and keeping of a madman. This power or prerogative of contingency, by the hypothesis, obeys no motive; adheres to no connection of truth with truth; is not to be calculated upon, or foreknown; is not governed by relationship to any actual existence, or abstract principle. But it is manifest, that, to an intelligent being, whose welfare is committed to himself, and who provides for that welfare by calculating upon the known order of nature, the liability to contingency, whether in the external or internal system, must be a pure curse, by deranging every provision and thwarting every purpose. A liability to sudden frenzy, would not be at all more fearful, than the liability to sudden contingency. The unhappy being, so privileged to live beyond the circle of nature, and so distinguished as an outlaw from the orderly system of causation, would be justified in making for himself such an apology as this,—‘Whenever, and as long as my conduct is governed by reasons and motives, I cheerfully consent to be treated as a responsible agent; and am willing to receive the due consequences of my actions. But not so in those dark moments, when the fit of contingency (my fatal glory) comes upon me:—then, and in those portentous moments, I am no longer master of my course; but am hurried hither and thither by a power in the last degree capricious, whose freakish movements neither men, nor angels, nor the Omniscient himself, can foresee. Fain would I surrender this fatal freedom, and take my place among those who enjoy the benefits of the laws of nature and reason; but it is the unalienable condition of my existence, to be governed by a power more stern and inexorable than Fate herself. Alas! contingency is mistress of my destinies.’”

to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or, what is the cause, ground, or reason, why it concludes thus and not otherwise?" Philosophy has no right to waive this inquiry. The solution of it is a natural demand of the human intellect, which must be satisfied. Prof. T. by no means does this, in saying, that nothing moves the will to go in one direction rather than another; that it is a cause *per se*; it goes in that direction, because it has power to go in that direction; or, that the particular determination is accounted for, in the very quality and attribute of the cause. The mere fact, that the mind has power to will in a certain direction, does not answer the above inquiry. As President Day well remarks, "the mere power of willing, is not of itself alone, even the reason why a man *wills at all*." This power is not a perpetual motion; it need not be always employed; it may often be suspended, and allowed an entire repose. Much less does this account for the mind's willing in one direction rather than another; for the same power might have been used in any direction. Nor does the quality and attribute of the cause sufficiently explain the fact. It would have been perfectly consistent with this quality and attribute, for the mind to have willed in a very different direction. Prof. T. constructs a labored argument,* not, indeed, to answer this inquiry, but rather to show that the inquiry itself is needless. But this argument, logically analyzed, amounts only to this: if causality be granted to the will, selection must be granted, likewise, in every act of causality; and if the will chooses, it must choose something. Therefore, the object chosen is sufficiently accounted for by the very fact of choosing it. Now, it is true, that wherever there is choice, something must be chosen; but does this prove that there is no cause or reason *why* that something was chosen, rather than any thing else? This is the very fact to be accounted for. We regard his illustration as peculiarly unfortunate; "to say, that fire burns wood and not stones, it is required to account for this selection of the fire, is the same thing as to say, that the causative act of fire must be accounted for by something which is not itself fire. But this is palpably absurd, since it is the very nature of this cause, to produce certain phenomena and not others." But it is not the nature

* Vol. II, p. 104.

of will to produce certain volitions and not others ; its nature will allow it to produce all sorts of volitions. It is, indeed, the nature of fire to burn wood and not stone ; but suppose it should burn one piece of wood, and not another, equally combustible, and which it was equally liable to reach ; should we not search for the cause of this, out of the nature of fire itself ?

The question, then, of Edwards, still remains for solution : "What is the cause, ground, or reason, why the mind wills one way rather than another?" As there must be some cause, we proceed to inquire what it is. But here, let it be distinctly understood, that we are now to use the term *cause*, in a very different sense from that in which we have heretofore employed it. When we ask, what is it that wills, we are inquiring for an efficient producing cause ; and the proper answer is, it is *mind* that wills. When we ask, *why* the mind wills one way rather than another, we are inquiring for a cause, in the sense of a *reason* or *motive*. But, says Prof. T., this inquiry does not respect the *cause* of phenomena, but the *reasons* or *design* of the phenomena ; it does not respect the *efficient*, but the *final* cause. Be it so ; and what is to hinder a final cause from being a motive to the mind, which shall be certainly and infallibly followed by volition ? May not all the busy volitions of active life, with all their particular directions, be accounted for, by a simple reference to the varying schemes, and plans, and ends, which men propose to themselves ? The intellect conceives a design, an end ; the feelings become enlisted in favor of it ; what is to hinder all this from operating as a motive or inducement to the mind, to put forth a volition for the accomplishment of this end ? Should this be the case, this conception of the intellect, in connection with the feelings which accompany it, is the antecedent ; the volition, the consequent ; and this consequent is so absolutely dependent upon the antecedent, that if the former had never entered the mind, the latter never could have existed ; and, if the existence of the former, with all its attendant circumstances, be supposed, the latter must certainly and infallibly follow. When we have found such an antecedent, we have completely satisfied the inquiry of Edwards,—What is the cause, ground, or reason, why the mind concludes thus and not otherwise ? But it is said, that such an antecedent only furnishes the *occasion*, upon which the mind causes

its own volitions. Be it so; Edwards expressly informs us, that, in this particular inquiry, he uses the term *cause* in such a sense, that it may sometimes signify an occasion, rather than cause, properly so called.

“Therefore, I sometimes use the word *cause* in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, in whole or part, why it is rather than not; or why it is, as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent, with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition, which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence or not. And, agreeably to this, I sometimes use the word *effect*, for the consequence of another thing, which is rather an *occasion* than a *cause*, most properly speaking.”

This language of Edwards has been surprisingly overlooked by his opponents. According to this notion of cause, motive does not *compel* volition, nor deprive it of its character of freedom, without which, indeed, it could not be volition; nevertheless, it does secure volition, though in a different way, with a certainty equally absolute; it serves as a ground or reason, in view of which, the mind infallibly puts forth, or efficiently produces, a free volition.

But there is one view which Prof. T. gives us of the will, which, if correct, must for ever prove fatal to all our reasonings against a self-determining power. He represents the will “as the *condition* of all acts of knowing;” as that “which gives birth to our earliest knowledges.” His meaning is, that we can have no knowledge whatever, till the will shall direct the intelligence, by an act of attention, to certain objects. Yet he says, the first characteristic of this act of attention, is, that it is under our control; but how under our control, when, as yet, we have neither sense nor reason? He says, “this act of attention is not an act of sensation, nor an act of intelligence; and yet, without it, the sensation leads to no results, and is not even recognized in the consciousness, and the intelligence springs not into activity.”* According to this, the mind can scarcely be a mind; at least, it cannot be conscious that it is a mind, till will sets in motion the wheels of thought. How it happens, that in this infantile state of all our other faculties, the will should have attained to such mature dignity, as to be able to teach our “young

* Vol. II, p. 40, 124.

ideas how to shoot," we are not informed. But if this be true, if even sensation itself can find no place in the consciousness, if the intellect can have no conceptions and the heart no desires, until will performs her task, then neither the intellect nor the sensibility can furnish this faculty with the least motive or inducement to action. Will, at least, at the commencement of her work, must, as a matter of necessity, be self-determined. But, if she can begin her work without the aid of the rest of our faculties, we see not why she may not carry it on, upon her own resources and responsibility, through all the varying emergencies of life. But we need spend no time in refuting this notion. Its absurdity is evident, from the very terms in which it is stated. What agent is there to use the power of will in an act of attention, while neither intelligence nor desire have yet been born; and even before sensation itself is recognized in the consciousness? The will must be a sovereign, indeed, to all our faculties, if they are thus to ask at her hands the boon of their very existence. This notion is contradicted by our author himself, when he tells us in subsequent pages, that "the intelligence supplies the will with objects and laws;" and, that the "will must act blindly and without purpose, unless it be supplied with knowledge, laws, and purposes, by the intelligence."* It is contradicted, also, by the admission of most other intelligent writers on the same side of the question, that the will can never act without a motive.

According to the above view, volition must always precede motive, and not be consequent upon it; nor, in any sense, occasioned by it. Prof. T., therefore, speaks of will, drawing its motive, sometimes from the reason, sometimes from the sensitivity; and, as able to act, irrespective of either; that is, it may act without motive. Or, if he represents the reason and sensitivity as presenting motives to the will, he always reserves to the will the power of choosing what motive it will allow itself to be influenced by. This, also, if it be true, must settle the question in favor of a self-determining power in the will. This is the theory of Mr. Chubb, whom Edwards so ably refutes. But, if we keep distinctly in view what the will is, the absurdity of this notion must be very obvious. What is it that is to govern the man? Is it him-

* Vol. II, p. 135.

self, that is to say, his intelligent and sentient nature? Or, is it the mere blind power of willing? If I am deliberating what book to read, and my judgment and inclination seem to have some difficulty in deciding, what is to settle the question? Shall my mere power of reading take the matter in hand, and decide it for me? Does my power of reading go from the reason to the sensibility for advice, and after all, decide, irrespective of either? This would be just as proper, as to talk of the will drawing its motive from reason or passion, and deciding according to either, or irrespective of both. But, it is asked, is not a volition good or bad, virtuous or vicious, just according to its motive? Undoubtedly; but if the volition precede the motive, how can it derive its characteristic from the motive? This brings us to the point, which settles the great question of freedom. That mind is free, whose volitions obey, implicitly and infallibly, the mind's own dictates. It matters not how the mind may have come by its judgments or its preferences, whether necessarily or contingently. It matters not which of its numerous active principles may, at the time, furnish the strongest motive; whether it be reason or conscience, self-interest or benevolence, love of glory or love of country, a right feeling or a wrong one; the will must obey. Should it refuse submission to a wrong principle, it would be just as likely to refuse submission to a right one; a revolt, in either case, would be a dangerous precedent, tending to the destruction of all freedom. Will is a power committed to the mind for its own use; without this, the mind could not be perfectly free; freedom must, also, in many important respects, perish, if this power should refuse to be controlled by the motives of the mind. But the very supposition of such an event is an absurdity. As well might I talk of my power to read refusing to submit to my determination to read. We see now, the two notions of freedom. Which shall we choose? That freedom which consists in a power to *will* and to *act*, in accordance with the pleasure of the mind, according to the promptings of the judgment and the dictates of the heart; or, that freedom which consists in having a power which will do just as it pleases, despite of reason or conscience, judgment or feeling; and whose glory it is to refuse absolutely to be governed by any motive whatever. Prof. T. chooses the latter, with many of its logical consequences; and for choosing the

former, he charges Edwards with fatalism, pantheism, and atheism.

We now advance to a still more serious topic of consideration, the extent of our accountability. And here we are constrained to pause, and interrogate our own heart afresh, in relation to the motives by which we are actuated. We are now leaving the region of speculative theories, and approaching a great moral question. If ever it becomes us to lay aside pride of opinion, and mere love of system, it surely is here. If candor, and a sober regard to truth, should at all times characterize our reasoning, they are especially requisite in those investigations which intimately affect our relations to the great moral Governor of the universe, and which are to adjust the claims of his law upon our hearts. Happy for us, if the conclusions of the intellect shall not be at war with the decisions of conscience. The fundamental principle adopted by Prof. T. in relation to this particular, is thus expressed. "According to the results of our investigations on this subject, man is responsible only for that which is under the determinations of his will. *The power of choice and volition is the only moral and responsible power*; and what cannot be governed or influenced by this in the individual, he cannot be responsible for."* At first thought, many of our readers may suppose that this position is incontrovertible. But let us be careful, in the first place, to understand it; and then let us see whether it is susceptible of demonstration. Let it be particularly noticed, that it is not said, man is responsible *for all that is within his power*, and for nothing that is not within his power; but that he is responsible only for that which is under the determination of his *will*; and that the power of choice and volition is the only moral and responsible power. Let this statement be taken, also, in connection with the limited signification of the term *will*, in Prof. Tappan's scheme, as implying a power to put forth volitions only; from which are excluded, not only all the operations of the intellect, but all our emotions and passions, and all the affections and desires of the heart. Unless this circumstance be kept in view, we fear, that, in controverting the above position, we shall seem to call in question a doctrine upon which there has been a general agreement

* Vol. III, p. 257.

among metaphysical and theological writers. The generality of European writers have, heretofore, ascribed to the will all the mental phenomena, which were not classed with the operations of the intellect. In this they were followed by the majority of metaphysical and theological writers in our own country. Hence, nothing is more common, than for them to represent man as accountable only for what is *voluntary*. But in this, they would include, not only volitions, properly so called, but all our passions, affections, and desires, and even the very disposition and state of the heart. It is in accordance with this usage, that Edwards himself ascribes responsibility to the will alone, in the following passage. "So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required; and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct, and immediate subject of command; and if this cannot be prescribed, or required, by command or precept, nothing can; for other things can be required no otherwise, than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good will." His meaning is, that a good heart is required by the law of God; and that other things are required, and are acceptable, only as they are the fruits of a good heart. He would say, that volitions themselves would not be acceptable to God, unless prompted by a good heart. Now this is not the doctrine which we controvert; but it is the principle, that the *power of imperative volition is the only responsible power*. Edwards has clearly demonstrated, that this principle, if consistently carried out, must banish all virtue and vice from the universe. But the objections upon which we shall at present insist, are, that it is too narrow in its range; that it degrades from the dignity of moral and accountable feelings by far the most important phenomena of the human mind; and that it transfers responsibility entirely from that very department of our nature, with which, as Mackintosh has well observed, "*morality more immediately deals*." Nothing is more common, than for ethical and theological writers to speak of the virtuous and vicious affections: by which they mean, not only affections which lead to right or wrong volitions and actions, but affections which are, in themselves, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious. And what is more natural in common life, than to hear men speak of malignant passions, wicked dispositions, vicious propensities, and corrupt inclinations?—plainly showing that it is the decision of the common

consciousness, that a moral character attaches itself not merely to external actions and to volitions, but to the disposition, propensity, or state of heart, from which action and volition spring. So that the heart, or what Prof. T. calls the sensitivity, is, by common consent, regarded as the source of all that is morally good or evil in man. Indeed, a true psychology may adopt as her own, and as the result of her own experience, the language of Revelation, "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies." Can it be, then, that a state of heart, or a disposition, which necessarily produces such evils, is not in itself wrong? Sir James Mackintosh considered it a "noble principle," which Edwards announces, when he says, "true religion in a great measure *consists in holy affections*. A love of divine things, for the beauty and sweetness of their moral excellency, is the spring of all holy affections." He, also, in speaking of Malebranche, says, "he is, perhaps, the first philosopher who has precisely laid down, and rigidly adhered to, the great principle, that *virtue consists in pure intentions, or dispositions of mind*; without which, actions, however conformable to rules, are not truly moral; a truth of the highest importance, which, in the theological form, may be said to have been the main principle of the first Protestant reformers." How slow must philosophy have been in arriving at a principle, which theology had long and patiently taught before! And can it be that she is now impatient to unlearn a lesson, which it was so difficult to acquire? Against this great principle, and the one above ascribed to Edwards, Prof. Tappan's philosophy enters a decided protest. According to this, true religion and virtue can consist in no holy affections, in no pure intentions and dispositions, and, indeed, in no abiding principle whatever; for all these belong to the sensitivity, whose states and acts are all without the sphere of accountability. It is in volition alone, that we can find either virtue or vice. Neither affection nor passion, neither love nor hatred towards God or man, can possess, in itself, any moral character; for will is the only responsible power, and the only "spring of all holy affections." It is due to our author, however, to say, that he makes a laudable effort to evade this alarming consequence, and does every thing which his system will possibly admit of, to redeem the phenomena of the sensitivity from the degrada-

tion to which his philosophy has doomed them. "The question," he says, "may here be asked, whether we are not guilty for impure desires and passions, as well as for choice and volitions, transgressing the law? We reply at once in the affirmative." But he carefully gives us to understand, that we are guilty for these, only so far as they are consequent upon our previous volition; inasmuch as "it is through the relation of will to the sensitivity, that our responsibility arises with respect to the affections developed."* This, we conceive, is not mitigating the principle in the least, which restricts virtue to the mere exercise of volition. It still does not allow us to say, that "true religion *consists* in holy affections;" it must consist in the volition to place certain objects before our minds, adapted to produce holy affections. Where this volition is put forth, there ceases our responsibility, there ceases our virtue, so far as the consequences are concerned. For, according to this philosophy, after an object adapted to excite a pure affection, is once placed before our minds, a pure affection is a matter of necessity; and we are no more praiseworthy for exercising it, than we are for seeing a certain object, when it is held before the eyes. And if we have impure affections, we are blameworthy only in case we designedly place before our minds the objects which excite them. Hence, neither virtue nor vice can consist in the *exercise* of good or evil affections, in themselves considered.

"It cannot be denied," says Prof. T., "that where the Bible commands certain affections of the sensitivity, or where it condemns certain other affections, they are always those *specific affections* which depend for their development upon the activity of the will, in the manner above pointed out." Now we do most unhesitatingly deny this. The Bible commands love to God; but where does it say any thing about different species of this love? Where does it say that this species only is acceptable, which is consequent upon a previous volition? And where does it repudiate that species, which springs up in the heart without any previous design of the agent? Is it not a revealed fact in the Bible, that wherever true love to God takes possession of the heart, it in no instance results from the will of man, but is uniformly

the result of the Holy Spirit's influence? But it may be asked, does the Spirit dispense with the service of the human will in the production of love to God? We reply, that it can be clearly proved from the Bible, that love to God, wherever it exists in the heart, uniformly precedes, and is the cause of, every proper direction of the will towards God. It is equally evident, also, that love is, in itself, and in its own nature, the fulfilling of the law, irrespective entirely of the mode of its production.

We do not deny, that the will may be employed for the improvement of the sensitivity, and that such use of the will is a proper subject of command; and that we are truly responsible for all that can be accomplished in this way; but we deny, that the Bible condemns only "*those specific affections*" which depend upon the will. Impure affections and unholy passions are condemned, on account of their own nature; they bring with them guilt, even where they spring up without any previous intention of the agent, and where his will has had no concern in their production. Here we especially dissent from Prof. T., who says, that "when an object, in correlation with a depraved sensitivity, comes suddenly, unexpectedly, and without any choice and volition of the individual, the emotion, immediately and necessarily excited, cannot be a matter of responsibility."* We see not why the principle here avowed would not fully justify the following sentiment, from Finney's "Sermons on changing the heart:"

"Emotions of love or hatred to God, that are not directly or indirectly produced by the will, have no moral character. A real Christian, under circumstances of strong temptation, may feel emotions of opposition to God rankling in his mind. If he has voluntarily placed himself under these circumstances of temptation, he is responsible for these emotions. If the subject that creates these emotions has been forced upon him by Satan, or in any way against his will, he is not responsible for them. If he divert his attention, if he flee from the scene of temptation, if he does what belongs to him to resist and repress these emotions, he has not sinned."

We doubt, however, whether Prof. T. could approve of this language. We should judge that he has a mind too delicate to perpetrate such a sentence as this. He would not willingly do such violence to the feelings of a pious heart. There is not so unguarded an expression in all his work.

* Vol. III, p. 33.

He endeavors, as far as possible, to make his philosophy speak in the language of common Christians, and of common men. Yet we cannot but perceive, that his philosophy meditates an ultimate repeal of the authority of the divine law over our whole moral nature.

In order to settle the question as to the morality of the affections, let us now hastily glance at the grounds upon which a moral character may be accredited or denied to any of the mental phenomena. We have already shown, that as the mind, and not the will, is itself personality and causality, the acts of the intellect and of the sensibility are as truly our own, as the acts of the will. Here, therefore, all the mental phenomena stand on the same level; they are all equally *ours*; so that in this respect, at least, there can be no ground of distinction. Is it then the mere fact, that they have been produced by a previous volition, that raises any of the mental phenomena to the dignity of responsible acts? If so, then volitions themselves cannot be responsible acts; for Prof. T. admits that these are not produced by previous volitions. Is the pre-eminence to be assigned to phenomena, then, owing to the fact merely, that they proceed from the substance of the will? But what is the substance of the will, but the substance of the mind? The mind is the only agent, will is one of its powers; but why is it not responsible for the acts of its other faculties, as well as for those of will? Is it said, that the mind is responsible for nothing, which is not within its power? But is volition alone within its power? Surely, if affections and passions were not within its power, it could not put them forth. It is said, that these affections and passions are the result of necessity. But of what kind of necessity? Surely of no necessity that can interfere with responsibility. A man may be to blame, even for a physical confinement in a dungeon, if he delight in that confinement; and if this delight of his heart is the only cause of his confinement. So the man who indulges any impure affections and desires, is under no necessity, which a different disposition would not entirely remedy. Can such a necessity in any case destroy responsibility? If so, then the stronger the disposition to evil, the less demerit there is in committing it. The highest form of iniquity would then bring with it its own apology; and a previous disposition to virtue would make virtue itself impossible. It is evident, that we have not

yet discovered the foundation upon which we may rest the claims of any of our affections or mental acts to a moral character ; nor can we, till we search for it in the *nature* of these feelings and acts themselves. Here it is that we find it, and no where else. And when it once flashes upon the mind, that it is exclusively upon the nature of a particular feeling that we are to found its claims to a moral character, we feel perfectly satisfied with this disposition of the matter, and a thousand difficulties immediately disappear. It is not by speculative reasoning upon the origin or consequences of a particular feeling, that we are to ascertain whether it is right or wrong ; it is by the immediate perception of a faculty, given to us for the very purpose of teaching us moral distinctions. That must be wrong, which the moral sense of each man and of all men pronounces wrong, with a firmness which no sophistry nor skepticism can shake. On what other ground can mere philosophy know any thing to be right or wrong ? Let us now try by this criterion the feelings of pride, revenge, cruelty, covetousness, malignity, hatred of God. We need ask no man what his philosophy is, what creed he has embraced, or what metaphysical theory he advocates ; we only ask him to interrogate carefully his own moral nature in relation to these feelings ; and we are willing to abide the issue. If he decide according to the testimony of an unbiassed conscience, he will pronounce them wrong, as certainly as he possesses a human soul. And if they are wrong, no apology can be made for them that can annihilate their guilt. No matter whether they have arisen suddenly, or gradually ; under provocation, or without provocation ; by our own previous choice and design, or without any choice or design ; their essential nature is not in the least degree changed. Vice consists in the exercise of such feelings, and in possessing the dispositions and state of heart from which they flow ; and virtue consists in the opposite class of feelings, and in the state and dispositions of heart from which they proceed. And while we are not disposed to deny to volitions the dignity of possessing a moral character, yet they are in general evidently entitled to this rank, only on account of their connection with some moral feeling. It is generally admitted, that they draw their characteristic, as being right or wrong, entirely and exclusively from the motive, feeling, desire, affection or passion by which they are prompted. But

we place the phenomena of the intellect upon a level with volitions in this respect. These, too, may be raised to the same dignity by the same connection; they acquire a moral character, when influenced and determined by moral considerations. Who can deny that the judgment which the Jews formed of Christ was culpable? But why culpable? It was because their judgments were swayed by the state and feelings of their hearts. Our judgments have a moral quality, only as they stand in connection with our moral feelings. They are not, in their own essential nature, either morally right or wrong. But this cannot be said of that class of phenomena belonging to the sensibility usually called moral. These feelings, desires, affections, and passions, draw their characteristic from no volition, no judgment; they are *per se*, and in their own essential nature, right or wrong. A spirit of revenge and cruelty could not be altered in its character, by the absence of all previous volition and design in its production. No mistake of judgment, no sudden impulse, could alter the character of hatred to God. If it can properly be called hatred to God, conscience will ask no farther questions before she pronounces it utterly wrong and inexcusable. And when the existence of a state of heart, or a disposition, is detected, which naturally and necessarily gives rise to wrong feelings and passions, conscience also pronounces such a state or disposition wrong and inexcusable, without ever pausing to inquire how it came into existence. No possible method of accounting for its origin could, constituted as we are, change in the least our moral estimate of the disposition itself. If conscience did not condemn such a state of heart as wrong, why are we under moral obligation to seek to have our corrupt propensities eradicated, and the heart purified? And why should we check the first rising of impure emotion, if this emotion itself is not, in its own nature, wrong? Prof. T. says, "the moment the emotion with its true character is recognized by the consciousness, the individual is bound to resist." But what is the true character of an emotion, which is neither right nor wrong? And what can bind us to resist such an emotion? The truth is, the very intimation of conscience, that an emotion is to be resisted, is an unanswerable argument that it is wrong; and if wrong, it cannot even make its appearance in the consciousness, however speedily it may be checked, without leaving a moral stain behind.

The conclusions at which we arrive are, that man's responsibility extends not merely to his volitions, but to all his desires, affections, and passions ; and even to the state of his heart ; and, that the only ground upon which a moral quality can be ascribed to any mental act or state, is to be sought for exclusively in the nature of this mental act or state itself. That system of philosophy, therefore, must carry with it its own condemnation, which undertakes an apology for any of our impure and corrupt affections, or which attempts to vindicate depravity itself from being a sin. For, however its seductive suggestions may be received by the mind, while conscience is in a state of repose, the insulted dignity of man's moral nature will ultimately rise in its majesty, and spurn with contempt such base flatteries ; and would rather make an open and candid acknowledgment of guilt, than be thought degradingly ignorant of moral distinctions.

If our conclusions are correct, they decide the question in relation to the sinfulness of our native depravity, or of that state of heart which precedes all moral action, and predisposes man to actual transgression. It will then appear, that psychology and revelation harmonize in the same great truth, that we are "by nature the children of wrath." It is quite evident that Paul, in the 7th of Romans, calls depravity sin, and that he regarded it as "exceeding sinful." This was, also, one of the fundamental doctrines of the reformers. "Proud hypocrites," says Melancthon, "teach that corrupt affections, unless we yield to them our consent, are not sinful ; but this," he says, "is false and insulting to the law of God ; and that it is contradicted by Paul's own language, when he defines this itself to be sin, and says that it is evil in our members, contending against the law of God."*

We have now finished our remarks upon the prominent errors of Prof. Tappan's scheme. It will be perceived, that we have left the minor details of his system entirely untouched. Whether the considerations we have suggested are of any weight, we shall leave our readers to judge. We had intended to examine, particularly, the application he makes of his philosophy to the doctrines of revelation ; but, as we have already transcended our limits, we must satisfy ourselves with a few brief remarks upon this department of the subject.

* *Loci Theologici—De bonis operibus.*

The author's system allows him to admit the doctrine of man's native depravity,—that he is born depraved. This depravity has its seat in the heart, or sensitivity ; but, as he will not allow that the heart is the seat of virtue and religion, this depravity need not necessarily interfere with either ; it is not sinful, and man is in no sense responsible for it. It furnishes no necessary obstacle to duty. As all duty is circumscribed to the sphere of will, the will can, of itself, discharge every duty without any aid from the sensitivity ; it need not draw a single motive from this source. This is expressly avowed : “ Let the sensitivity be taken as totally opposed to some duty enjoined by morality or religion, so that the duty, when contemplated, awakens only strong dislike ; then again, in this case, and in the very face of the dislike, the freewill or personality can perform the duty.” But here let us pause, to inquire whether any thing like this can be found in all the word of God. In the first place, it is a virtual abandonment of the scriptural doctrine of depravity, to admit only a kind of depravity which has nothing of the nature of sin. Let evangelical Christians beware how they allow themselves to be allured from a great and important truth, by such a shadow. Let them be assured, that there is no medium between the doctrine of a sinful depravity, and absolute Pelagianism. Prof. T. meets the passage in Eph. 2 : 3, not as a guide to truth, but as an obstacle to be removed out of the way of his system. “ Ye were by nature the children of wrath.” His exegesis consists in omitting part of this sentence, and constructing the remainder into an interrogation. He asks, When were ye the children of wrath ? —and replies, “ when ye walked according to the course of this world.” But, who can read the passage, without perceiving the incongruity of making the apostle say, “ ye were by nature the children of wrath, when ye began to walk according to the course of this world ?” To the question, When were ye the children of wrath ? Paul answers, “ ye were by *nature* the children of wrath ;” that is, ye were born so. The passage means, that we are born to the inheritance of a sinful nature, which renders us the children of wrath. But it is asked, Do the Scriptures really teach that we are doomed to the wrath of God, for that in which we have had no agency ? We answer, the Scriptures teach no such thing. We had no agency in committing Adam's sin ; and

we are not condemned for committing it. We could not help being born descendants of Adam, and we are not condemned for not helping it. But if we sustain or possess a disposition of heart which gives rise to sinful emotions and affections, who can say we have no agency in sin? These emotions and affections are our own acts. Even the very state of heart from which these spring, is, itself, a moral defect, which cannot be viewed with complacency by the eye of Infinite Purity. A holy God will adjust his displeasure, in each particular case, to our real deserts. Into his merciful hands we are willing to commit the destinies of our race; but let us not be wilfully blind to our real moral condition.

Again, we would ask, Does it correspond with the teachings of Revelation to say, that, let the heart be totally opposed to some duty enjoined by religion, so that the duty, when contemplated, awakens only a strong dislike, the will can in this case, of itself, perform the duty? Most assuredly not. How can a pure and holy God accept such a service? He will be satisfied with no obedience which springs not from the heart. True, we may go forward in obedience to some divine command, while we are conscious of many opposing inclinations; but we may be prompted by a still stronger feeling of love to God; so that, on the whole, we do not dislike, but really approve the duty. Yet, even in this case, our duty is defective; while a single opposing feeling remains, the divine law is not completely fulfilled. It requires not merely the consent of the will, but of every feeling of the heart. According to the above doctrine, we see not why depravity should be regarded as so great an evil. It is not itself sin, nor need it prevent the discharge of any duty. Indeed, according to Prof. T., it cannot be called an evil at all; for he tells us there is no evil but moral evil, and that this consists in wrong volitions. The Holy Spirit, it is acknowledged, in regeneration, changes the sensitivity; but why is this so necessary, if this philosophy be true? Why may we not go through life, discharging our duties, without any change in the sensitivity?

But we forbear, for the present, farther remarks. We may, in a future number, inquire how far the system we have been considering has enabled its author to succeed in the refutation of Edwards.

ARTICLE V.

THE AGE OF LORENZO DE' MEDICI.

The Life of Lorenzo de' Medici, called the Magnificent.

By WILLIAM ROSCOE. In two volumes, pp. 448, 453, 8vo. Philadelphia, Carey & Hart. 1842.

THE history of Florence (*Ital.* Firenze), the capital of the grand-duchy of Tuscany, can be traced back, according to popular tradition, to the times of the dictatorship of Sylla, or, according to Politiano, to the triumvirate of Octavius, Anthony, and Lepidus. It originated from the ancient city Fiesole, whose walls still remain, at the distance of about three miles from Florence. When the Roman state was overrun by the northern barbarians, Florence followed the fate of the rest of Italy. But, as early as A. D. 1010, it had recovered some degree of strength and independence, which it exerted against the place from which it sprung. The government of Florence was directed by a council of the citizens, and a chief executive officer called the Gonfaloniere, or standard-bearer, who was chosen every two months. But the discord and animosity that arose from the instability of an administration, fluctuating as it did, from an early period, between the aristocratic and the popular form, may easily be conceived. When either of the contending factions gained the ascendancy, the leaders of it soon disagreed in the exercise of their power, and the weaker party, attaching themselves to the body of the people, effected a revolution. Alternations of this sort were continually going on; and the frequency of electing their magistrates fomented a spirit of continual opposition. But these disadvantages were amply compensated by the great degree of freedom enjoyed by the citizens of Florence, which had the most favorable effect on their character, and gave them a decided superiority over the rest of the inhabitants of Italy. There was nothing in the form of their government, to prevent even the poorest member of the body politic from attaining wealth and influence, and gradually rising to the highest honors of the state. Hence, it was im-

possible that there should be an indolence and a stagnation of talent in ancient families, relying, as is too often the case, in an aristocratic government, on ancestral dignity, and unwieldy accumulations of wealth. The rivalry created by the industry and talent of the people at large, made them feel the uncertainty of any such reliance. It promoted a spirit of untiring and meritorious exertion to deserve well of their fellow-citizens, in the families of the high and low, rich and poor, ancient and recent. Their faculties were cultivated by the necessities of their mercantile pursuits. The careful examination and free discussion of the measures of the government, and of the character and ability of the citizens who administered it, contributed also to the discrimination and general education of the common people. Intercourse with foreign nations produced mental enlargement. Deep as was the darkness, whose pall enshrouded the countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, during the middle ages, the merchants of Florence could not go abroad without receiving some intellectual benefit. "The fatigues of public life, and the cares of mercantile avocations," says Mr. Roscoe, "were alleviated at times, by the study of literature, or the speculations of philosophy." It is possible, that, in the beginning of the revival of letters in Europe, this was true of a very few persons only; honorable exceptions to the general mass; lights, shining with an incipient and pale radiance, whose brilliancy was noticeable, chiefly on account of the gloom of the surrounding darkness. But they were enough to awaken a spirit of literary enthusiasm among the various ranks of society. They were enough to create a setting of the tide in favor of learning. They were enough to convince the community, that a people devoted to the cultivation of a polished literature, and warmly attached to the pure taste exhibited by the ancient models, have, in every respect, the advantage of men who, though they have intelligent souls, are delivered up to sottish ignorance and imbecility. But a very few persons, in an elevated station, could give direction to many. They could communicate their own life and inspiration to the mass about them. They could encourage the collection of manuscripts, and specimens of architecture. They could interpret parchments and coins, and explain their value to the less enlightened of their countrymen. The popular character of the government, which opened the highest stations to the ambi-

tion of the citizens generally, created an inducement for the poor to emulate the rich in industry and intelligence, and for the unlettered to strive after the cultivation of the learned. The superiority of the citizens of Florence was universally acknowledged ; and they became the historians, poets, orators, and preceptors of Europe. There collections were made from the antiquities that belonged to the best periods of Grecian and Roman civilization. There were gardens, and palaces, and paintings. There were libraries and the classics in them. And there were scholars, who could appreciate them, and be moulded by them. Few they may have been, and immature, when compared with the scholars of a later age, and living under more favorable auspices. But the influence of an individual, whose earnest sincerity of spirit pleads his cause for him, cannot be over-rated. One reproduces his thousands. The good seed yields, in some, an hundred fold. The sun shining upon a mirror, cut with a thousand facets, gives a thousand images of itself. The thousand facets of human society all reflect the image of a mind, capable of shedding around it light and heat. And while the orb of day sheds his beams upon the mirror, every facet, according to its position, both receives its modicum of light from every other, and communicates to every other something of its own light. It was thus that Florence became the cradle of the arts in Europe, at the period of their regeneration.

It is an interesting fact, in the history of Italy, that the light of literature was not wholly quenched there, even in the darkest period of the middle ages. The Latin language, it is true, degenerated very much from its original elegance. It was corrupted by the admixture of foreign words, introduced through the influence of the northern barbarians. The dialect of the common people, if it was ever equal to the literary language of Cicero and Horace, had lost its eloquence and beauty. The cultivated Italian did not arise until the period of Boccaccio, who is commonly regarded as the father of Italian prose. But there was still a succession of learned men, in the clerical and other professions, some of whose works remain to us. From the period of Charlemagne, early in the ninth century, it is easy to trace, by literary monuments in the form of treatises on dialectics, theology, medicine, jurisprudence, lexicography and history, the condition of literature in its stationary periods, and in its occasional

seasons of more successful development, together with the influences which gave it these occasional impulses; and in its seasons of retrogradation, with the causes of such retrogradation, even down to the present time. During some portions of the middle ages, literature and the arts could boast little advancement. The breath of life remained in the system; but there was neither spirit nor progress. In other portions, the world of letters seemed reviving on every side. Influences were at work, which gave a fresh spring to the energies of cultivated minds, and opened new sources of information. Lothaire, who was king of Italy, A. D. 823, founded the first public schools in many cities; and Eugene II followed his example in the states of the church. But on account of the want of competent teachers, these schools gradually fell into decay. The popes, Gregory II and Alexander III, were friends of learning, and took measures to improve the schools. During their incumbency, the copies of ancient classic works were multiplied, and individuals took pains to collect books. Petrarch was a very zealous laborer in this department. In all his journeys, he made it one of his chief aims to gather together valuable manuscripts; and when he could not purchase and carry them away with him, he transcribed them. A copy of Virgil in his hand-writing, is still in the Ambrosian library at Milan. He complains, in a letter from Flanders, that in the rich city of Liege, he could hardly find a little yellow ink to copy a few orations of Cicero. Notwithstanding a prevailing deficiency of good taste, the Greek and Latin languages were studied by a few persons, who thus opened the way to the knowledge of the ancients; and, by imitating the style of such models, contributed to the literary elevation and advancement of their country. The crusades, whose influence at first was injurious, ultimately proved the means of great benefit to the cause of letters. They led to new sources of knowledge, and thus gave a new impulse to literary advancement. From about the close of the twelfth to the end of the thirteenth century, princes and states in Italy vied with each other in encouraging scholars, and in founding institutions for education. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the university of Bologna contained 13,000 students. The writings of Aristotle became known to the Italians, and Thomas Aquinas, by command of the pope, wrote a commentary on them. Mathematics and grammar, including

belles-lettres, were cultivated. Marco Polo, with his father and uncle, by their distant journeys through Asia, improved the science of geography, opened wider fields for the acquisition of knowledge, and enlarged the sphere of the enterprise of their countrymen. The Troubadours of Provence, who emigrated to the south of Italy during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in consequence of encouragements which they received from the Neapolitan court, disseminated throughout Italy the peculiar style of their poetry. This had an influence on the works of the earliest authors. But the Provençale literature had in it nothing progressive. It was, in its nature, stationary; and, therefore, in the presence of a literature continually advancing and improving, it might well be said to embrace within itself the elements of its own extinction. However strongly its influence might be felt, it would be overshadowed ultimately by the growth even of its own offspring. But Dante (born 1265), Petrarch (born 1304), and Boccaccio (born 1313), laid anew the foundations of taste and letters, in the country already consecrated by the memory of the classic authors of Roman literature. By means of their works, the polished language of Italian writers obtained a settled form, having entered into substantial being, as one of the fixed and finished tongues in which modern literature is enshrined. Dante died in 1321, Petrarch in 1374, and Boccaccio in 1375. After the death of the latter, the rising literature retrograded for nearly a century and a half. The Italian language was so far debased, as, by the acknowledgment of the best critics, to have become scarcely intelligible. By the recent discovery of the lost classics, the attention of scholars was turned away from the cultivation of their own tongue, and the invention of a national literature. But this very event increased the taste for learning, and secured an acquaintance with the best models. At the same time, the conquest of Constantinople, by Mohammed (1452), drove to Florence many learned Greek exiles, by whose influence the germs of science and literature were trained up to a healthy growth.

It was just at this point that the literary influence of the family of the Medici began to be felt. In the language of Mr. Roscoe, "Cosmo de' Medici, after having established his authority in Florence, devoted the latter years of a long and honorable life to the encouragement, and even the study,

of philosophy and polite letters. He died in 1464; and the infirm state of health of his son Piero, who was severely afflicted by the gout, did not permit him to make that progress in the path which his father had pointed out, which his natural disposition would otherwise have effected. After surviving him only about five years, the greater part of which time he was confined to a sick bed, he died, leaving two sons, to the elder of whom, Lorenzo, the praise of having restored to literature its ancient honors, is principally due."

It is of little importance to trace the origin of the Medici, or the circumstances which gave them their power. It is sufficient to say, that for many ages before Lorenzo, the family had been esteemed one of the most considerable in the republic. By strict attention to commerce, with skill and prudence in conducting their operations, they rose to immense wealth. By affability and liberality, they secured the confidence of their fellow-citizens. By a moderate use of their authority, and a meek appearance of seeming to submit to the honors bestowed upon them, and the offices committed to their trust, rather than to demand or usurp them, they retained that confidence. And when occasionally, as in the time of Cosmo, by the violence of parties, Guelf warring against Ghibeline, and Bianchi and Neri contending together for the ascendancy, the Medici were shorn of their authority, a strong party of the people, mindful of the obligations they had conferred on the state, and won to their cause by the unaffected humility with which they had worn their honors, were always prepared to promote their restoration. Their authority consisted, as Mr. R. informs us, rather in a tacit influence on their part, and a voluntary acquiescence on that of the people, than in any prescribed or definite compact between them. The citizens imagined that they enjoyed the full exercise of their liberties; but such was the power of the Medici, that they generally either assumed to themselves the first offices of the state, or nominated such persons as they thought proper; although, in this exercise of power, they paid great respect to popular opinion. An interchange of reciprocal good offices was the only tie by which the Florentines and the Medici were bound.

The foundation of the greatness of the Medici family was laid, by Giovanni, the great-grandfather of Lorenzo. That which Giovanni commenced, Cosmo, his oldest son, carried

forward. The period of the administration of Piero, the son of Cosmo, was not distinguished by any new triumphs in government or learning. It was well for Florence, in a literary and political view, that his days were short. Hence, whatever occurred in the reigns of Giovanni and Cosmo, calculated to elevate the literary reputation, or to enlarge the political power of Florence, served to add illumination to the brilliant career of Lorenzo. The age of his great-grandfather and grandfather was preparatory to the splendor of his own. In their days, the stones and timbers were hewn and fitted, which, in the days of Lorenzo, were built up into a magnificent temple. Their age was preparatory to his, as his age was preparatory to the ages following; the influence of which has been felt in various and distant countries down to our own times.

An age of the world is generally such as it is made by the formative influences of preceding ages, acting upon it. Both in the physical and moral world, causes and consequences are perpetually succeeding one another. That which was the consequence of one event, becomes, in its turn, the cause of another. If the circumstances of a given period call forth a man, and, so to speak, form him, those circumstances, and that man, so far as his influence operates, determine the character of the period which follows. It is thus that a man lives, after his body is dead. The cold earth enshrouds the mortal tenement. We see no longer the speaking eye, nor hear the eloquent voice. But the principles which he established and exemplified, the inspiration which he breathed around him, the causes which he originated, ever fertile in their appropriate results, can no more be buried, than the immaterial, immortal soul. He lives again in the following age. And thus every age re-appears in its successor, like in general producing like, life springing out of life, light giving birth to augmented light, and progress resulting in still further progression. But, on the other hand, the excesses of one age sometimes seem to produce characteristics of an opposite nature, a superabundance of darkness issuing in light, and the most profound ignorance and superstition, in knowledge; as an unusual degree of cold in an arctic winter produces the same effect as the return of heat upon the torpid animals,—to awaken them from their torpidity. Thus the very darkness and thick night of popery, which preceded the age of the Reformation (we speak only of the state of religion), aroused the spirit of Luther, to call

out from his cell at Wittenberg, "Watchman, what of the night?" And the midnight of error hastened the breaking of the morning of truth.

Yet this exception, which we have stated, may be apparent rather than real. There has been no age, in which some gleams of light have not penetrated the gloom. And, shooting abroad from nation to nation, from the south to the north, from the west to the east, and back again from the east to the west, it is impossible to calculate the influence they may have had in completing a renovation already begun, or in accomplishing that, in a nation or in an individual mind, to which there was before a tendency. The light which continued to linger in Italy in the darkest period of the dark ages, shone across the waters, to the island of Britain. There the star of Wickliffe came up, as the harbinger of the Reformation. Its rays penetrated to Germany, where, after a time, Luther and his coadjutors shed over the moral heavens a responsive radiance. Switzerland, France, Scotland, and other countries, as it were answering the signal, sent up their successive lights; and these were followed by others, rising as it were simultaneously, until the whole firmament glowed with the illumination. From the period of the dark ages, we can trace the influence of century upon century, and almost of generation upon generation, even down to our own times.

The preparations made in the age of Giovanni and Cosmo, for the advancement of taste and learning which occurred in the age of Lorenzo de' Medici, would alone furnish materials for an interesting history. The early part of the fifteenth century was characterized by an extreme avidity for the works of the ancient writers; and the wealth of the opulent was directed to the recovery and preservation of them. Among the most diligent and successful of the learned men of his time, whose attention was turned to these researches, was Poggio, born of Florentine parents in 1381. He was secretary at Rome, in the service of eight popes; and in 1452, being then upwards of seventy years of age, he was invited to Florence, as secretary of the republic. In the convent of S. Gallo, in 1415, he discovered a complete copy of Quinctilian, whose works hitherto had appeared only in an imperfect and mutilated state. At the same time, he found a part of the writings of Valerius Flaccus, "buried in the

obscurity of a dark and lonely tower, covered with filth and rubbish." He afterwards recovered, in France and Germany, several of the orations of Cicero. It is also affirmed, that he first discovered the poem of Lucretius, that of Silvius Italicus, the work of Columella, and the poems of Statius. At the instance of Poggio, the first complete copy of Plautus was brought to Rome, by Nicholas Treves, a German monk. Guarino Veronese visited Constantinople, and other parts of the east, for the purpose of procuring manuscripts, and acquiring a knowledge of the Greek language. On his return to Italy, with many valuable works, he was shipwrecked; and so pungent was his grief on account of his loss, that, as Pontico Verunio affirms, his hair became suddenly white. Aurispa, a companion of Guarino was more successful. He "arrived at Venice in the year 1483, with 238 manuscripts, among which were all the works of Plato, Proclus, Plotinus, Lucian, and Xenophon, the histories of Arrian, Dio, and Diodorus Siculus, the geography of Strabo, the poems of Callimachus, Pindar, Oppian, and those attributed to Orpheus." Niccolo Niccoli was another indefatigable collector of ancient MSS., who devoted his whole time and fortune to the acquisition of them. He collected over 800 volumes of Greek, Roman and oriental authors. To him must be ascribed the honor of having set the first example in Italy of forming a public library. Tomaso Calandrino, the son of a poor physician, who attained by his literary merit to the chair of the supreme pontiff, under the name of Nicholas V, collected more than 5000 volumes of Greek and Roman authors, and commenced the Vatican Library.

Nearly simultaneous with this passion for the collection of MSS., were two great events, which had the happiest influence on the cause of letters. The first was the invention of printing, in Germany, by means of which the mass of MSS. that had been collected, was preserved. "Had it been made known at a much earlier period," Mr. Roscoe remarks, "it would have been disregarded or forgotten, from the mere want of materials on which to exercise it; and had it been further postponed, it is probable, that, notwithstanding the generosity of the rich, and the diligence of the learned, many works would have been totally lost, which are now justly regarded as the noblest monuments of the human

intellect." The other event was the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, under Mahomet II,—an event which led many learned Greeks residing in that city to seek shelter in Florence. Through their influence, the philosophy of Plato began to oppose itself openly to that of Aristotle, and skilful partisans, arrayed on opposite sides, by their acute and learned discussions, laid a broad foundation for the discovery of truth. A spirit of emulation was created between the Greek and Italian professors, which operated most favorably on the cause of learning. The cities of Italy, also, vied with each other in their efforts to bring to perfection the art of printing; each striving to outdo the rest in the number and elegance of the works produced from the press.*

In the year 1457, Cristoforo Landino was appointed, by the authorities of Florence, public professor of poetry and rhetoric. Still earlier than this, Piero was engaged in promoting a literary contest in the city, by proposing a premium of a silver coronet in the form of a laurel-wreath, for the best poem on a given subject. During the later years of the life of Cosmo de' Medici, Brunelleschi made a successful attempt to restore the Grecian orders of architecture. Before his time, the Italians imitated their German neighbors, who retained the old Gothic forms of their ancestors. Masaccio and Filippo Lippi improved the style of painting, and decorated with their pictures the altars of the churches and the palaces of princes. Donatello gave life to sculpture, and Ghiberti cast in brass the stupendous doors of the church of St. John, which "Michel Agnolo deemed worthy to be the gates of paradise."

At so auspicious a period, in respect to literature and the arts, Lorenzo came upon the stage. He was born Jan. 1, 1448, so that he was something more than sixteen years of age, when his grandfather Cosmo died. At that early period, he had already given decided proofs of talent. He was under

* The character used by the German printers was the Gothic, whose pointed letters corresponded to the pointed Gothic architecture. This was also the form of the old English black-letter. The same form was used by the early Italian printers; but in a few years, it was superseded by the character now in general use, which is hence called the Roman. The *carattere corsivo*, or running character, was invented by Aldo Manutio; and, being first used in Italy, acquired the name of the *Italic*, or *Aldine* character (*literæ Aldinæ*). The cursive character, however, strictly speaking, was the original, from which the upright Roman letters were derived. To the same source, as Villoison remarks, are to be traced the letters used by the Gothic, French, Merovingian, Anglo-Saxon, and other languages.

great obligations to his mother Lucretia, who was "one of the most accomplished women of the age, and distinguished, not only as a patroness of learning, but by her own writings." Crescimbeni is of opinion, that she excelled the greater part of the poets of her time. Lorenzo rendered himself conspicuous by his poetical talents, before he arrived at manhood. At the age of seventeen, he had attempted different kinds of composition. His productions, says his biographer, "are distinguished by a vigor of imagination, an accuracy of judgment, and an elegance of style, which afforded the first great example of improvement, and entitle him, almost exclusively, to the honorable appellation of the restorer of Italian literature." His works are cited in the celebrated dictionary of the *Accademia della Crusca*, as authorities for the Italian tongue. Lorenzo was largely engaged in the pursuits which promised to maintain the great wealth of his family; his versatile talents permitting him to enter into employments the most dissimilar, and often most responsible and perplexing. The Florentines, and probably the Medici among them, in the early part of the fifteenth century, traded at Alexandria for spices and other productions of the East. Cosmo and his descendants had also extensive farms, which yielded them a regular and sure return. Most of the alum mines in Italy either belonged to the family, or were hired by them of their owners; and by monopolizing the trade, they were enabled to render it highly lucrative. The Medici had also established banking-houses in many of the large cities of Europe; and at a period, when the rate of interest frequently depended on the necessities of the borrower, and their establishments were resorted to for pecuniary assistance by the most powerful sovereigns of Europe, this source of revenue must have been inconceivably profitable. On the death of his father, Lorenzo acceded to the cares of government, which he administered with so much urbanity, prudence and consideration, that the Florentines felt him to be truly worthy of the title which they had conferred upon Cosmo, *pater patriae*.

It is not necessary that we should detail, by themselves, the successive events of the life of Lorenzo. His personal history, both political and literary, belongs to the history of the public. It constitutes the history of his age. He lived for his country, a true patriot; we decide not for what

motives ; but the fact is clear, that his history is the history of Florence. Hence, in a brief description of the literary and political character of the age in which he lived, and of the most striking events which transpired ; of the influence which he exerted upon it, and of the influence, which, proceeding forth from that age, is still felt in every literary community, we shall give a true view of the life of this Mæcenas of the fifteenth century.

The age of Lorenzo was distinguished by the advancement of literature. An enthusiasm in the cause of learning had been already kindled, which his influence served greatly to increase. We have before noticed the zeal for the collection of ancient manuscripts, which characterized the early part of the fifteenth century. This zeal gave rise to the establishment of public libraries in various parts of Italy ; and the establishment of public libraries, in its turn, promoted still further improvement. The work of collecting manuscripts, which Cosmo and Piero began, Lorenzo carried to perfection. If they laid the foundation, he erected the superstructure ; and, by thus preserving the wisdom of past ages, he performed a work of the highest importance for the benefit of his own period, and of the ages to come. "If there was any pursuit," says his biographer, "in which he engaged more ardently and persevered more diligently than the rest, it was that of enlarging his collection of books and antiquities." Niccolo Leonicensi, in writing to Politiano, says, that the messengers of Lorenzo were dispersed throughout every part of the earth, for the purpose of collecting books on every science. And Lorenzo himself, we are told, once expressed to Politiano the wish, that the latter would procure for him such opportunities of purchasing books, that his princely fortune proving insufficient, "he might pledge even his furniture to possess them." Other patrons of learning, incited by the example of Lorenzo, embarked in similar pursuits. Lorenzo gave permission to Mattia Corvino, king of Hungary, and to the duke of Urbino, to copy any of his manuscripts which they desired to possess. For he was not anxious to enjoy the honor of an exclusive possession of literary treasures ; but, in the true spirit of a generous and philanthropic scholar, and a friend to the improvement of his race, he wished rather to diffuse the benefits of learning as far as opportunities offered.

The collections of manuscripts of ancient authors and of other antiquities, made by Lorenzo, were not shut up in libraries and museums, like hoarded but useless treasures. He knew how to appreciate them. His love of literature ensured in him a due estimate of their value. And the influx of learned Greeks into Florence after the fall of Constantinople, before alluded to, secured the labors of scholars who knew how to use the MSS. accumulated in the Tuscan capital, in restoring, revising and elucidating the text. Landino was one of the first learned men, who, after the revival of letters, turned his attention to this important work. He published in his *Disputationes Camaldulenses*, a critical dissertation on the works of Virgil, corrected the errors with which the works abounded, and restored the text to its original purity. In 1482, he published an edition of the works of Horace, with numerous emendations, and critical remarks, which have been of great use to subsequent editors. Politiano was an indefatigable laborer in the same department. By collating the manuscripts in the library of his patron, he discovered, in many cases, the true reading; and by the aid of coins, sculptures and inscriptions, elucidated many obscure passages. Among the ancient authors, upon whom his labors were bestowed, are Catullus, Propertius, Ovid, Statius, Suetonius, the younger Pliny, and Quintilian. But his most important service, perhaps, was the collation of the existing copies of the pandects of Justinian. On this work was founded the whole system of jurisprudence, which prevailed throughout Europe in the fifteenth century; and, in correcting and explaining it, he conferred lasting obligations, at the same time on legal science, and on the cause of ancient literature and history. Others followed the laudable example of Landino and Politiano. The text of Martial employed the talents of Domitio Calderino; Persius, of Bartolomeo Fontio, and Columella, of Lancelotto. The first edition of the works of Homer, appeared in 1488, under the care of Demetrius Chalcondyles and Demetrius Cretensis, and was inscribed to Piero de' Medici, the son of Lorenzo.

For nearly two centuries before the time of Lorenzo, an academy of much celebrity had existed at Pisa, which was under the dominion of the Florentine state. Though it had been in high repute, on account of the number of its students,

and the ability of its professors, it had declined. Lorenzo made a journey to Pisa, for the purpose of resuscitating this academy. The citizens of Florence entered warmly into the project, and granted an annual sum of 6,000 florins, to aid in defraying its expenses. Lorenzo added to this amount liberal donations from his private fortune; and some of the most eminent scholars of the age, were speedily embraced among the professors at Pisa. Such was the reverence felt by Lorenzo for men of learning, that he was unwilling to inflict upon a literary transgressor any ignominious punishment. When Soccini, a law professor at Pisa, made an attempt to evade his engagements there, and to carry to Venice sundry books, the property of the academy, artfully concealed in wine-casks, and, after trial, was condemned to death, Lorenzo exerted his authority to prevent the execution of the sentence; alleging as the reason of his interposition, that so accomplished a scholar ought not to suffer an ignominious death. Soccini, within three years, was reinstated in his professorship, with a salary of 1,000 florins. Before this circumstance, he had received but 700. The studies at Pisa were mostly confined to the Latin language, and to works of science, written in that tongue. Lorenzo established a public institution at Florence, for the cultivation also of Greek literature. This was the first institution in Europe for the pursuit of science, detached from the scholastic method which had been before universally adopted. The first professor was Johannes Argyropylus, who had been the teacher of Lorenzo, an acute and learned man, although in some respects deficient in information, or else the victim of strong prejudices. He was followed, probably, by Theodorus Gaza. The third Greek professor was Demetrius Chalcondyles, one of the editors of Homer. Many pupils attended at this establishment, not only from various parts of Italy, but also from France, Spain, Germany, and England, by whom the learning which they had acquired was diffused throughout Europe. William Grocin, for some years professor of Greek literature in the university of Oxford, spent two years in studying at Florence under Chalcondyles and Politiano. Thomas Linacer, "whose name deservedly holds the first rank among the early English scholars," enjoyed a similar opportunity, and was selected by Lorenzo as the companion of his children in their studies.

The Latin tongue was, at this period, very generally used in the negotiations of the different states of Italy ; and it was almost impossible for any one fully to meet the claims of a high office, who had not a thorough acquaintance with the learned languages. This fact was of great importance, as a means of quickening the zeal, and securing the application to literary pursuits, of men who were ambitious to obtain places of power and trust. And for many years the highest offices in the several governments of Italy were conferred upon the most accomplished scholars. The most permanent officers in Florence were uniformly selected on account of their learning. A circumstance of this sort, in a government like that of the Florentine republic, was equivalent to the donation of a premium on education. The whole community felt its influence. Many a son of a poor citizen, having no name of an ancient family, no wealth, no patronage, to aid him, stimulated by ambition, and relying on native talent, rose, through diligence and scholarship, to high offices in the state. We have seen that Poggio was the son of a poor physician. Bartolomeo Scala, chancellor of the republic during a large part of the supremacy of Lorenzo, was born of parents of the lowest rank. Giovanni Pontano, a friendless young man, was commended by his learning to Alfonso, king of Naples, and to Ferdinand, his son ; and became to the latter a confidential adviser, and frequently his representative to other powers.

The age of Lorenzo was also characterized by the devotion of many ladies to the cause of literature. Numerous pieces still extant were addressed in the learned languages to distinguished females ; a proof of the diffusion of learning among that sex. Politiano celebrates a lady of Sienna, as the tenth muse. We have already spoken of Lucretia, the mother of Lorenzo. Alessandra, the daughter of Bartolomeo Scala, was also highly distinguished. At an early age, she was a proficient in Latin, and in Greek also, which she studied under the most renowned professors of the time. Cassandra Fidelis began her studies at an early age ; and, by great diligence, acquired such skill in the learned languages, as to entitle her to the rank of one of the first scholars of the time.

It would give undue prolixity to this article, to enumerate all the scholars of the age of Lorenzo, with even a brief account of their works. To some of them, and their labors,

we have already called the attention of our readers. The influence of libraries, manuscripts, and museums of antiquities, drew out many others, and furnished employment for their talents. It was natural, that the learned should attempt to introduce to the acquaintance of their countrymen the ancient authors, whom they themselves so highly valued. Living, as they did, in the light of antiquity, drinking from its pure fountains of taste and wisdom, we should expect of them, at first, an imitation of the cultivated ancients, rather than any ambitious productions of original genius. Accordingly, we find, that one of their earliest efforts was the translation of eminent Greek authors into Latin. Leonardo Aretino produced versions of various works of Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch, and other authors. Ficino's labors, in this department, were still more voluminous. Politiano translated the history of Herodian, uniting in his version, elegance, and fidelity to the original. While he was very young, he commenced the translation of the Iliad of Homer into Latin hexameters. It is uncertain whether he ever completed the work. Ficino remarks of this translation, that a person who did not know that Homer was a Greek, would be in doubt which was the original, and which the version. Argyropylus, the tutor of Politiano, at a somewhat earlier period, translated into Latin various tracts of Aristotle.

But the scholars of Italy did not long confine themselves to the versions of the ancients. The first symptoms of literary improvement in the time of Lorenzo, were in the sonnets of Burchiello, and in the works of the three brothers of the Pulci family, Bernardo, Luca and Luigi. The earliest edition of Burchiello was published in 1475. Bernardo de' Pulci, the first to attempt the translation of the Eclogues of Virgil into the Italian language, was the author of a poem on the passion of Christ, not without poetical merit, and of an elegy to the memory of Cosmo de' Medici. Luca was the author of an epic romance, probably the first that appeared in Italy. Though highly esteemed by some critics, others regard these works as too strongly tinctured with the rusticity of the age in which they were written. Specimens remain of the poetry of Scala, both in the Latin and Italian languages. Giovanni Pico arrived at Rome, at the age of twenty-one years, after having spent seven years in the most celebrated universities of Italy and France, "with the reputation

of being acquainted with twenty-two different languages." Possessed of quick apprehension, a retentive memory, and most varied acquirements, it is no wonder that his youth was marked by some specimens of vanity; he atoned, however, too severely for his early excesses, by committing most of his productions to the flames. By his early death, Crescimbeni says, Tuscan poetry sustained a heavy loss. Michel Verini (born 1465), though he died at the early age of seventeen years, had obtained the admiration and esteem of his learned contemporaries. To these names may be added those of Platinus Platus, Cantalicio, Folengi, Ariosto, Braccio and Augurelli, and especially Politiano, whose works have secured the esteem of the learned, and hold an honorable place among the productions of cultivated Italians. Leonardo da Vinci, the founder of modern painting, was equally distinguished in philosophy, music, architecture, mechanics, and polite letters. He is said to have discovered the true system of the universe, though he never made it of any practical use. History, during that period, made very great progress. It aimed, at the same time, at truth in its statements, and beauty of style. Some of the historians, it is said, may be viewed as models. Few ages of the world have produced, in any country, so large a number. Among these, Niccolo Macchiavelli, (born at Florence, in 1469), holds a distinguished rank. His name is immortalized, not only as a historian, but also as a politician and a scholar. His history of Florence, in eight books, is described as "among the first historical works of modern times, which deserve to be placed side by side with the beautiful remains of antiquity." No Italian of that age has been more generally known, and perhaps no character of any age has been the subject of wider discussion. The design of his Prince, a political treatise, has occasioned as much debate as the authorship of the letters of Junius. Without espousing his defence, we cannot resist the impression, that he has been sometimes treated too severely since his death, as he certainly was during his life. Though a stern misanthrope, he was a true patriot, and an impartial writer. The inscription over his tomb in the church of Santa Croce, at Florence,—"*Tanto nomini nullum par elogium*,"—is an honorable testimony to his character and talents, which is doubtless not wholly undeserved. Geography, likewise, was improved, during this age, by discriminating travellers, and

skilful navigators. Francesco Berlinghieri wrote a geographical work in verse. Even the oriental languages received a share of attention. Meritorious treatises appeared, also, on geometry, arithmetic, architecture, and the science of war.

Amid this harvest of the literary influence of Lorenzo, and after all that has been said of his devotion to the pursuits of letters, some one may have the curiosity to ask whether any of his own productions remain, as monuments of his genius? To this we reply, in the words of Mr. Roscoe, that he "led the way in some of the most valuable species of poetic composition; and some of his productions stand unrivalled amongst those of his countrymen to the present day. Yet such has been the admiration paid by the Italians to a few favorite authors, that they have almost closed their eyes to the various excellences with which his works abound. From the time of his death, no general collection was made of his writings for upwards of sixty years; and, after their first publication, by Aldus, in 1554, upwards of two centuries elapsed without a new edition." Several of his productions, both in prose and verse, in Italian and Latin, are given in the Appendix to the volumes, by Mr. Roscoe. Muratori has cited several of the sonnets of Lorenzo, as specimens of elegant composition; of one of which he says, "It is gold from the mine, mixed, indeed, with ruder materials, yet it is always gold."

It is somewhat remarkable, that in this general revival of literature, and in an age in which so much pride was taken in the productions of the press, the Scriptures were overlooked. Many of the works of classic Greece were multiplied by the press, and disseminated in Europe, before any one undertook to publish the books of the New Testament in the original language. As the first attempt of the sort, the celebrated Aldus, in 1504, edited the first six chapters of John's gospel, as an experiment; and, so unpropitious was its reception, that no advance was made beyond this for a long time. The work of printing the whole New Testament was first accomplished, nearly simultaneously, by Desiderius Erasmus, and Cardinal Ximenes, July 10, 1517, during the pontificate of Leo X, Lorenzo's second son. It was in the fifteenth century, however, that the Bible was first translated into Italian, by Niccolo Malerbi, or Malermi.

Notwithstanding the numbers of convents and ecclesiastical dignitaries in Italy, it is to be doubted whether religion and theological literature were not at a very low ebb.* Perhaps commercial and literary pursuits had absorbed the chief attention of persons, whose sphere in life was such as to make them subjects of history. The things belonging to this world were exalted by them to an undue prominence; and the things of immortality were thrown out of the field of their vision. Such a condition of the public mind, in the educated and influential classes, would produce one of two consequences; either the ministry would lose its high tone, and become worldly, and time-serving; or, by means of the disregard of religion prevalent among the literary leaders of the age, a tendency of an opposite character would be created, and the clergy would array themselves against the pursuits of the learned. We find that both these results actually took place. In recording a panegyric on Mariano, the favorite preacher of Lorenzo, Politiano takes occasion to inveigh against "those, who affected to consider the study of polite letters as inconsistent with the performance of sacred functions." In his description of Mariano, he gives involuntarily an insight into the feelings which existed among literary men, in respect to the edification which they expected from public religious services. He says, "I was lately induced to attend one of his lectures, rather, to say the truth, through curiosity, than with the hope of being entertained." The remainder of his description shows, at the same time, the religious taste of Politiano, and the character of Mariano, and of his public performance. "His appearance," he proceeds, "interested me in his favor. His address was striking, and his eye marked intelligence. My expectations were raised. He began: I was attentive,—a clear voice,—select expression,—elevated sentiment. He divides his subject,—I perceive his distinctions. Nothing perplexed; nothing insipid; nothing languid. He unfolds the web of his argument,—I am enthralled. He refutes the sophism,—I am freed. He

* We may judge how inadequate were the views of the leaders of the public opinion of that age, in respect to the church and the priesthood, from the fact, that Giovanni, the son of Lorenzo, afterwards Pope Leo X, was admitted to holy orders at the age of seven years, and soon afterwards declared capable of ecclesiastical preferment. Before he was eight years of age, he was presented by Louis XI, of France, to the archbishopric of Aix in Provence. At thirteen, he ranked with the prime supporters of the Romish church, and at sixteen, was invested with all the honors of a cardinal.

introduces a pertinent narrative,—I am interested. He modulates his voice,—I am charmed. He is jocular,—I smile. He presses me with serious truths,—I yield to their force. He addresses the passions,—the tears glide down my cheeks. He raises his voice in anger,—I tremble, and wish myself away.” This dramatic description, we are constrained to suspect, is founded upon a subject, in which there was too much of the theatre, with its tricks and machinery. It indicates very strongly, that the pulpit exercise of Mariano was a performance,—an exhibition, rather than an earnest argument for Christ, and the soul, after the manner of St. Paul.

But Mariano was, perhaps, the preacher of the intellectual and polished Florentines. Mr. Roscoe introduces to us another, who attracted more forcibly the attention of the citizens, and possessed himself of their confidence. This was Girolamo Savonarola. While he pretended to superior sanctity, he prostituted the pulpit to the basest purposes. “In his public discourses, he omitted no opportunity of attacking the reputation, and diminishing the credit of Lorenzo, by prognosticating the speedy termination of his authority, and his speedy banishment from his native place.” Savonarola, after the death of Lorenzo, excited those disturbances in Florence, which terminated at the same time in his own destruction, and the ruin of the republic.

Savonarola is, of course, as far from our evangelical model of a good minister of Jesus Christ, as Mariano. Appealing to different and opposite ranks of society, and breathing in atmospheres of very discordant qualities, they were both below the standard of the New Testament. A better specimen was Matteo Bosso, the confessor of Lorenzo; but from the little that can now be known of him, it is to be doubted whether he did not, in some respects, exceed his duty, in his desire to flatter and please his distinguished patron. At a period when the incumbents of the chair of St. Peter, the representatives of Christ upon earth, and supreme heads of the church, nourished up their illegitimate offspring openly in the palace at Rome, giving their children, for the sake of apparent consistency only, the title of nephews, it could hardly be expected that the ecclesiastics of the lower orders should be entirely pure from sin. The age of Lorenzo saw many exhibitions of wickedness in the highest places of the

so-called church, at which humanity shudders, and over which religion would fain draw the veil of everlasting concealment. But the persecution set on foot by Paul II, against the literary men of his age, who were congregated at Rome, the proud, unforgiving, avaricious spirit of Sixtus IV, and the infamous and unnatural crimes of his successor, Alexander VI, are delivered to the imperishable records of history. The church which can apologize for such deeds as those men were guilty of, or maintain their infallibility, as the vicars of God, must answer it at the tribunal of an injured, outraged Christianity. God overruled the corruptions of popery which were so rife in those, and in the succeeding pontificates, to the glory of his name, and the purity of the faith. The measures of the Romish church, advocated and adopted by the sovereign pontiffs, were so glaringly unscriptural and anti-Christian, that the eyes of men could no longer remain closed. And thus, during the reign of Leo X, the germs at length burst, and the reformation of Luther opened upon the world.

From the gloomy and sickening views which belong to the religious history of the age of Lorenzo, we find a relief in returning to the remaining considerations, illustrating the progress of literature.

The earnest discussions which took place among men of letters, on philosophical and other questions, formed one of the distinguishing features of the fifteenth century. When these discussions were on literary topics, they served to sharpen the intellect of the scholars engaged in them, to increase their discrimination, to enlarge the bounds of their knowledge, to stimulate them to more extended studies. The comparative merits of the philosophy of Aristotle and Platonism, furnished a fruitful subject of debate; one of the indirect fruits of these investigations was, an increased attention to classical literature. The defender of Plato would desire to read the writings of Plato; and the advocate of Aristotle must know the system which he had espoused, not from the accounts of others, but from having read Aristotle. The philosophy of Aristotle had the predominance in the learned world, until the fourteenth century; when Platonism, in various quarters, revived again. Among the manuscripts of antiquity, which the Italians had discovered, they found Plato, as well as the Peripatetic. When the Greek refugees

came from Constantinople to Florence, the Platonic philosophy found, in the persons of Demetrius Chalcondyles, Johannes Andronicus Calistus, Constantius and Johannes Lascaris, able defenders, by whom the antagonist system was warmly opposed. One of the debates referred to was occasioned by a treatise of Theodore Gaza against Platonism. This treatise called out Cardinal Bessarion in a temperate reply. George Trapezuntius, or, of Trebisonde, boldly came forward in defence of the declining cause of Aristotle, and attempted to cast reproach on the doctrines and the morals of the opposite party. He was answered by Bessarion, and other learned Greeks joined in the controversy. The eloquence of Bessarion, and the example of the Medici, overpowered the partisans of Aristotle, and, in the words of Mr. Roscoe, "the Platonic academy, instituted by Cosmo, acquired additional strength, till, by the countenance and support of his grandson Lorenzo, it arrived at its highest pitch of eminence."

The efforts of Lorenzo to promote the cause of Platonism, had a favorable tendency, in respect to literature, in another way. Educated in this system from his earliest years, he learned to view the wealth, and political eminence, and the sensuous enjoyments by which he was surrounded, as unsatisfying in their nature, and inferior to the proper aims of rational and immortal man. And, although Platonism was, in this respect, immensely inferior to pure Christianity, yet its influence ought not to be overlooked. It led him to the cultivation of intellectual power, and to the investigation of moral truth. The influence of this philosophy on the mind of Lorenzo, was a pattern of its influence on other distinguished men associated with him. In the absence of views of religion, fitted to instruct, and awe, and captivate a well regulated mind, and in the general ignorance and neglect of divine things, the fifteenth century, through the influence of this philosophy, saw the best days of Greek heathenism lived over again. The mythology of Greece was, indeed, discarded; but it left the community without religion. The idols were not set up again, but literary antiquity became an idol, to which a more fervent worship was offered, than ever ascended to the gods of the Greek or Roman pantheon. In order to perpetuate the memory of Plato, and to give additional stability to the pursuit of philosophy, Lorenzo and his friends

renewed the annual festival, in commemoration both of his birth and his death, which had been discontinued for the space of twelve hundred years. The most learned men in Italy resorted to these convocations, and the professors of this philosophy were considered the most enlightened men of the age. The city of Florence was the chief hive of this Platonic association. But its influence on the Florentines, in a literary point of view, may be inferred from the statement of the biographer of Lorenzo, that "a thorough acquaintance, as well with the ancient authors as with the literature of his own age, was an indispensable qualification in the character of a Florentine; but few of them were satisfied with this inferior praise. The writers of that country, of whose lives and productions some account is given by Negri, amount in number to upwards of 2000; and among these may be found names of the first celebrity."

But the age of Lorenzo was not remarkable simply for the revival of literature. The arts and sciences, commerce and the principles of government, shared in the renovating influence which had wrought such wonders in the department of letters. Toscanelli's celebrated gnomon was erected in the church of S. Maria del Fiore. Lorenzo de' Medici constructed for Lorenzo de' Medici a clock, which marked the hour of the day, the motions of the sun and planets, the eclipses, the signs of the zodiac, and the whole revolutions of the heavens. The science of medicine, by the liberality of this universal patron, was greatly improved. The absurdities of judicial astrology were exploded. The theory and practice of music attained a perfection before unknown. Silk and linen fabrics were manufactured by the Florentines, mostly from their native productions. The idea of fixing the balance of power among the governments of Europe, a measure of so much utility in preserving a general peace, belongs to the same period, and is one of the fruits of Lorenzo's consummate policy. The arts of painting and sculpture were carried to a higher degree of excellence than in any previous age. Lorenzo, perceiving that his contemporaries were inferior in the art of sculpture, to those whose noble works survived from the ruins of Greece, appropriated his gardens adjacent to the monastery of S. Marco, as a school for the study of the antique; furnished them with the finest busts and statues; appointed the sculptor Bertoldo the superintendent of the gardens, and teacher

of those who might resort thither for purposes of study, and allowed the latter not only a competent stipend during their studies, but generous premiums as rewards of unusual proficiency. It was here that Michael Angelo Buonarrotti attained to that excellence which has immortalized his name. He excelled in sculpture, painting, architecture and poetry. The amusing story of the painter's revenge, related by Salvatore Rosa, is a specimen of the independence and boldness with which he handled the pencil: the critic Biagio, having censured the famous picture of the last judgment, was, in return, represented by Michael Angelo in a group of the damned. To the same period belongs the revival of the art of engraving on gems and stones; and the art of transferring to paper impressions from engravings on copper and other metals. Niccolo Grosso, a Florentine citizen, also wrought ornaments in iron with extraordinary skill. He had a sign over his door, which represented account-books in the process of being destroyed in the flames; indicating that he kept no accounts,—in conformity with his custom of refusing to labor except for the ready money. As a fruit of the commercial spirit of the times, the navigators of Florence went abroad on voyages of discovery. To this honored period belong Columbus (born 1441), and the celebrated Amerigo Vespucci, whose name is immortalized, whatever be his merits as a discoverer, in the continent of America. He was born at Florence, in the year 1451.

We have thus far said nothing of the fine volumes quoted at the head of this article. The work of Mr. Roscoe is not a new one. Its character and value have already secured it a place in our permanent literature. Mr. J. C. Walker, the author of the '*History of Italian Tragedy*,' says, "It is, in my opinion, one of the finest pieces of biography in the English, or perhaps in any other language." This testimony corresponds with that of the best critics in Great Britain. Mr. Roscoe published the first edition on his own account; but he soon received the offer of the liberal sum of £1200 for the copyright, which he accepted. The work first appeared in England in 1796. An Italian version of it, by Gaetano Mecherini, was published at Pisa in 1799; and a German version, by Kurt Sprengel, of Halle, at Berlin in 1797; also, another German version, by Dr. Forster. A French trans-

lation, by François Thurot, appeared at Paris in 1799. The first American edition was printed at Philadelphia in 1803. Such an extended circulation is the best recommendation which the volumes could receive. Mr. Roscoe had the most abundant materials for his work, and skill and taste to use them. His work is a noble example of the industry and literary ability of a Liverpool banker. EDITOR.

ARTICLE VI.

DEVELOPMENT OF CHARACTER IN EDUCATED MEN.

EVERY alumnus of a collegiate or professional institution knows that a triennial catalogue is a publication of deep interest. Especially is it so, if it be the catalogue of the institution in which he has received his own education. It may be, to many other men, the driest and dullest of all the productions of the press ; but not so to him. He can spend an hour, two, perhaps three, over it, though he will not read it through from page to page, as other books, and he turns hither and thither among its leaves, as chance or inclination guides ; yet he will probably prefer it, for the time being, to almost any book of straight-forward reading ; perhaps prefer it to the latest news from Congress, or the latest quarterly ; and certainly to the latest fiction, however popular or splendid.

In this peculiar description of reading, various things will interest an educated man ; to see who are civilians ; who, physicians ; who, ministers ; who has been made a college professor, president or fellow ; who has found his way to the bench, or into Congress, or to the gubernatorial chair, or foreign embassy ; whose name has begun to have appended to it, in long and imposing train, those literary initials, S. T. D., or D. D., L. L. D., S. H. S., A. A. S., etc. etc., and for the mysterious meaning of which, other men must draw upon the spelling-book learning of their youthful days. And last, not least, and with interest serious and tender, his eye looks for the starred names, as those of men "*qui e vivis cesserunt* ;" and which point him to the mortality of literary, as well as all other men ; and to the end of literary and all

other toils and honors. As he passes along from page to page, old and choice friends of college-days are brought to mind; and scenes and incidents, and perhaps some follies of college-life, are recollected. And a little of the romance and sentimentalism, associated with "days that are past," may mingle with all. Like the old soldier who loves to "fight his battles o'er again," so the alumnus loves to live over the days of college life; to recall the excitement and parade of commencement, and the valedictory hour; and the less formal, but more hearty personal valedictories and actual separation for life, which taught him and his classmates how well they loved one another.

Additional, however, to all these minor matters which may interest an educated man, in examining this periodical of his college, there is one other point of deeper and more important interest. He is occupied with the history of the men of education, with whom he was once associated in literary pursuits. Unwritten history it is; but furnished to his mind's eye from full and vivid tablets of his memory, and by the knowledge of them which he has acquired, while,—since the hour of graduation,—he has followed them, with the interest of literary friendship, in their various directions in life. With the dry catalogue of names of men, living and dead, before him, and with the feelings of former friendship awakened, recollections vivid, and knowledge recent and fresh, he may read mentally and with the swiftness of thought, in a short hour, that which would swell the catalogue into a volume of history and biography united; and he will have followed men into lines of life, and scenes of professional, and perhaps public action and influence, and on paths of honor or dishonor, of evil report or good, and of happiness or sorrow; bringing before him as great a variety of matters of interest, as the mind could well conceive. For the history of literary men is checkered with as singular variety of light and shade, of the bright and the sombre, as of any class of men whatever. And he must have made but very indifferent use of the discipline, which his mind received in his collegiate course, and feel strangely unsusceptible of interest in his associates in study, who has not learned how to employ himself in those studies of literary character, for which opportunities are so amply afforded in a land of colleges, and of men of education.

Among the many points embraced in such a history, and which will interest an educated man, will be one, not surpassed in interest or importance by any others,—the development of character in men of education. This point will be the subject of a few remarks in the present article.

Every man who has passed through a collegiate course, or one which is equivalent to it, in the amount of studies and of mental discipline accomplished, is to be, for life, a different man, in some very important particulars, from what he would have been with only a common education. His mind will have received elevation and expansion; his talents, of whatever class or grade, a discipline and strengthening, which he would have experienced in no other way. He is to be something, in consequence of his collegiate education, and through its means, which he would not otherwise have been. And it is a question of high interest for himself, his friends, and that portion of the community in which Providence may cast his lot and give him influence,—perhaps for the nation, what he shall be. Some development of the man is inevitable, ordinarily speaking. It will be one, in some general points, like that of other educated men; and yet there will, doubtless, be much which will be characteristic; and by which, to all observing men and careful estimators of character, he will be distinguishable from other men of education, as clearly as his own countenance is distinguishable from theirs, in its peculiar lineaments and expression. To mark out the man's probable course, would be a mere affair of conjecture. And so interminable is the variety of intellectual character, and so much is dependent upon the circumstances in which any man may be placed, that it would be impossible to predict what he is to be. We are more especially interested to know what are some of the instrumentalities, which have been, in times past, and doubtless will continue to be, concerned in developing the characters of men of education. If we are successful in fixing our attention upon some of the most important of these, we shall probably attain our best instructions on this subject.

Of the instrumentalities in the development of character in educated men, we mention, first, poverty. While, doubtless, this has kept many a man of good, or even surpassing powers, from attaining what is called a liberal education, still, where, in despite of poverty, men have sought it, and

made their way through a collegiate and professional course, this same severe instrumentality has, not unfrequently, proved itself an inestimable blessing. Plenty of money has far oftener proved to be an incubus upon talent, and a clog to education, than poverty. To be compelled to struggle with its difficulties and embarrassments, has generally given a strength and resolution, first to the literary, and afterwards to the professional, character; preparing the way for higher eminence and usefulness than would ever have been reached, with a full purse, to place the student at his ease, and lead him into temptations adverse to mental progress. Some of the journals have recently given a catalogue of shoemakers, who rose from poverty in this world's goods, to most princely mental riches, and to honor and usefulness most enviable; and all under that pressure of poverty, in overcoming which, the man accumulates and concentrates energies, which are certain to carry him upward to most desirable literary eminence and usefulness. A catalogue of blacksmiths could, in our own country, be well begun, with a name now quite well known; and the catalogue could be lengthened, too, with a little research into the history of scholars, sufficiently to show that there is no natural repellantcy between the anvil, the leather-apron, and the hammer, on the one hand; and the lexicon and the pen, and the habits of close and successful study on the other. These two illustrations, out of many others, are sufficient to rebuke that pride, which would claim the privileges and honors of education for aristocrats, or men with royal blood running in their veins; and to show that the true elements of intellectual greatness may be found in men who live in small houses and work in shops, as well as in men who inhabit splendid mansions, and ride in coaches; who wear silk stockings, and elegant shoes, and white gloves, sweetened with "the perfumes of Arabia." No disrespect is by any means intended to rich men, and their sons whom they send to college. We mean only to say, that wealth is far from being, in itself, an infallible instrumentality of intellectual greatness; that some men of eminence have had far more occasion to bless their poverty, than other men their wealth; and that it is very possible for one man to purchase that with the toil demanded by his own poverty, which another cannot purchase with the wealth of both the Indies. True, the prayer of a man who desires an education, may

very naturally be, "give me neither poverty nor riches;" but if he must have one or the other, there are some very potent reasons, why he should ask that he may be poor, rather than rich. A poor genius, with reasonable diligence, may do something; a wealthy blockhead certainly can make nothing.

A second instrumentality in the development of character in educated men, we know not how to call by a better name than temperament. A case will both explain what is meant by the term, and illustrate the importance of the thing itself. In one of our New-England colleges, several years since, a still, unpretending, and seemingly dull young man, one day, in the recitation-room, shook his head at a solution of a mathematical problem, either given or endorsed by the professor; and whispered to a fellow-student next him, that that could not be so. He did not venture on a contradiction of his professor before the class, but called at his room and modestly stated his difficulty. After a few days and nights, spent in working at the problem, he produced and offered a solution, which his professor, not by any means a tyro in his department, accepted as a correction of his own. One who personally knew this young man, said, "he had mathematical talent enough to have matched any man in New-England." Yet that same man has made only an ordinary one; good, useful in his parish,—for he is a minister,—but his correction of his professor's mistake on the occasion aforesaid, was the only important development of mathematical talent which he ever exhibited. What was the difficulty in this case? It was, doubtless, that this student's temperament was too easy and quiet for his talents; or, in plain English, it was too sluggish, to permit him to move far on, in the path of scientific enterprise, to put forth his real strength, and to do himself justice. A little of the effrontery of another, who recited by guess, when he could recite in no other way, and with great glee joined in the laugh of his class at his own blunders, would have brought this man out; and, associated with his real talent, would perhaps have made him to be, at this moment, a professor of mathematics in one of our colleges.

An interesting contrast to the case now stated might be given, in that of a man of powerful talents and high attainments for his years, whose early and untimely loss, on his way to England, several years since, to seek the advantages

of foreign study and acquaintance, was deplored by men of science on both sides of the Atlantic. We allude to the talented and excellent Professor Fisher. To admirable powers, and rising attainments, he united modesty, well fitted to adorn a man of true scientific worth; and yet, with this modesty, a temperament fitted to help his worth into merited notice, and to place him, probably, had he lived, among the first of American scholars.

Very true, there is little or no help for defective temperament in a scholar, however sound. Some successful men, doubtless, owe much to their natural advantages over others, in this particular, as well as to their native talents, their teachers, and their own industry. But the defect of temperament helps us to account for the fact, that, in some cases, where rare talents are discovered during college-life, there is never, after all, any very interesting or commanding development, in subsequent professional life.

Professional associations have somewhat to do in the development of character in men of education. Much depends on the circle of lawyers, medical men, or ministers, into which the scholar is thrown; according as law, medicine, or theology is his profession. There may be among them talent, professional spirit and enterprise, and literary spirit superadded, which will steadily and powerfully stimulate his own efforts. He may rise with them, and through the influence of their minds on his own, to a rank, most honorable, and unsurpassed by any of his associates. And when he goes abroad, he shall go into honorable seats among men of his profession. On the other hand, let him, on his entrance into professional life, fall into a circle of men where little more is done than to jog on, at the moderate and easy rate which human nature, naturally indolent, prefers; where the main point is to get food to eat, and raiment to put on; leaving it to any one that chooses, to push onward, and rise in the scale of intellectual and professional worth; and he who, under other circumstances, would have become distinguished, from sympathy with ordinariness in those about him, will be what they are, and no more; and hide in "a napkin" talents which would have been of great worth to society.

This is, perhaps, the place to suggest a caution to educated men, against a sympathy which will carry the mind down-

ward, which will conform in the wrong direction. He who finds himself thrown into such circumstances, should be aware of his danger, and rouse himself to thorough effort, seeking to awaken in his associates a sympathy with the spirit of improvement, and a desire for a higher standard. Men are not educated to descend to meet other minds, but to ascend, and influence others to do the same. The adage applies here, "a dead fish can swim with the stream; but it requires a living one to stem the current." The legitimate object of an education, as respects others, is answered, so far, and so far only, as it goes to elevate the standard of intellectual culture.

On the same general principle with this last instrumentality, may be stated another, the intellectual habits of the community in which the lot of the educated man is cast. In a district of country where the standard of popular education is elevated; where the mechanic, the farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, and others not in the learned professions, have a good degree of mental culture, on the basis of a discipline begun under a thorough system of popular education; and where people, through habits of reading and thought, have attained a good measure of general intelligence; and where, also, female education gives dignity and worth to domestic society, and brings out the often fine powers, and taste, and mental activity of women; in such a community, he who comes through college and the professional school into active life, must aim at an ascendancy of his own mind, which shall be proportioned to the superiority of his education above even the respectable one of those about him. Duty, his own usefulness, and his influence, require it of him. And their influence on him, for his own intellectual advancement, will be valuable, if it keeps him mindful that they know and understand the principle, as applicable in education, as well as in morals and religion, "of him to whom much is given, much will be required." The consciousness of this, kept active in himself, will lead him to regard this intelligent community where he is placed, as a soil in which he must grow, thrive, and advance continually; and be thankful, moreover, that this necessity is laid upon him. Let such a man bless a kind Providence, that his lot has not been cast in the congressional district of a certain late representative in Congress, the fame of which district we have heard; where no newspaper even is taken; of which fact the honorable

representative seems to have been proud ; where more than one quarter of the white population under twenty years of age can neither read nor write ; and where, surely, there must be a fair opportunity to test the comforts and joys of profound ignorance. Place a student, who has enjoyed the advantages of the best literary and professional institutions in this, or any other country, in such a community of uneducated minds, and he will need strong intellectual buoyancy, to keep himself from sinking to their level. Though he cannot annihilate in himself the knowledge, and the mental discipline he has attained, he will still be liable to assimilate himself so much to the minds about him, that an old college acquaintance who should meet with him twenty years afterwards, might hardly be able to recognize the finished scholar of former years, through the dust and rust which will have accumulated upon him in the atmosphere of intellectual torpidity where he has lived.

Political associations and habits constitute an instrumentality in the development of character in educated men. We are not now going to say, that it will make a difference with a man of education in our country, whether he is a whig, or a democrat. We will leave whigs and democrats by profession to settle that point for themselves. For any thing that we know, there may be men of as sound learning, as genuine literary spirit, and as high literary and scientific worth, in the ranks of the one of these parties as of the other. And there may be men of as small calibre too, and of as low intellectual habits, in the one as the other. We are not aware, that there is any thing in the genius of political partizanship, which is unfriendly to learning and literary development. Yet a man of high education may take directions, move on a track, and enter into political or party associations, and throw himself into political positions, which will be to his own detriment as an intellectual being. If, with the self-respect and high-mindedness which belong to him as a man of intellect and culture, he associates himself with such men, wherever he finds them ; occupies himself in studying politics, on the large and enlightened scale ; seeks to deal with, and influence the minds of the men who think with him, in the way of sound reason and enlightened political sagacity, he may attain, by his talents and education, almost any honor among them, which he can desire. Let

him, on the contrary, descend, let him place himself among the lower sort of minds in his party, for the mere purpose of influencing and using them for the accomplishment of his own ends ; let him tie his mind down to the business of making tools out of the ignorant and vicious ; in other words, let him devote himself to the art and mystery of demagoguism, and he will as certainly injure his own mind, as he has one ; he will as certainly desecrate his character and profession as an educated man, as he has such a character and profession. Whatever is intellectually low, is contagious. To live and breathe in its atmosphere, to shake hands with it, to sit down on a bar-room bench and talk with it, to eat, and drink, and smoke with it, to rush and scramble with it around the ballot-box, to huzza, and throw up hat with it on a party victory, or to scowl, complain, rant and rave with it, on occasion of a party defeat ;—all this is enough to tarnish the brightest mind, and to sink the most gifted, ever favored with a liberal education.

A point of caution, then, is here suggested for educated men, especially in such times as our own ; viz., that in political life and association, where every man's duty calls him more or less, as a freeman and a citizen, there should be diligent, and careful cultivation of those intellectual habits in himself, as a member of political society, and in others, over whom he may have influence, in which, instead of descending to meet and mingle with the low political feelings and views in other men, he shall do something to elevate their minds to views more salutary, both to themselves and to the public interests. The benefit thus derived, to an educated man's own character, may be of incalculable worth. He thus becomes the salutary influencer of others, instead of submitting to be tamely influenced to his own hurt. He leads men, for their own good and that of the public, instead of following the downward tendencies of other, and low minds. Instead of allowing himself to be dragged down, he draws others up. He does something to correct wrong political biases and prejudices, to purify political society of its corruptions, and to benefit the commonwealth, and his country at large.

The action of the minds of educated men on each other in public life, constitutes another instrumentality. This is especially true in relation to those, who, from difference of

views upon important subjects, are led into discussion and controversy. In the halls of Congress and of our state legislatures, into which the freemen of this country have generally sent some of their most powerful minds, to discuss and decide great national questions ; and on which questions, still, men of different political schools entertain varying opinions, and exhibit them in the putting forth of their best powers ; and where one mighty mind grapples with another in the energy of argument, and force of eloquence ;—in these scenes, the powers of our political men are mutually tested, and disciplined, and strengthened. And the intellectual character of such men advances with every legislative session.

So it is among the men in the learned professions, in their public life. The civilians, in the progress of every session of court ; the theologians, of different denominations, and among whom are discussed their varying articles of religious belief and ecclesiastical polity ; the men of the medical profession, whose studies and researches sometimes lead to different results ; the men in the pursuits of literature and science, and whose collisions may be less frequent, but whose discussions possess interest to men of literary and scientific enthusiasm ;—all these are doing much to strengthen, and sharpen, and call forth each other's powers, and to develop in each other intellectual character. Entrance into the great fraternity of men of educated minds, is entrance upon a new and most efficient course of mental discipline ; where great minds help each other onward with accelerated rapidity and success in their intellectual course ; where attainments are made, which never would have been made in the retirement and quiet of studies in which each one's mind wrought alone, and without the stimulus of collision with others, or the impulses enjoyed in free and friendly intellectual interchange. Great men thus become deeply indebted to each other for what they are.

The advantages of the instrumentality of which we now speak, are often had, it is true, among public men, at the expense of some excitement and animosity ; among theological men, connected with unchristian asperity ; and, among all, accompanied with rivalries and competitions, which disturb the balance of moral feeling. This is matter of regret ; and it were doubtless wise, in men of mental dignity and force, to place a rigid watch over themselves here ; to

remember, that a right spirit is one very important accompaniment of intellectual greatness ; to be mindful that the man who can best bear to have his positions examined by an opponent, and who can keep the best temper in a controversy, gives the best evidence that he is a man of a great and strong mind. He who can both master a powerful opponent, and govern himself, proves that he is, both intellectually and morally, a Samson. And before giving battle to a man, uniting such moral strength with intellectual, it will be esteemed by others around him wise to "count the cost."

Need it be said, on the pages of a *Christian Review*, that moral and religious associations have something to do with the successful development of literary character in men of education ? We should have no fears for the result of a careful investigation and estimate of the amount of literary attainment and mental discipline in truly religious men, as compared with those not of religious character, in this, or any other country. The men who unite Christian character with education, are the minority, it is true ; but we will venture the assertion, that their literary power and attainments would be found to bear a better proportion to their number, than do the same in men whose minds are not under religious influences. Religion does not impart inspiration, in the strict theological sense, to men of education ; but it imparts motives for mental effort ; applies a stimulus to conscience ; fosters a sense of responsibility for the use of talent and attainment, with which the mere motives of ambition and pride in other men cannot compete. And the attainments made under the force of religious principle, will surpass those made under that of pure ambition. Generally speaking, that educated man is most sure to make good progress, and to develop thorough literary excellence, who lives in society pervaded with healthy moral and religious influences. By no means is it questioned, that there have been instances of the lofty ascent of minds destitute of religion ; and in society too, where there was "no fear of God before men's eyes." We shall have occasion to remark on this point in another place. But the history of learned and scientific men justifies our placing moral and religious associations and influences among the choicest instrumentalities of which we are speaking. The flower which opens

most beautifully, is generally that which is nurtured under the clearest sunlight, and in the purest atmosphere. The happiest development of literary character takes place under the shining of "the Sun of righteousness," and where is experienced the pervading influence of the religion of the gospel of Christ Jesus.

Criticism is a very important instrumentality in the development of character in educated men. We mean, not that corrupted, unlearned, unphilosophical, and unreasonable criticism, which deals either in indiscriminating praise, or equally indiscriminating condemnation, of a man's book, pamphlet, speech, or other literary production; but that criticism which is the result of patient, candid, and *bona fide* examination of that which is professed to be criticised; which proceeds upon just and established rules of judgment, and gives the results of mental toil; criticism, the approbation of which is not compliment, nor flattery, but the award due to merit,—and the condemnation of which is not the outpouring of the literary bile and bitterness of a reviewer upon an author, but a fair and honest pointing out of his defects; criticism, the severity of which is the severity of truth, and not of personal pique, nor sarcasm, nor satire. True it undoubtedly is, that an educated man has sometimes derived benefit from being flayed alive under the hands of some Jeffries; by profession, a dealer in unmerciful caustic; who seems to have studied the art of criticism in the dissecting-room, in witnessing operations with the scalpel, and the forceps, and the tenaculum upon dead men, that he may learn how to cut, and pull in pieces, and eviscerate living ones; who sometimes awakes the genius of a Byron into wrath, and might, and majesty; and calls forth from wounded pride, associated with lofty talent, a satire upon partial and corrupt criticism, which never could have been provoked by candor, justice, and true-hearted literary friendship. But this is not the best kind of criticism. It is not that under which we are to look for the most fair and advantageous development of intellectual character. We speak of that criticism which does strict literary justice; delighting to approve, where approbation is merited; censuring where, and where only, censure is demanded; and this, in all the mildness which can possibly consist with fidelity in the correction of faults. Under such criticism, a writer may sometimes sit down with feelings akin

to discouragement, and tempted to resolve that he will furnish no more matter for the examination, even of the most judicious and kind-hearted of the critics. But if he try his pen again, he will probably come forth the better for the ungrateful, perhaps the acid, or bitter medicine he has been compelled to take. He has learned to think more carefully and laboriously; to advance his positions more cautiously; to construct his work more firmly and handsomely, and to finish it in better taste. He rises from his temporary depression, under a first and searching criticism, with his powers renewed; stands more firmly than before, and probably on higher ground, where the critics will approach him more respectfully. And thus criticism does very much to make a man of him, one of higher intellectual stature, and of better intellectual nerve, than he would have otherwise possessed.

There is much professed criticism in these times, which deserves not the name; which fills columns of certain elegant monthlies, and bi-monthlies, and mammoth-sheet weeklies, every new number reminding us of Shakspeare's "two grains of wheat, and two bushels of chaff;" such publications, having barely enough of worth to procure them admittance, where unadulterated nonsense and frivolity could never enter, unmasked, or unattended by something better than themselves. But all such criticism thrown overboard, to sink by its own leadenness and stupidity, there is a rich amount in circulation, which is doing its work,—a good and salutary work, by influence, direct and indirect; and helping the advantageous development of intellectual character in all positions in society. And young men, now, who go forth from our literary and professional institutions, do, from this cause, go into an improved literary atmosphere. They see every where the evidences of a rising standard of literature, both scientific and professional. They see how severely literary empiricism is handled by men of science and sound sense; and are, therefore, cautious. They see, also, how honest, sound, sterling merit is taken by the hand, welcomed, put forward; and they encourage themselves with the certainty that they shall have justice done them. They can apply themselves to their chosen departments of study and research, and to the practical business of professional life, with good confidence that they shall have their share of success and of reputation, and their proper standing. In this country, too, where we

have neither nobility nor royalty, to which to look for patronage, but where educated freemen, the people enlightened, are the patrons of genius and worth, no man is of too obscure parentage, or too poor, to rise, and take rank among the useful and the honorable.

Our space does not permit us to consider all the instrumentalities in the development of character in educated men, which might be mentioned. It was designed, in this essay, to speak of providential occurrences befalling educated men, and the scholar, as sometimes thrown into positions and circumstances, trying, but excellently adapted to call out particular talent, and that "in which his great strength lieth;" and particularly to remark, what comes to an educated man, of his falling within the influence of some particular system of philosophy, whose appellation or designation winds up with some such convenient termination as *onian*, *ite*, or *ism*; and which may be as intelligible, and as descriptive of a sound system, as the term *Newtonianism*; or, on the other hand, may be as undefinable, intangible, and as much like the ghost of Banquo, as *transcendentalism*; and, under the influence of the one of which, a student will be made a man of genuine Dr. Witherspoon common-sense; and by the other, a learned, but unintelligible and incorrigible dealer in mystification and fogmatics. Passing over these, we come to the consideration of one more of the instrumentalities in the development of character in educated men, viz.:

The power of self-training. This yields precedence in importance, to scarcely any one which has been mentioned. We talk of "self-made men." The expression is a proper one, as it has been commonly applied to men who were not made in college; who have come forward, struggling with the disadvantages of a defective early education. But, in truth, every man who ever has been made any thing of worth, has, in one very important sense, made himself. And no one ever is, or will be, any thing useful, or estimable in his intellectual character, who does not use his liberty and his powers as a free agent, mental, moral, and accountable, in the anxious and untiring effort of self-making. There is, then, much depending upon self-development, as distinguished from the instrumentalities already considered. Several things enter into this.

Cultivation of the spirit of literary and professional enterprise, is one. It is delightful to witness, in some educated men, the restless, ardent, untiring spirit of the student, moving in his path of pursuit with the same energy with which other men act in amassing wealth ; and who, if it be allowable to apply to useful human knowledge, that which is said, in the Scriptures, of divine and heavenly, are " seeking for wisdom, as silver, and searching for it as for hid treasures."

Diligence in plying the toils of the mind, in the studies appropriate to a profession, or of general literature, enters into this. So that, whether lawyer, medical man, minister of religion, literary and scientific instructor, jurist, or statesman, the man is ever giving his own mind employment, and keeping up his powers to an elevated tone of activity ; and this, under the influence of pure love of study. It is said of an eminent French philosopher, of the last century, D'Alembert,—and the skeptical philosopher, in this case, has furnished a rebuke for intellectual indolence in some who hold the Christian faith,—that " his delight was in study. He says that he awoke every morning, thinking with pleasure on the studies of the preceding evening, and on the prospect of continuing them through the day." The love of study for itself, but more especially for its objects, as being the good of men, and the honor of him who created the mind, bearing the student onward in efforts for the acquirement of knowledge, especially that which is professional and practical, will be a continual moving spring of developments of intellectual character.

Perseverance, unsatisfied with attainments yet made, enters into this instrumentality, and belongs with these. It sometimes appears, that when a student has closed his collegiate course, his mind pauses, and that for life. Even where there has been good scholarship and considerable promise, and attainments of the first order have been reached, this has appeared. And cases have occurred, in which a young man, the height of whose ambition appears to have been to place himself at the head of his class, and to be their valedictory orator upon the day of graduation, when he has accomplished that, seems to think he has reached the chief end of going to college ; and has sat down to enjoy this pretty literary laurel, his last ; while his associates, who, in college were his inferiors, finally pass him in their course ; and leave him alone

at that point whence he should have started forward with accelerated energy. Genius too often lacks perseverance, has too much confidence in itself and in its first attainments; and wherever this is the fact, there follows inaction and ordinariness. But let him who has arrived at the end of a course of liberal education, be mindful that he has only begun his work; let his motto be, onward; let him look for no quiet bowers along the highway of science, in which to sit down to rest and sleep; let him act on this conviction, and there is no point of attainment, on which he can fix his eye and his heart, which he may not reach.

The study of talent and the intellectual habits and attainments of eminent and useful men, is another instrumentality. Scarcely any can be employed by the young student, to better purpose than this. To see what other educated men before him, have been; to learn how fearlessly and successfully they have grappled with the difficulties of the sciences, professions, or particular pursuits to which they devoted themselves, and to estimate the achievements of their minds, will have the most happy effect on his own.

To study the intellectual productions of other men is still another instrumentality. What, by some philosophical writers, has been called imitative invention, and which is discussed in a very instructive manner by Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his lectures on the art of painting, is deeply concerned here. The artist, who wishes to study, and to improve both his taste and skill in the use of the pencil, visits Rome, Florence, Venice, Paris, Bologna, that he may see and study the productions of the pencil of Titian, of Raphael, of Correggio, of Claude Lorraine, and other great masters. He does this, not that he may copy what they have executed; for copying is not invention; but that he may acquaint himself with the characteristics of each artist; and that, studying their works, as specimens of the inventive genius of each, he may learn how to employ his own powers. And while he copies not a line, not a stroke of the pencil of any one of them, yet he returns to his own easel, and takes up his own pencil, to employ his own genius and talents in his own way, and all under impulses in the process of imitative invention, which he had obtained from the study of his admired masters. So with the sculptor, who has sat for months and years before the works of the chisel of Michael Angelo, of John of Bologna,

of Canova, of Banks, and of John Bacon ; who has learned how "almost to make the marble speak ;" and stimulated his own powers of imitative invention, by his studies of the genius and efforts of his favorite great men, so that he will, at length, perhaps rival their excellences. So likewise the student of the art and science of music (for it is both these), and who reads the great works of Handel and Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, will sit down to his own piano-forte and take up his own pen, with an enthusiasm of imitative invention, which will most delightfully help his powers in his own compositions ; while he shall not write a musical phrase, nor not a bar, in servile copying or imitation of the men he has been reading. These illustrations may assist our conceptions of the utility and power of this principle of imitative invention, as it may be transferred from the fine arts to the sciences, and to the learned professions ; and employed among the instrumentalities for the development of his own powers. The student in the law can for this purpose, in addition to the study of abstract principles, apply himself to the volumes of Littleton, Coke, Mansfield, Blackstone, Story, Kent, and others of his profession, who have written in the study, and discussed and reasoned at the bar, or from the bench.

The student of medicine and the young practitioner can derive this description of benefit, also, from studying the professional character and works of men like Rush, Roget, McIntosh, Eberle, and Good ; who have thrown light on the science and practice of medicine, and shown how, in the walks of this profession, talent, mental discipline and skill may have ample range.

The student of theology and the Christian pastor converses, through their works and professional biography, with the "men of stature" in his profession ; with the Barrows, and Baxters, and Bateses ; with the Edwardses, Bellamys, and Dwights of past and present Christian ages. And the man, whose eye is on public and political life, does well to be familiar with every thing that was or is talented, sagacious, eloquent and commanding, in Chatham, and Burke, and Canning ; in Ames, and Hamilton, and Webster, and Calhoun. For each of these classes of students, there may be in reserve, rich attainments, successful advances in the study of the great intellectual and professional masters, at whose feet they are willing to sit. Great and good men, of the various

professions, present in their own literary, scientific and professional characters, subjects for study. In that which they have done, they show us what can be done again by ten thousands of those who are coming after them, and who are willing to study their works, as an instrumentality in mental development. The achievements of mind which have been, are the same which shall be, to the end of time, the reward of those, who, in the study of great masters and models, shall stimulate their own powers; and who, as diligently and faithfully, are fixing their eye, and putting forth their strength, to reach the same goal.

The subject of this essay is one to which a volume might be devoted, rather than an article like the present. What has now been presented, is offered rather as a collection of hints upon a single branch of the subject, than as a discussion of the whole.

The instrumentalities now described are such as begin their influence upon the young student who has received his first academic honors, and whose operation may continue through life. Under right use, they help intellectual vigor in the first years of professional study. They give energy, intellectual dignity and augmented usefulness in middle life, the noon-day of the scholar. And then, in the decline of his days, when a course of study, of professional, perhaps, public toil, and the trying vicissitudes of life, have worn upon his physical frame-work, so that, to the eye which knew him in the freshness and beauty of youth, his personal identity may be almost doubtful for a moment, and when infirmities are coming on, and life is drawing to a close; still, in the old and venerable student, there is an intellectual beauty peculiar to literary old age; a beauty matured, it may be, by "threescore years and ten." And at the point where he calls himself an old man, and young students esteem him as one of the ancients, there is sometimes exhibited an intellectual richness altogether peculiar. His last days, as an intellectual man, are his best. The last labors of his mind are the most successful; and they constitute a kind of literary last will and testament, which he will leave to posterity.

We have confined our attention mainly to the development of intellectual character in educated men. It would be the work of another essay, to go into an examination, on the one

hand, of the moral and the Christian ; and, on the other, of the unprincipled, the skeptical, the atheistic and the profligate, in educated men. Some who have risen to eminence in science, the arts and professions, have also held high the light of virtue and of religion, and taught the world how goodness puts honor upon talent and intellectual greatness. On the other hand, there have been men,—would that they had been few,—who, with all that has been splendid in talent, and admirable in literary enterprise, and in the accomplishment of works of the mind, have taught us, with painful impressiveness, how possible it is to keep, in wide and affecting separation, the attainments of the mighty and even magnificent mind, from the virtues of the heart, and from the religion which divine grace implants in the soul. The history of great minds, as such, is delightful matter for study ; and sometimes it is so, as giving us specimens of moral greatness united with intellectual. But how often that question will arise in the thoughts of a Christian, Why is it that so many men of great minds forget him to whom they owe their greatness ? Why are there so many, with whom study is a pleasure, and mental advancement a virtue, and who perfectly feast and revel in the delights of intellectual absorption ; but who unbend themselves by descending into the darkness of skepticism, and to vicious indulgences which desecrate talent, and subject the intellectual man to the animal, the base, the depraved ? Our inclination leads us to form the habit of regarding intellectual power and nobleness, as having a species of sacredness in them. And instances there are, in which this is sufficiently manifest to keep up in us this inclination. We are sometimes so happy in seeing a great man a good one, not only the friend of common worldly virtue, but having the superadded beauty of Christian faith, and laying his intellectual riches and honors at the foot of the cross, that we cannot repress the desire that it were always so. So, however, it is not. If an archangel mind, once bright and beautiful in heaven, could link itself with sin ; if intellectual greatness, heaven-born, yet could come into close association with moral deformity and with greatness in guilt, then no desecration of any human mind, in this world, however high its rank and noble its attainments, is to be esteemed strange. And so long as it is true, that the first ruined heavenly intelligence retains yet his intellectual greatness and

might, and can have access to the loftiest and most splendid minds in the human race, to influence them and tempt them away from the paths of virtue and holiness ; and so long as every new era in the history of mind presents us with some new forms and manifestations of moral deformity, in close and humiliating association with mental power and greatness ; so long we must not wonder, that some great minds will follow Lucifer himself,—once a “son of the morning,”—down into the deep darkness of depravity ; and come under the same displeasure of God, which rests upon the “archangel ruined.”

But these things will not always be so. Thanks to the Infinite and Supreme Intelligence who sits upon the throne of the universe, who presides over every mind, and is able to bow the loftiest to himself, from man upon this his footstool, up through all the ranks of intelligences, to Gabriel himself, thanks be to him, these things will not always be so. We believe a millennium is to come for the mind, as well as for the soul ; for the intellectual, as well as the moral and spiritual man. Divine wisdom has provided one element of influence, which can be brought into contact with minds farthest removed from rectitude, and can perfectly, sweetly, and gloriously control the most disorderly, mad, and fearful moral elements, which ever disclose themselves in the fallen human mind. That element is the grace of God. The time is on the wing, the day is yet to break, rise, shine, when this world of minds shall come into some most delightful resemblances to the world above ; when, if there still shall be instances of intellectual greatness, associated with depravity and guilt, they shall be few,—shall be exceptions to the general condition of things ; and when men shall be accustomed to see mental advancement on equal line and movement with that which is spiritual,—in the New Testament sense of the word ;—when talent shall not be the subject of pride, nor attainment be made under the force of mere ambition ; but each of these, regarded as gifts of God, shall be consecrated to his service and honor, and employed appropriately to their design ; and this, with a satisfaction, in men thus endowed, sweeter than is ever found in the most successful self-exaltation.

It would be pleasant to look at the relation in which this subject stands to some,—to a good number of American

scholars. Our readings, such as have been described in the history of literary men of this country, have, perhaps, been with interest, as done in the contemplation of many excellent developments of character. It would not be pride, but a just estimate of true intellectual and moral worth, which would lead us to speak of some American scholars, who have given happy illustrations of this subject. Of the living, it would not become us to speak, because they have not finished their earthly course, nor their duties. All which they are and will be, in the various stations they occupy, in social, civil, professional, or public life, in the church, and in the commonwealth, cannot yet be seen, written, or spoken. But men there have been, of talents, genius, literary enterprise and attainments, and better than all, of Christian excellence, who have finished their course on earth, and passed into the heavens; whose intellectual developments, in this world, are now followed by those which go on amidst celestial scenes. We are interested, delighted, filled with admiration, at the exhibitions of mind, even here, where there is so much of infirmity and imperfection to clog it, and almost chain it up to weakness. But when death has "canonized our friends,"—as said Cox at the funeral of the accomplished and devoted Bruen,—we write in our memories, and sometimes in our books, as best we can, our descriptions of what their intellectual powers were, and what they accomplished while they were with us. Yet, could we follow them to those celestial seats, where the minds, gone up from the earth, have become associated with those in heaven, what progress should we find them to have made, since they dropped their mortal bodies, and began to rejoice in the expansions and employments which Deity keeps in reserve for the human mind in eternity;—free as the air of heaven;—spotless as its holiness; rising, and becoming beautiful, under the culture which the mind receives in "the paradise of God." As said an American scholar and missionary, while, in a foreign land, he stood by his friend, the excellent Parsons, the moment after his spirit had "ascended to God who gave it," and while endeavoring to trace the way of the departed up to the heavenly fields, "O! what glories! O! what glories!"

Be it ever, and solemnly remembered by educated men,—whatever the professions they pursue,—that their minds were created by God, and created too for higher and brighter

expansions than are ever known on earth. Let ours be the aims, which become beings created but "a little lower than the angels;" and created in adaptedness for such destinies after this life. And may all which we are capable of being on earth, be only the beginnings of what, as sanctified intelligences, we shall be, in the world of light, and holiness, and eternal bliss.

ARTICLE VII.

MISSIONARY TRAVELS.

Missionary Labors and Scenes in Southern Africa. By ROBERT MOFFAT. New York, 1843. Robert Carter. Boston, Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 406 pp. 12mo.

A History of Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands, with remarks upon the Natural History of the Islands, origin, language, traditions, and usages of the inhabitants. By REV. JOHN WILLIAMS. D. Appleton & Co., New York. Saxton, Peirce & Co., Boston. pp. 525. 12mo.

MISSIONARY travels form an interesting and important part of our modern evangelical literature. No travels that have ever been written can be fairly said to equal them in thrilling incident, or worthy object, or real value. They are generally the productions of men of disciplined minds, trained to habits of discriminating observation, and capable of taking comprehensive views of the countries and tribes which they visit. The accurate scholarship of many of our missionaries qualifies them, in an eminent manner, for the responsible, but useful task. Their knowledge of geography, history and literature, their acquaintance with the elements of diverse languages, their intellectual culture, guiding them to investigations which promise the most beneficial results, and directing their attention to points of the highest consequence, render their works the most interesting contributions to this department of learning. They know what discussions will be most acceptable to men of letters. They know on what points information is demanded. Their religious

character and object give them an element of qualification for their work, raising them above the sphere of common travellers, and securing to us a series of interesting investigations and observations, which, in the notes of merely worldly travellers, would be sought in vain. They go abroad with the eye of scholars, and the heart of Christians. We trust the time is not distant, when science will more fully acknowledge its obligation to missions; when it will be universally understood, that, while this great enterprise is raising human beings from degradation and sin, and preparing them to be "partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light," it is, at the same time, contributing to enlarge the treasures of learning, the extent and profits of commerce, the benefits of international intercourse, and all the salutary results of mutual sympathy and communication between man and man. In the journeys undertaken for the promulgation of the gospel, while this primary end is accomplished, the boundaries of human knowledge are also increased, the safety and the virtue of our mariners are secured, national honor and influence are extended, the foundations of new literatures are laid, the cause of morality and human happiness is advanced, new intellectual energies are aroused, mind acts upon mind, both by a direct and a reflex influence, evangelical truth is illustrated and confirmed, and the period of the world's highest prosperity, peace and joy is hastened.

The volumes before us are good specimens of intelligent missionary journals. With all the solemnity and importance of truth, they have all the attractiveness of fiction. Messrs. Moffat and Williams were called to take extensive tours in the regions around their several fields of labor; and these works are chiefly occupied with accounts of their journeys and investigations. Hence, they have more interest to the student of geography or history, than the detail of the quiet, but not less useful, labors of a missionary, who, confined to a single district, spends his life in preaching, translating, and distributing tracts, and portions of the word of God. The volumes relate, in the main, the adventures of pioneers in the missionary service in the regions where they toiled. Every thing was yet to be done. The first ray of evangelical and intellectual light was to be poured upon the people. Prejudices were to be overcome. In the case of some of the South-African tribes, the first notion of a God, and of moral

obligation, was to be implanted. Theirs was not the poetry of missionary life. They knew the sternness of sober toil. They were called to suffer self-denial and pain, hunger and thirst, perils by sea and land, by storm and heat, by savage beasts, and often by more savage men. Our deepest sympathies are often awakened by the perusal of their narratives. We feel that such a work demands an unusual measure of faith and piety, high natural courage, and the richest supplies of the grace of God. A melancholy interest is imparted to the journal of Mr. Williams, by the fact, that, in the prosecution of his work, he fell a victim, not long ago, to the merciless inhabitants of Erromanga, one of the New-Hebrides. Mr. Moffat has returned to the land of his pilgrimage amid the scorching droughts of Africa, and still lives. John Williams wears the crown of martyrdom.

Messrs. Williams and Moffat were accepted at the same time for the service of the London Missionary Society. They were set apart at the same time to their arduous work, by public exercises at Surrey chapel, in London. Both, after several years, returned to their native land, and published a narrative of their respective labors. Their journals show them to be men of ardent missionary spirit, cultivated intellect, warm piety, great natural courage, fertility in expedients, zeal, endurance, and unwavering purpose to fulfil, at all hazards, the work to which they had consecrated their lives. We feel that they are not hirelings, submitting to expatriation as a means of getting their bread; but noble specimens of the Christian spirit, constrained to labor, and suffer, to "spend, and be spent," by their love for Christ, and the souls of men.

Our space forbids us to go as largely as we could wish into the interesting discussions suggested by these volumes. All that we can do is to notice a few of the most striking topics in them, and heartily to commend them to the perusal of our readers. The works are well printed, on good paper; the narrative of Mr. Williams, especially, has an open, clear type, and an inviting page. As the books are stereotyped, it is to be regretted that so large a number of typographical errors have escaped revision, which must be perpetuated in future editions.

The difficulties, attending the propagation of the gospel in South Africa, were very different from those which were

encountered in the first evangelical efforts among the islands of the Pacific Ocean. The depravity of human nature and the deepest ignorance were the same in both. But in the sphere of Mr. Moffat, human nature seemed to have sunk into a more hopeless state of degradation. With so debased specimens of savage man, raised but a step above the wild beasts, which roamed untamed through their gloomy forests, and over their deserts of glowing, barren sands, civilized man could scarcely wish to claim kindredship, except under the impulse of a philanthropic desire to elevate the low, a Christian hope of redeeming and saving the lost. The remote influence of the white colonists, instead of aiding the missionary in his work, in many cases served only to oppose additional barriers to his success. When Dr. Vanderkemp first established himself among the Kafirs (Caffres), it was "among a people destitute of confidence in each other, and fired with jealousy towards every white intruder . . . who could not view his sojourn among them in any other light than as a spy, or precursor of deeply-laid stratagems to get possession of their country and cattle, by the people from whom he had come, and to whom he belonged . . . When he appeared before the sovereign of the country, he was at the mercy of a tyrant, whose mind was poisoned by individuals from the colony, of some influence, insinuating that he was a spy." So ignorant were the natives, that a young Kafir-woman, going to visit the doctor and his companion, "seeing in the distance their tent shaken by the wind, and supposing it to be some rapacious beast, which the messengers of peace had let loose to devour her, bolted off through the river into the forest, where, missing the path, she had nearly lost her life by falling into a pit." The murder of a white man was considered among them a meritorious deed; and, as he once remarked in his journal, "it was resolved that I should be killed, as a conspirator against the king of the country." At a comparatively recent period in the history of the mission, the Bechuanas were persuaded by some enemy of the gospel, that two Liliputian soldiers affixed to the Dutch clock in the chapel, which strutted out of a small box, as often as the clock struck, were symbols of the military bondage, to which the government of the missionaries' country would eventually reduce them. The images were magnified into Goliaths by the affrighted natives; and it was necessary to take them

down and cut off a piece of their bodies, in order to convince the people that these objects of their terror were only painted bits of wood. The natives of Namaqua-land are sometimes known to shoot their poisoned arrows at the lightning, in tremendous thunder-storms, in order to arrest its deadly flashes. Mr. M. remarks that he has known of Bushmen, who were in the habit of throwing at the lightning old shoes, or any thing else which they happen to lay hold of.

The condition of the Bushmen is said to be extremely wretched. Except the Troglodytes, a tribe mentioned by Pliny as inhabiting Central Africa, no people are more brutish, ignorant, or miserable. They have neither house, nor shed, flock, nor herd, but live in a condition resembling, as nearly as possible, that of the wild beasts around them. Mr. Moffat says:

“It is impossible to look at some of their domiciles, without the inquiry involuntarily rising in the mind,—are these the abodes of human beings? In a bushy country, they will form a hollow in a central position, and bring the branches together overhead. Here the man, his wife, and probably a child or two, lie huddled in a heap, on a little grass, in a hollow spot, not larger than an ostrich’s nest. Where bushes are scarce, they form a hollow under the edge of a rock, covering it partially with reeds, or grass, and they are often to be found in fissures, and caves of the mountains. When they have abundance of meat, they do nothing but gorge, and sleep, dance and sing, till their stock is exhausted . . . Many suffer great distress, when the weather is cold and rainy, during which, not unfrequently, their children perish from hunger. A most inhuman practice, also, prevails among them, that when a mother dies, whose infant is not able to shift for itself, it is, without any ceremony, buried alive, with the corpse of its mother.”

To this account Mr. Kicherer, for sometime a missionary among them, adds:

“Their manner of life is extremely wretched, and disgusting. They delight to besmear their bodies with the fat of animals, mingled with ochre, and sometimes with grime. They are utter strangers to cleanliness, as they never wash their bodies, but suffer the dirt to accumulate, so that it will hang a considerable length from their elbows. Their huts are formed by digging a hole in the earth about three feet deep, and then making a roof of reeds, which is, however, insufficient to keep off the rains. Here they lie close together, like pigs in a sty. They are extremely lazy, so that nothing will rouse them to action but excessive hunger. . . . They are total strangers to domestic happiness. The men have several wives; but conjugal affection is little known. They take no great care of their children, and never correct them except in a fit of rage, when they almost kill them by severe usage. In a quarrel between father and mother, or the several wives of a husband, the defeated party wreaks his or her vengeance on the child of the

conqueror, which, in general, loses its life. Tame Hottentots seldom destroy their children, except in a fit of passion ; but the Bushmen will kill their children without remorse, on various occasions ; as when they are ill-shaped, when they are in want of food, when the father of a child has forsaken its mother, or when obliged to flee from the farmers, or others ; in which case they will strangle them, smother them, cast them away in a desert, or bury them alive. There are instances of parents throwing their tender offspring to the hungry lion, who stands roaring before their cavern, refusing to depart till some peace-offering be made to him. In general, their children cease to be the objects of a mother's care as soon as they are able to crawl about the field. In some few instances, however, you meet with a spark of natural affection, which places them on a level with the brute creation."

From Mr. M.'s account of the Namaquas, an interior tribe, we shall obtain some additional views of the extreme ignorance and degradation of the natives of that country. We shall see, from these accounts, the entire insufficiency of the light of nature, to inform the unenlightened heathen in the principles of natural religion. Our treatises on natural theology are convincing to us, because the truths which they establish have grown up with us. The rays of revelation, like the rays of the natural sun, have illumined our path from the moment that our reason awoke to judge, or the power of attention, to perceive and compare. But the light of nature is too dim to teach those who have no other teaching. It presents a sealed book. It needs a commentary, an interpreter, yea, a revelation from above, to make known the truths which it teaches. Indeed, we should scarcely err in saying, that the book of nature does not teach ; it only confirms.

" Their ignorance," says Mr. M., " though to a calm reasoner on the subject, not to be wondered at, was distressing in the extreme, and perfectly confounding to my preconceived notions about innate and intuitive ideas, and what some term natural light. . . . In some, there was a glimmering of light ; but again I found, to my mortification, that this had been received from the ' hat-wearers,' as they call the people from the South, or from Mr. Schmelen's station at Bethany, whom they denominated ' the people that talked about God.' . . . It would be more amusing and ludicrous, than instructive, to give the result of all my inquiries ; and perhaps I cannot do better than to repeat the substance of a conversation between our missionary, Mr. Schmelen, and a native on this subject. Mr. S. had, at that time, better opportunities than any other man, of becoming acquainted with the Namaquas in their native state. . . . In his journal of May, 1815, he writes thus : ' Addressing a Namaqua, I asked, ' Did you ever hear of God ? ' ' Yes, we have heard that there is a God, but we do not know right.' ' Who told you that there is a God ? ' ' We heard it from other people.' ' Who made the sea ? ' ' A girl made it on her coming to maturity, when she had several

children at once ; when she made it, the sweet and bitter waters were separated. One day she sent some of her children to fetch sweet water, while the others were in the fields ; but the children were obstinate and would not fetch the water, upon which she got angry, and mixed the sweet and bitter water together ; from that day we are no longer able to drink the water ; but people have learned to swim and run upon the water.' 'Who made the heavens?' 'We do not know what man made them.' 'Who made the sun?' 'We always heard that the people at the sea made it ; when she goes down, they cut her in pieces and fry her in a pot, and then put her together again and bring her out at the other side. Sometimes the sun is over our heads, and at other times, she must give place for the moon to pass by.' They said the moon had told to mankind, that we must die, and not become alive again ; that is the reason that when the moon is dark, we sometimes become ill. Is there any difference between man and beast? 'We think man has made the beasts.' 'Did you ever see a man that made the beasts?' 'No, I only heard so from others.' 'Do you know you have a soul?' 'I do not know it.' 'How shall it be with us after death?' 'When we are dead, we are dead ; when we have died, we go over the sea-water at that side where the devil is.' 'What do you mean by the devil?' 'He is not good ; all people who die run to him.'

"Mr. Campbell, in his little tract of the 'Life of Africaner,' states, being asked what his views of God were, before he enjoyed the benefit of Christian instruction, his reply was, that he never thought any thing at all on these subjects ; that he thought about nothing but his cattle. He admitted that he had heard of a God (well might he, being brought up in the colony), but he at the same time stated, that his views of God were so erroneous, that the name suggested no more to his mind, than something that might be found in the form of an insect, or in the lid of a snuff-box.

"Dr. Vanderkemp, in his account of the Kafirs, makes the following remark :—'If, by religion, we mean reverence for God, or the external action by which that reverence is expressed, I never could perceive that they had any religion, nor any idea of the existence of a God. I am speaking nationally ; for there are many individuals who have some idea of his existence, which they have received from adjacent nations. A decisive proof of the truth of what I here say, with regard to the national atheism of the Kafirs, is, that they have no word in their language to express the idea of a Deity ; the individuals just mentioned, calling him Thiko, which is a corruption of the name by which God is called in the language of the Hottentots, literally signifying, one that induces pain.'

We are willing to linger a little further upon this topic,—the amount of light on moral subjects which is communicated by the book of nature,—because we think that such facts as these volumes bring into view, constitute an argument of great force, in favor of efforts to propagate the gospel among the heathen. In speaking of the Bechuanas, to whom his labors were especially directed, Mr. M. says :

"The situation of the missionary among the Bechuanas is peculiar, differing, with slight exception, from any other among any nation on

the face of the earth. He seeks in vain to find a temple, an altar, or a single emblem of heathen worship. No fragments remain of former days, as mementos to the present generation, that their ancestors ever loved, served, or revered a being greater than man. A profound silence reigns on this awful subject. While Satan is obviously the author of the polytheism of other nations, he has employed his agency with fatal success, in erasing every vestige of religious impression from the minds of the Bechuanas, Hottentots, and Bushmen; leaving them without a single ray to guide them from the dark and dread futurity, or a single link to unite them with the skies. Thus the missionary could make no appeals to legends, or to altars, or to an unknown God, or to ideas kindred to those he wished to impart. His was not the work of turning the stream backwards to its ancient course. Their religious system, like those streams in the wilderness which lose themselves in the sand, had entirely disappeared; and if devolved on the missionaries to prepare for the gracious distribution of the waters of salvation in that desert soil, sowing the seed of the word, breathing many a prayer and shedding many a tear, till the Spirit of God should cause it to vegetate, and yield the fruits of righteousness.

"During years of apparently fruitless labor, I have often wished to find something, by which I could lay hold on the minds of the natives,—an altar to an unknown God, the faith of their ancestors, the immortality of the soul, or any religious association; but nothing of this kind ever floated in their minds. 'They looked upon the sun,' as Mr. Campbell very graphically said, 'with the eyes of an ox.' To tell them, the gravest of them, that there was a Creator, the governor of the heavens and earth, of the fall of man, or the redemption of the world, the resurrection of the dead, and immortality beyond the grave, was to tell them what appeared to be more fabulous, extravagant and ludicrous, than their own vain stories about lions, hyenas, and jackals. To tell them that these were articles of our faith, would extort an interjection of superlative surprise, as if they were too preposterous for the most foolish to believe. . . . When we attempted to convince them of their state as sinners, they would boldly affirm, with full belief in their rectitude, that there was not a sinner in the tribe, referring us to other nations whom they dreaded, or with whom they were at war."

"When we assured them that God was in the heavens, and that he did whatever he pleased, they blamed us for giving him a high position beyond their reach; for they viewed their Morimo (the term employed by the missionaries for God), as a noxious reptile. 'Would that I could catch it, I would transfix it with my spear,' exclaimed S., a chief whose judgment on other subjects would command attention."

In speaking of the poor Bechuanas, a mendicant class in the tribe, Mr. M. made many inquiries to discover if they had any sense of moral evil; and it was with great difficulty that he could convey his meaning to their understanding. He says, 'They assured me again and again that they could not comprehend that there was evil in any thing they could do. The term, *sin*, did not convey to them the same meaning that it does to us. They applied it to a weapon, or to any thing

else which was not made as they wished. . . . But of a sense of sin arising from responsibility, they had no conception.'

"But it is to the testimony of such as have been brought out of darkness into the marvellous light of the gospel, that we must look for decisive evidence on this point. The question being put to one whose memory was tenacious as his judgment was enlightened, 'How did you feel in your natural state before hearing the gospel? How did you feel upon retiring from public as well as private crimes, and laying your head on the silent pillow? Were there no fears in your heart, no spectres before your eyes, no conscience accusing you of having done wrong, no palpitations no dread of futurity?' 'No,' said he, 'how could we feel, or how could we fear? We had no idea that an unseen eye saw us, or that an unseen ear heard us. What could we know beyond ourselves, or of another world, before life and immortality were brought to us by the word of God?' This declaration was followed by a flood of tears, while he added, 'You found us beasts, and not men.'"

The sufferings and discouragements of the missionary brethren in South Africa, were of the severest kind. In their settlements, transient, being driven from place to place by excessive drought, which ended in famine; in their journeys, exposed continually to lions and other beasts of prey; in their labors, hindered by the excessive ignorance, and malice, and jealousy, which reigned on every side of them; toiling for nations whose degradation opposed almost insuperable barriers to every step of their progress, who were to be educated, by a slow process, to think, and reason, and decide, to love and obey,—our chief wonder is, in a worldly point of view, that they did not abandon the task in utter despondency, and leave the wretched Africans to perish. But the energy of Christian faith prevailed over external trials. The prayers of their brethren went up continually in their behalf before the throne. They persevered in their arduous toils, till the Sun of righteousness burst forth in glory, and the native mind began to be disenthralled, and the debased spirits of that debased people yielded to the renovating power of the gospel of Christ. We can only add, that the efforts of Mr. M. and his missionary brethren have been crowned with most gratifying success.

Our space will not permit us to speak largely of the interesting work of Mr. Williams. He labored among a people whom God seemed to have prepared for his word. Idolatry, in almost every instance, retired before the first rays of the gospel, like darkness before the dawn. In the *Messenger of Peace*, a small vessel of his own construction, he sailed with his

associates from island to island, over the vast field which Providence assigned to him, and to which his own taste eminently adapted him. Through the co-operation of native helpers, who, with an almost apostolic spirit, were ready to go wherever the cause of Christ seemed to call them, and a succession of whom God raised up wherever the gospel was preached, the triumphant march of truth stretched abroad from island to island, until he was able to record many of them, once the abode of idolaters, and the seat of every cruelty, as Christian countries. It is the Lord's doing, and marvellous in our eyes.

EDITOR.

ARTICLE VIII.

LITERARY NOTICES.

1. *Classical Studies. Essays on Ancient Literature and Art.* With the Biography and Correspondence of eminent Philologists. By BARNAS SEARS, President of Newton Theological Institution, B. B. EDWARDS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, and C. C. FELTON, Professor in Harvard University. Boston. Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1843. 413 pp. 12mo.

This elegant book is worthy of a more extended notice than our limits at present will permit us to give to it. Great labor and care have been bestowed upon its typographical execution, which does honor to the American press. It is one of the rare beauties of the page, that not a word is divided at the end of a line. The mechanical part of the work, however, is its least praise. It is unique in its character,—standing alone among the innumerable books of this book-making age. The authors well deserve the thanks of the cultivated and disciplined portion of the community, for the service which, by this publication, they have done to the cause of letters. Amid the tide of influences which are calculated to deteriorate our literature, and to degrade the standard of taste and sound learning, we feel under great obligations to those who endeavor to restore the authority of acknowledged models; to set up barriers against the sweeping flood of a worthless literature, which is spreading far and wide its evil results, and concerning which our chief consolation is, that it is likely to be as transitory as it is deleterious.

The book is a plea for classical learning. While its fine introduction and some of the essays directly avow this design, the correspondence of literary men which it contains, aims indirectly at the same result. The largest, and most responsible part of the work is from the pen of Prof. Sears, and bears the marks of his sound judgment, extensive learning, and clear thought. The first article gives a view of schools of German philology,—a suitable preliminary to the whole. It embraces biographical notices of Heyne and Winckelmann, “who have contributed most to the formation of the present character of German philology,” the state of classical learning in Europe at the period when their influence began

to be most widely felt, a notice of Wolf, one of the earliest and greatest critics on Homer, of Heindorff, Bekker, Böckh and Hermann, with incidental facts concerning other individuals, and an account of their distinguishing characteristics and principles. Article second, a translation from Tegnér, is on the study of Greek literature; describing its attractions and uses. Article third, a translation from Frederic Jacobs, is on the study of classical antiquity. It delineates the object of a learned school, the materials which call for the scholar's attention, and the manner in which he is to use them with the highest profit. Article fourth, on the wealth of the Greeks in the works of plastic art, by the same author, treats, as the title indicates, of the architectural models, and remains of sculpture which flowed from the refined taste of the Greeks and Romans, and by a reflex influence, contributed, in their turn, to elevate and purify the taste in which they originated. The fifth division of the book contains a mass of correspondence of eminent philologists, filled with statements of facts in reference to the pursuits of the several writers and of others, deeply interesting to the lover of classical literature. Article sixth gives an account of the Dutch philologists, Hemsterhuys, Ruhnken and Wyttenbach, with extended biographical notices of each of them, and a view of their influence on the literature and men of letters in Holland. Article seventh is on the use of the Greek dialects in the classic authors, by F. Jacobs. Article ninth is a history of the Latin language, in its various periods, with remarks on its distinguishing characters. Article tenth is on the education of the moral sentiment among the ancient Greeks. The whole is followed by more than fifty pages of notes, giving a short biography of most of the eminent men, spoken of in the text. The book is of a high order, and worthy the attentive perusal of every scholar. It is a noble monument to the taste, and judgment, and sound learning of the projectors, and will yield, we doubt not, a rich harvest of fame to themselves, and of benefit to the literary interests of our country.

2. *The doctrine of Christian Baptism, examined by the acknowledged principles of Biblical Interpretation.* By JAMES J. WOOLSEY. Philadelphia. Baptist Publication Society.
3. *The Baptismal Question.* Rev. William Hague's *Controversial Tracts, embracing the Review of Messrs. Cooke and Towne, and a Rejoinder to their Reply.* Boston. Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1842.
4. *Infant Baptism weighed in the Balances and found wanting; a reply to a tract by Dr. Brownlee.* By C. H. HOSKEN. Troy, N. Y. 1843.

The works issued from the press on the baptismal question, it seems to us, are more numerous, on both sides, than the cause of truth and Christian fellowship requires. If good standard works are extant, it would be the part of wisdom to promote the circulation of these, rather than to publish new ones, which must be, necessarily, only a repetition of the same views, and arguments, and testimonies. Issued from various geographical points, to serve a local demand, they usually do not obtain a very wide circulation; perhaps nourish unkind feelings in the sphere where they originate; and when the circumstances which gave birth to them cease to exist, or become modified, the works themselves are forgotten. It seems to us, also, that the question is too

often discussed as a matter of speculation, in which ecclesiastical combatants wish to measure their spears with their brethren, rather than as a question of serious, humble, and earnest obedience to the expressed will of Jesus Christ. It is, or should be, a question of obedience, not of controversy. Still, we do not think uncharitably of those who deem themselves called upon to meet pressing exigencies in a local community, rather than to write labored treatises, having in themselves the elements of endurance, if not of immortality.

The little volume of Mr. Woolsey was originally a series of sermons to his own congregation, published by their request. It contains an able and faithful exhibition of the argument in favor of Baptistical views, drawn wholly from the Scriptures, and the concessions of writers on the other side of the question. It is divided into sections, and treats the whole topic in an appropriate and scholarlike manner.

The pamphlets of Mr. Hague, though written under the impulse of temporary circumstances and with great expedition, show that he had already studied the subject with attention, and that his weapons are always kept ready burnished. A more thorough and worthy treatment of the question could not well be found. He has the merit of having examined and refuted, in a satisfactory manner, the newest forms of stating and defending the error which he discusses, and of presenting a very clear exhibition of the grounds of his own defence.

Mr. Hosken, recently a missionary in Honduras, received the work of Dr. Brownlee, soon after reaching the city of New York, and thought that a reply to it would subserve the interests of truth. In the course of his reply, he states afresh the main arguments of his own denomination, and in an independent and successful manner, meets the positions of his opponent.

5. *The Doctrine of Life, with some of its Theological Applications.* Boston. B. H. GREENE. 1843. pp. 74. 12mo.

This book was originally an essay in the *Dial*, a publication designed to promote the views of the transcendentalists. It treats on several topics in morals and theology, and is written in an attractive style. The author evidently thinks on the subjects upon which he has written. His book is a good specimen of an effort of an ingenious mind to disencumber itself for a time of the aid of revelation, for the purpose of ascertaining its skill in discovering truth by feeling after it in the dark.

6. *The Karen Apostle; or Memoir of Ko-Thah-Byu, the first Karen Convert, with notices concerning his Nation.* By F. MASON, *Missionary to the Karens.* First American Edition. Revised by H. J. Ripley, Professor in Newton Theological Institution. Boston. Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. pp. 153. 16mo. 1843.

An interesting addition to our missionary literature, and a pleasant gift-book for the lovers of the missionary cause. The history of the successes of our foreign missions is always suited to awaken devout gratitude to God. The first-fruits are received with special joy, as the prelude of a coming harvest. Many of the items contained in the book have already appeared in our missionary journals; but they will assume new interest when read continuously, and as a part of the events of the life of one individual, the first Karen convert. The appendix gives an account of the traditions of the Karens, a subject which Mr. Mason has studied with great zeal. We hope the work will deepen the interest of the community in the great cause of missions.

7. *Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature*. By JOHN KITTO, assisted by several able scholars and divines. New York. Mark H. Newman; Boston. Tappan & Dennet.

This work is to be completed in fifteen parts, of 80 pages each, which are to be published monthly, with a steel engraving or a map, accompanying each part. It is printed in double columns, with a small, though distinct type, and a large and handsome page. The articles in the first number are of sterling merit. Some of them embrace both original and fresh matter on topics connected with Biblical interpretation, such as the researches of recent travellers, and the investigations of the latest critics have brought to light. It is perhaps chiefly in this respect, that the work proposes to be an improvement on Robinson's *Calmet*.

8. *Lectures on the Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Romans*. By THOMAS CHALMERS. New York. Robert Carter; Boston. Tappan & Dennet.

The lectures embraced in this work, were a series of sermons to the author's own congregation, and published by their request. They furnish a good example of expository preaching. Each sermon is commenced by an exposition of a few verses of the epistle, which are afterwards used as the foundation of the discourse. The name of Dr. Chalmers is a sufficient guarantee for the character of the work. It is to be printed in five monthly parts, of 100 pages each.

ARTICLE IX.

MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE.

BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES.

The American Baptist Board of Foreign Missions held its annual meeting at Albany, N. Y., April 26, 1843.—The receipts of the Treasurer for the financial year, ending April 1, 1843, from individuals, auxiliary societies, legacies, interest on temporary loans, &c., amount to \$47,151.06, and the expenditures to \$55,138.43; excess of expenditures above receipts, \$7,987.37, which, added to the debt of last year, makes the balance against the Board, at the present moment, \$14,859. The Board have also received from the United States government, for the support of Indian Schools, \$4,400; from the American and Foreign Bible Society, for printing and circulating the Scriptures, \$6,000; and from the American Tract Society, \$2,200; total, \$12,600.

The number of Missions in connection with the Board, is 19; and of stations and out-stations, about 80. The missions in Europe are in France, Germany, Denmark and Norway. The missions in Asia are, the Maulmain, Ava, Rangoon, and Tavoy missions; the missions to Arracan, Siam, China, Assam, and the Teloo-goos. The mission in Africa is to the Bassas; the missions in America, to several tribes of the Aborigines on this side the Rocky mountains. There are 103 missionaries, of whom 44 are preachers, and 52 are female assistants. Of native preachers and assistants, there are 114. The number of churches is 77; received by baptism the last year, nearly 900. Whole number of church members, about 4,000.

The American Baptist Home Mission Society held its 11th anniversary at Albany, April 25.—Total amount of receipts, including those in the treasuries of auxiliaries, \$40,583 12. Receipts directly into the treasury of the Society, \$11,306 57.

The total number of agents and missionaries employed the past year is 93. Their labors were performed in 22 of the United States and Territories, in Canada and Texas. They have labored regularly at 304 stations. They have preached 10,533 sermons, delivered 1,333 public addresses, made 13,351 pastoral visits, and have been active in the use of all evangelical means for extending the kingdom of Christ. In the performance of their duties, they have travelled 115,552 miles. The amount of ordinary ministerial labor performed by them, is equal to that of one man for 63 1-4 years.

The number of agents and missionaries reported by auxiliaries is 275. Their joint labors amount to 152 1-4 years of one man. They have occupied not less than 458 stations, preached 25,075 sermons, made 13,262 pastoral visits, and travelled 59,483 miles.

Total number of agents and missionaries, 368; years of labor performed, 215 1-2; miles travelled, 175,035.

Among the results of missionary labor performed last year, the missionaries report the baptism of 1,489 persons, which, with the additions by letter, have increased the number of communicants reported when the missionaries applied for their appointments, more than one third. They have organized 50 churches, and ordained 23 ministers.

Under their superintendence 5,570 pupils have been instructed by 724 teachers, in 179 Sabbath schools and Bible classes, furnished with 9,211 volumes in their libraries. At the stations occupied, 5 houses of worship have been completed; the erection of 22 others has been commenced; seven churches have been able to support their ministers without our aid; \$7,007 have been paid for ministerial support, and \$1,901 for foreign missions and other benevolent purposes. In those churches, there are 54 young men preparing for the ministry. The missionaries of auxiliaries also report 3,431 baptisms, and 6,172 scholars in Sabbath schools and Bible classes connected with their churches, which are supplied with 9,627 volumes in their libraries.

Total, 4,920 baptisms, and 11,742 Sabbath school scholars.

The American Baptist Publication and Sunday School Society held its anniversary at Albany, April 26. The receipts for the past year, including a loan from the building fund amounting to \$1,371 16, were \$9,906 54. The appropriations have been \$9,869 27, leaving a balance in the treasury of \$37 27. To avoid embarrassment, the Society has proceeded cautiously and slowly in the publication of books. Three new ones only have been issued, viz: *Memoir of Mrs. Jones*,—*The Spiritual Voyage*,—and *Effie Maurice*. Of Tracts 1,262,680 pages have been published. About 3000 copies of the *Baptist Record* have been regularly issued, and 11,000 copies of the *Almanac and Baptist Register*. The stock on hand is invoiced at \$5,200. During the year \$157 54 worth of books have been distributed gratuitously, and 158,000 pages of tracts,—100,000 of them to the missionaries of the *American Baptist Home Mission Society*.

American and Foreign Bible Society.—The sixth anniversary was held at Albany, April 26. The receipts for the last year, are \$23,638 03. Appropriations have been made in aid of the Bible operations of several missionary stations, amounting to \$8,500, and a balance remains in the treasury of about \$2,500.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

The king of Prussia has appointed a Commission, consisting of thirty-two members, to visit the East Indies, and make a scientific and artistic examination of those countries. The duration of the mission is provisionally fixed for three years, and the distinguished linguist, Francis Bopp, is appointed its president.—It is stated, that Göthe's house at Saxe-Weimar, together with the noble collection of works of art and objects of science contained in it, is to be purchased by the German confederation, as a national monument. This gratifying arrangement is chiefly due to him who is foremost in every good work,—the king of Prussia. Dr. Kniewell, of Dantzic, is about to publish a narrative of his travels through Switzerland, France and England. His attention has been chiefly directed to religious subjects, and it is said, that he speaks highly of the progress of Protestantism in Switzerland, and even in France; but of that of England, he speaks less favorably. He looks on the progress of Puseyism with much alarm. He intends to enter into very extensive details on the subject of sects in England.—The Prussian government has voted the following sums in the course of the present year for scientific purposes,—\$800 to the '*Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Kritik*,' in Berlin; \$1,600 for the Zoological Museum; \$1,500 to the two Chemical Laboratories; \$2,700 to the Mineralogical Museum. The Royal Library has received from government, from 1818 to 1840, about \$300,000; of which \$250,000 have been applied to the purchase of books and MSS.

ENGLAND.

It will interest musical men to know, that the Psalter and Canticles of the morning and evening service of the church of England, have been set and pointed to the Gregorian Tones, by Richard Redhead. The work is intended to assist congregational chanting, by exhibiting, on the same page with the psalm or canticle, the Gregorian Tone to which it is adapted.

QUARTERLY LIST.

DEATHS.

MANSFIELD BRUCE, Wilmington, Vt., Feb. 6, aged 61.
 WILLIAM COLLIER, Boston, Mass., March 19, aged 71.
 HIRAM GEAR, Marietta, O., Feb. 10, aged 39.
 JAMES HALLOWELL (licentiate), Windsor, Me., March 15, aged 48.
 JABEZ HAM, Callaway Co., Mo., Dec. 10, aged 50.
 CHARLES HARDING, Indian Creek, Ill., Feb. 3.
 STEPHEN HUTCHINS, Cooperstown, N. Y., Jan. 31, aged 40.
 CHARLES MARSHALL, Mammoth Cave, Ky., Feb. 1, aged 29.
 JEREMY PACKER, Hinsdale, N. H., April 28, aged 80.
 JOHN RICE, Mercer Co., Ky., March 19, aged 84.
 DAVID SHORT, Deerfield, Tioga Co., Pa., Nov. 27, aged 69.
 ASHBEL STEVENS, Fowler, N. Y., March 30, aged 43.

ORDINATIONS.

SEYMOUR W. ADAMS, Durhamville, Oneida Co., N. Y., Feb. 9.
 TIMOTHY BAILEY, Oxford, Me., March 15.
 LEWIS BARROWS, Woolwich, Me., April 4.
 CHARLES P. BARTLETT, Friendship, Me., April.
 E. G. BLOUNT, French Creek, Jefferson Co., N. Y., Feb. 14.
 B. F. BOLCOM, Campbell, N. Y., March 9.
 JAMES FULLER BROWN, Gainsville, Ala., March.
 WILLIAM T. BUNKER, Lockport, Pa., Mar. 1.
 J. M. BURTT, Newfane, Niagara Co., N. Y., March 14.
 WILLIAM CURTIS, Columbia, S. C.
 ALBERT E. DENISON, Saybrook, Conn., April 19.
 B. P. DRAKE, Fayette Co., Ky., Dec. 24.
 RUFUS DUBBY, Geneva, N. Y., Feb. 9.
 WILLIAM J. DURGIN, Islesboro', Me., Mar. 8.
 GEORGE G. EXALL, Northampton, Va., March 19.
 JAMES FRENCH, Lima, Allen Co., O., March 15.
 DANIEL McGEOR, New-York, N. Y., April 9.
 LUCIUS H. GIBBS, Poughkeepsie, N. Y., Feb. 16.
 LEWIS GRANGER, Shelbyville, Ky., March 16.
 ISSACHAR GRASSCUP, Bristol, Ontario Co., N. Y., March 12.
 JAMES HALL, Jackson, Mich., March 8.
 WILLIAM M. JESSEE, Andrian Co., Mo., July 31.
 A. J. JOSLYN, Warrenville, Ill., Nov. 3.
 LEWIS LAWTON, Otsetic, Chenango Co., N. Y., March 9.
 DAVID LOGAN, Piermont, Rockland Co., N. Y., Feb. 16.
 ABNER MASON, Dunbarton, N. H., March 22.
 WILLIAM MILLER, Newburg, Me., March 16.
 RICHARD MORRIS, Freedom, Cataraugus Co., N. Y., March 16.
 CHARLES R. NICHOLS, Canaan, N. H., Jan. 19.
 JONAS PALMITER, Yorkshire, Cataraugus Co., N. Y., Jan. 31.

JOHN B. PARRIS, Carver, Mass., March 1.
 JESSE M. PERRY, Buffalo, Fairfield District, S. C., Feb. 26.
 WILLIAM G. RAYMOND, Wheeler, Tioga Co., N. Y., Feb. 27.
 HUMPHREY RICHARDS, Springfield, Mass., May 10.
 GEORGE SAPP, Cleridont Co., O., March 25.
 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN SHAW, China, Me., March 16.
 DEAN W. SMITH, Peterboro', Madison Co., N. Y., March 9.
 SAMUEL W. STEEL, Plymouth, Mich., Jan. 6.
 WILLIAM STORRS, Cherry Valley, Otsego Co., N. Y., March 8.
 L. S. TRIPP, Cape Neddock, York, Me., May 17.
 SAMUEL S. WYMAN, Peru, Me., March 15.
 EPHRAIM WARD, Raynham, Mass., Feb. 22.
 CHAUNCEY WARDNER, Rushford, Alleghany Co., N. Y., March 30.
 STEPHEN WATKINS, Milton, Wayne Co., O., March 1.
 HENRY G. WESTON, Frankfort, Ky., May 4.
 NILES WHITING, Avon, Conn., Jan. 25.

CHURCHES CONSTITUTED.

Salem, Columbia Co., O., Dec.
 Union River, Me., Jan. 4.
 Knoxville, Tenn., Jan. 22.
 George's Road, Middlesex Co., N. J., Jan. 25.
 Ingham, Ingham Co., Mich., Jan. 25.
 Will's Chapel, Isle of Wight Co., Va., Jan. 29.
 Yorkshire, Cataraugus Co., N. Y., Jan. 31.
 Vienna, Ontario Co., N. Y., Jan. 31.
 2d chh., Palmyra, Me., Feb. 3.
 Spring Arbor, Jackson Co., Mich., Feb. 4.
 Lancaster, O., Feb. 10.
 French Creek, Jefferson Co., N. Y., Feb. 14.
 Oneida Castle, Oneida Co., N. Y., Feb. 14.
 Beakleyville, Monroe Co., Pa., Feb. 15.
 Hartland, Me., Feb. 17.
 Brandywine, Pa., Feb. 21.
 South Danvers, Mass., Feb. 22.
 Long Island Harbor, Me., Feb. 23.
 Mohecanville, Wayne Co., O., Feb. 28.
 Troy, Walworth Co., Wis. Ter.
 Waterloo, Ala.
 Jackson, Franklin Co., O., March 4.
 Freedom, Cataraugus Co., N. Y., March 7.
 Herrick, Bradford Co., Pa., March 8.
 North Bap. chh., Sedgwick, Me., March 8.
 Redhook, Dutchess Co., N. Y., March 14.
 Canaan Centre, Wayne Co., O., March 16.
 Groton, Conn., March 16.
 Johnstown, Barry Co., Mich., March 23.
 Solesbury, Bucks Co., N. J., March 26.
 8th Avenue, New-York, N. Y.
 Pioneer Chapel, Henrico Co., Va.
 Noank (Groton), Conn., April 6.
 South Valley, Otsego Co., N. Y., April 18.

DEDICATIONS.

Indian Creek, Ill., Dec. 8.
 Wentworth St., Charleston, S. C., Dec. 30.
 Malden, Mass., Feb. 22.
 St. Louis, African chh., Feb. 15.
 Holland, Erie Co., N. Y., March 2.
 Muncy, Pa., March 14.
 Brooklyn, Mich., April 7.